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1.0  ABSTRACT 
 
 
Mental health professionals regularly make judgements about the plausibility of 
others’ belief claims and have the socially sanctioned power to label a belief as 
delusional. However, little is known about how these judgements are made and 
the little research that exists suggests that they may be susceptible to a range 
of influences. There is also relatively little research exploring how the general 
public judge the plausibility of belief claims despite their judgements influencing 
who accesses professional help. As those who train as mental health 
professionals come from the general public, as a first step to better 
understanding professionals’ judgements about belief plausibility, it seemed 
reasonable that this study explored influences on the general populations’ 
judgements. In contrast to traditional quantitative approaches which require a 
priori assumptions about the investigated constructs, a Q-methodology 
approach was adopted as it is designed to explore numerous available 
accounts on a particular topic. Conspiratorial beliefs were also chosen as it is 
likely that a general population sample will have encountered them and they 
also share certain features of the rarer unusual beliefs encountered in mental 
health services. The author conducted two Q-sorts; the first was designed to 
better understand how participants conceptualised conspiracy beliefs, whilst the 
second involved an exploration of the factors that might influence plausibility 
judgements. An online Q-methodology programme was used and 57 
participants were recruited via opportunity sampling. The data was analysed 
using PQMethod (Schmolck, 2002). Analysis of Q-sort 1 extracted five different 
factors, or viewpoints, for conceptualising conspiracy beliefs whilst Q-sort 2 
extracted four accounts describing which aspects of a belief or believer made it 
less credible. The areas of commonality and difference between these factors 
was discussed with reference to the relevant literature for both conspiracy and 
delusional beliefs. The study was also critically reviewed and wider implications 
discussed. 
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2.0. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
2.1. Thesis Overview  
 
Mental health professionals regularly make decisions about the 
plausibility of belief claims and yet little is known about which factors may 
influence their decision-making processes. By recruiting from the general 
population, this thesis will explore which factors may affect judgements of 
plausibility using Q-methodology. This is a useful exploratory method for 
investigating areas that are not well understood and when there are few a priori 
assumptions.  
Within this chapter, the author will initially consider the clinical relevance 
of this issue by discussing how beliefs are judged to be delusional. This will 
include a consideration of how delusions are currently understood, and previous 
research which has explored how mental health professionals and members of 
the general public evaluate the credibility of belief claims. The author will then 
consider this more specifically by focussing on conspiracy beliefs, as conspiracy 
beliefs share a number of features with delusional beliefs and so provide a non-
clinical analogy. This will again be discussed within the context of how 
conspiratorial beliefs are understood and which factors may influence 
judgements of their plausibility. To begin, however, the author will briefly 
introduce the overall aims of this study.  
 
2.2. Chapter Introduction  
 
Unusual beliefs, or delusions, feature as part of the diagnostic criteria for 
all main psychotic disorders and have traditionally been regarded as one of the 
most important symptoms for diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994; Bortolotti, 2009; World Health Organisation, 1992). How a belief is 
understood to be delusional, however, and how it is differentiated from other 
types of belief claims has become one of the most elusive problems in 
psychology (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015). Though there are numerous different 
attempts to conceptualise delusions, the most widely held and conformed to 
conceptualisation within clinical practice is derived from the American 
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Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013). The most current version of this definition 
is found in the glossary of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual-5 (DSM-5) as 
follows:  
 
A false personal belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof to the 
contrary.  The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of 
the person's culture or sub-culture (i.e. it is not an article of religious 
faith). When a false belief involves a value judgement, it is regarded as a 
delusion only when the judgement is so extreme as to defy credibility 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013: 819). 
 
Based on this understanding, Georgaca (2004) argues that there are four 
key features that would suggest that a belief is delusional. These include: a) 
implausibility (i.e., the belief is considered to be false or unlikely); b) the belief is 
idiosyncratic (i.e., it is not acknowledged by members’ of the believers’ social 
group); c) the belief is held with conviction (i.e., it is believed with absolute 
certainty) and d) the belief is incorrigible (i.e., it will not be revised despite dis-
confirmatory evidence). Of these four characteristics, Georgaca (2004) 
suggested that implausibility is the most important criterion due to its equation 
with falsity, and the predominant understanding of delusions within the 
psychiatric literature is that they are ‘false beliefs’. 
Judgements of the plausibility of others belief claims are not only made 
by mental health professionals, but also by members of the general population. 
Such judgements can have significant consequences for a believer, such as 
within societal, clinical or even legal contexts. Despite some important 
exceptions (Boyle, 2002; McCabe, Leudar & Antaki, 2004; May, 2012), 
however, very little research has examined the specific processes that 
determine how some belief claims come to be seen as ‘unusual’ or ‘delusional’. 
The overall aim of this thesis is thus to explore which factors influence how 
members of the general public judge the plausibility of belief claims. The author 
has chosen to recruit members of the general public as they make constant 
decisions about the plausibility of others’ belief claims and thus have a 
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significant impact on who is referred to services. It can also be argued that 
mental health professionals are a subpopulation of this general population.  
Moreover, whilst previous research has typically focussed on examining 
the beliefs of clinical populations, a wealth of research (discussed below) 
suggests that delusional beliefs are not extreme and rare, but nuanced and 
relatively common within the general population. Despite this, the author will 
focus specifically on conspiracy beliefs as they share numerous features with 
delusional beliefs, but are a type of unusual belief that the general public will be 
more familiar with. The author hopes that using conspiracy beliefs will provide a 
better understanding of the factors that are important when members of the 
general public judge the plausibility of unusual beliefs. This would help 
determine whether the criteria outlined within the DSM-5 for diagnosing 
delusions matches the criteria used by the general population, or whether some 
criteria are missed or others are redundant. 
The author conducted a narrative review rather than doing a systematic 
review as the issues addressed in this study (e.g., plausibility of delusional or 
conspiratorial beliefs) have been studied in very different ways by researchers 
in different fields using different constructs, and so the author needed to draw 
upon different literatures and concepts. A narrative review is helpful when 
research areas are not well established, the search parameters are unclear and 
when specific search terms may not identify relevant papers. The author does 
acknowledge, however, that by conducting a narrative review, the review might 
have been influenced by the authors preconceptions and so relevant research 
may have been missed, though the author tried to circumvent this by following 
recommendations for conducting a narrative, outlined by Slavin (1995). 
 
 
2.3. The Continuum Perspective of Delusions  
 
Delusional beliefs have long been considered an exclusive feature of 
more severe psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia. The common 
assumption within the psychiatric literature and theory of delusions is that they 
are 'abnormal' in some way (Harper, 2004, 2011b). It has been proposed, 
however, that there are two problems with this idea.  
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Firstly, studies regularly find that members of the ‘normal’ population 
score highly on measures of apparently ‘abnormal’ beliefs (Harper, 2004, 
2011b). Whilst prevalence estimates are likely to vary in accordance with the 
content of a delusion and the criteria used for assessment, studies of the 
general population estimate that approximately 1-3% of people have beliefs that 
would be considered delusional with a severity equivalent to clinical cases of 
psychosis. A further 5-6% are also estimated to have delusional ideation but of 
slightly less severity (Freeman, 2006). Another general population survey of the 
UK also demonstrated that seemingly ‘unusual’ beliefs are actually relatively 
common, with 45% of people believing in telepathy, 45% believing that it is 
possible to predict the future and 31% believing in ghosts (Social 
Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd, 1995).  
Secondly, studies have found it difficult to discriminate between 'normal' 
and 'deluded' people on delusion-type measures (Harper, 2004, 2011b). The 
Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI) (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999a), for 
example, has been used to demonstrate nuance in beliefs considered to be 
unusual. The PDI is a self-reported questionnaire which contains questions 
about beliefs extracted from lists of psychiatric symptoms, but psychiatric terms 
are replaced with everyday language, e.g., ‘do you ever feel that you are a very 
special or unusual person?’ Participant’s responses to these questions are 
measured in terms of the conviction with which they held the belief, the distress 
related to the belief, and the individual’s preoccupation with the belief.  
In one study, Peters et al. (1999a) used the PDI to compare inpatients 
with a diagnosis of psychosis to members of the general population. They found 
that the inpatient sample had higher scores on the PDI, but that the range of 
scores of the general population and the inpatients samples overlapped, with 
some individuals from the former sample scoring higher than the latter. This 
finding was also replicated with a larger sample (Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 
2004), with 11% of the general population sample scoring higher than the 
average of the inpatient sample. Both studies thus demonstrated that the PDI 
could not effectively differentiate between inpatients with a diagnosis of 
psychosis and certain members of the general population. However, the 
inpatients could be differentiated from the general population in terms of being 
more preoccupied and distressed by their beliefs, and holding their beliefs with 
more conviction.  
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Similarly, Peters, Joseph and Garety (1999b) used the PDI to compare 
the scores of inpatients with a psychotic diagnosis to two control groups (non-
religious people and Christians), but also to members of two New Religious 
Movements (NRMs; Druids and Hare Krishna’s). The researchers included the 
NRMs to create an analogous context where people held unusual beliefs but 
still functioned within society. They found that members of the NRMs had 
significantly higher scores than control groups on all measures of delusions 
besides distress. There was no difference between members of the NRMs and 
the inpatient sample in the quantity or strength with which beliefs were held but 
the inpatients showed significantly more distress and preoccupation with their 
beliefs. These studies thus suggest that the unusual content, conviction or 
number of beliefs held is not necessarily problematic, but difficulties are largely 
determined by the relationship people have with their beliefs and how much 
they interfere with their lives (Scharfetter, 1980).  
Such studies thus suggest that sharply differentiating between beliefs as 
either pathological or normal would be an over-simplification. Some have 
argued that delusions may be better understood as situated along a continuum 
(e.g., Freeman, 2006; Johns, 2005; Peters et al., 1999a), where the delusions 
seen in psychosis exemplify the severe end of the spectrum, and their presence 
within the general population reflects an attenuated form. For example, 
Freeman (2006) indicated that suspicious thoughts exist upon a continuous 
distribution, and so ones belief that the government is plotting to kill them could 
be located on the same continuum as another’s suspicion that a neighbour is 
persecuting them. Freeman et al. (2005) also suggest that the most common 
and least severe belief type (30-40% of respondents) relate to more social 
anxieties or interpersonal worries. The most severe belief types expanded upon 
these milder ideas and were related to ideas of reference (e.g., thoughts about 
others trying to inflict harm upon them, and conspiracies known to the general 
public). They also found associations between holding more severe paranoid 
beliefs and individuals who felt excluded, inferior or marginalised within society. 
 
2.3.1. The Relation to Meaning  
This continuum approach to understanding delusional beliefs also 
supports the wealth of research which suggests that delusions make sense 
when considered within peoples’ social reality. Historically, the influence of 
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biological or psychiatric theories of delusions has meant that there has been 
more interest in whether someone has a delusional belief than the content of 
the belief (Harper, 2011a). Within these frameworks, delusions were seen as 
symptoms of illnesses such as schizophrenia, and thus ‘empty speech acts’, 
with no connection to anything regarding the individual or their world (Berrios, 
1991). It was thus considered that discussing delusional beliefs meant that the 
clinician was ‘colluding’ with the individual (McCabe & Priebe, 2008). 
Other attempts to understand delusions include cognitive theories, which 
link delusions to factors such as reasoning biases, certain thinking styles, 
negative self-beliefs, and difficulties inferring the intentions of others (e.g., 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002; Freeman & Garety, 
2014; Garety & Freeman, 1999). Kinderman and Bentall (1997), for example, 
compared the causal explanations for positive and negative hypothetical social 
events between a non-patient sample and ‘paranoid’ patients. They found that 
the former group were more likely to attribute adverse events to situational or 
external circumstances whilst the latter group were more likely to locate the 
blame in other individuals. This could be seen to indicate an attribution or 
reasoning bias in the group considered to be ‘paranoid’. Alternatively, it could 
be argued that making ‘other-blaming’ attributions for negative events is an 
adaptive function of hierarchical societies, which is systematically employed by 
dominant groups to disrepute subordinate groups (Boyle, 2002).  
This fits with other recent research which has focussed on the meaning 
underlying delusional beliefs. One study showed that individuals who had a 
diagnosis of psychosis scored as high on a measure of the meaning and 
purpose of life as individuals training to be Anglican priests, and higher than 
controls. Before developing their beliefs, many reported feeling lonely, inferior 
and purposeless (Roberts, 1991). Other research has found connections 
between the themes in an individual’s delusional beliefs and their current or 
previous everyday lives (Rhodes & Jakes, 2000). Mirowsky and Ross (1983), 
for example, demonstrated correlations between paranoid beliefs, victimisation 
and social inequality. In a population survey of Mexico and Texas, they found 
that the individuals who had the most paranoid beliefs were the working class 
Mexican women, who were also considered to have the least social power and 
at greater risk of exploitation. It could thus be argued that a paranoid worldview 
would protect this group of women who are continuously exposed to threat as a 
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result of their social position. It thus also highlights the importance of 
considering the biographical context of an individual’s belief and whether it 
relates to adverse experiences.  
A similar explanation may apply to the heightened rates of psychosis in 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) populations within the UK and their 
experience of racism. For example, within the UK, individuals from BAME 
populations are 50% more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia than their 
white peers (King, Coker, Leavey, Hoare & Johnson-Sabine, 1994), especially 
when living in predominately white areas (Boydell et al., 2001), or when they 
reported experiencing racism within the last year (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002). The 
idea that black people have more paranoid beliefs was first introduced by Grier 
and Cobbs (1968) with the concept of “healthy cultural paranoia”. They 
explained that paranoid beliefs and behaviour do not reflect psychopathology, 
but are a normal and adaptive response to historical and current experiences of 
discrimination and social oppression. Such research thus suggests that what we 
call delusions may actually be an adaptive response to someone’s social 
circumstances.  
Freeman et al. (2005) thus suggest that wariness about the intentions of 
others is adaptive in many situations, though such thoughts may become 
problematic if they become excessive, are unfounded, or causes distress. In 
line with this, Cromby and Harper (2009) propose a social constructionist 
perspective of paranoia and postulate that paranoia should be viewed as a type 
of story embodied within individuals, which reflects their different life 
experiences. They suggest that psychiatry’s focus on the falsity of delusional 
beliefs has meant that they have often overlooked the idea that many beliefs 
are metaphorically true and reflect numerous adverse experiences, including 
those that result from social inequalities and the impact it has on an individual’s 
life. 
Such research has important conceptual and clinical implications for 
diagnosing delusions and the lack of focus on causal and contributory social 
injustices has serious ethical implications (Kvaale, Gottdeiner & Haslam, 2013; 
Scrutton 2015a; Scrutton 2015b). This is particularly important as many people 
who have ‘delusional’ beliefs feel that they are normal, meaningful (not medical) 
experiences and do not feel that they require professional help (e.g., Gunn & 
Bortolotti, 2018; Weeks & James, 1997). Researching the topic of eccentricity, 
14 
 
Harper (2011a) identified numerous people who remain content and functioning 
in everyday life despite holding unusual beliefs; such as Sun Ra, a prolific 
recording artist who claimed to be an alien from Saturn, and David Icke, who is 
a well-published author who regularly makes conspiratorial claims. 
So far in this chapter, the author has discussed evidence that suggests 
that delusional beliefs are not unusual, pathological or ‘abnormal’ experiences 
of clinical populations, but exist along a continuum within the general 
population. The author has also discussed research that suggests that 
delusional beliefs are more than just a ‘symptom’ of an illness but are a 
response to real events in a person’s social world. It is thus the context of 
beliefs and their ‘fit’ with a person’s life that may determine whether they 
become problematic. Despite this research, however, it is not clear how a belief 
comes to be considered delusional and why some beliefs are less acceptable 
than others. It is also not clear how implausible a belief needs to be before it is 
considered delusional, or whether the mere presence of an implausible belief is 
enough. This thus leads to questions about who is given the power to decide 
that a belief is ‘unusual’ and how these claims are legitimised. In consideration 
of these questions, the author will next consider how judgements of plausibility 
are made within the diagnostic process.   
 
2.4. Assessing Plausibility and the Diagnostic Process  
 
2.4.1. Judgments of Plausibility from Members of the General Population  
Prior to seeing a psychiatrist, the plausibility of an individual’s beliefs will 
have already been questioned by those around them, and thus a decision made 
that the individual needs to see a professional (Coulter, 1973). Coulter (1973) 
alleges that a psychiatrist only confirms evaluations that have already been 
made by the people around an individual. This is likely to be the individuals’ 
family, but may also come from others (e.g., strangers in the street). A 
diagnosis could thus be seen as medical classification of a pre-existing, 
normative social judgement (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014). In a society without 
psychiatrists, diagnosis might not come but judgement of the belief, and 
concern about that individual’s mental health would still exist (Westermeyer & 
Kroll, 1978). 
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Relatively little research has explored why the hearers of others’ 
seemingly delusional belief claims judge them to be implausible, with it often 
just assumed that this is self-evident (Harper, 2014). Of the little research that 
exists, Lemert (1962, 1967) focused on the interactional context, observing that 
the typical response to paranoid belief claims is avoidance and what eventually 
leads to psychiatric intervention is not the content of the beliefs, but the 
persistence and insistence with which they are presented. Lemert (1967) 
suggested that an intervention becomes unavoidable when the individual takes 
extreme actions, such as by contacting legal authorities or government 
departments, or by accessing other formal complaints procedures. Once this 
stage is reached, the believer’s social system can no longer ignore or 
deliberately misinterpret their beliefs and actions. Rogers & Pilgrim (2014) thus 
suggest that identifying deviance and doing something about it are separate 
processes, but as Lemert (1967) suggests, at some point the behaviour can no 
longer be ignored. 
Similarly, other research suggests that beliefs may be considered less 
plausible when the behaviour of the individual begins to violate social norms 
(Cohen et al., 2016). Other research suggests that a belief may be questioned 
due to factors such as how the believer communicates their claims (McCabe et 
al., 2004), or not recognising that the hearer of their beliefs may perceive them 
as unusual and therefore not moderating how or how much they are discussed 
(Georgaca, 2004; McCabe, 2004).  Looking at evidence in the courtroom, 
Bennett and Feldman (2014) suggest that regardless of the truth, judgements of 
plausibility are affected by how the story is told. This includes factors such as 
the frequency of ambiguities, the overall completeness of the story and the 
adequacy of story connections. The more ambiguities, the more variation there 
will be in how members of the audience interpret the story.  
Furthermore, there is suggestion that judgements of plausibility are 
determined by the cultural assumptions and worldview of the hearer, as well as 
their readiness to make sense of an account (Bennett, 1997). Ingleby (1982) 
also suggested that whether the actions of another person are considered to 
make sense may depend on how ‘charitably inclined’ the hearer is towards the 
individual. The research thus suggests a range of acceptance for what is 
tolerated and numerous factors that may influence decision-making. It is also 
apparent that it is not just mental health professionals who make decisions 
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about the plausibility of others beliefs, and that these decisions occur within 
social contexts.  
However, what is or is not tolerated, what combination of factors may 
make belief claims less persuasive and what eventually causes people to come 
into contact with services is still not well known. The extent to which the criteria 
outlined in the DSM-5 corresponds to the criteria used by the general population 
for judging the plausibility of beliefs is also unclear. It may be that the public 
place greater weight on certain criteria over others. Gaining a better 
understanding of this can help to understand who presents at mental health 
services, who does not and why. The author will next discuss some of the 
limitations that may occur when assessing the plausibility of belief claims of the 
individuals who do access services.  
 
2.4.2. The Diagnostic Interview  
A belief is not fundamentally unusual but is considered to be so during an 
interaction with another (Heise, 1988). Within the psychiatric interview, the 
structure is such that one member of the interaction (the professional) has the 
socially legitimised power to define reality and thereby determine whether the 
beliefs of the other member (the service-user) are implausible. Dimensions of 
the belief, such as how preoccupied the individual is with the belief, and the 
distress and conviction with which it is held are assessed through an interaction 
with the professional and so cannot be conceptualised as just inherent, 
measurable qualities of an individual’s belief (Boyle, 2002; Georgaca, 2000). 
From a social constructionist position, therefore, Heise (1988) argues that within 
the diagnostic interview, a belief becomes delusional when a mental health 
professional deems it so, and thus the professional’s version of reality has been 
constructed to be truer than the speaker’s (Heise, 1988). Heise (1988) thus 
suggests that the same belief could potentially be judged as delusional or non-
delusional depending on the social conditions of the believer, as truth varies 
across social groups.  
 
2.4.2.1. Reliability, validity and a lack of conceptual consistency within the 
diagnostic interview  
The DSM-5 and thus the criteria for diagnosis on which the diagnostic 
interview is based has faced considerable scrutiny for issues of reliability, 
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validity, co-morbidity and heterogeneity (e.g., Bentall, 2004; Kirk & Kutchins, 
1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1999; Rogers & Pilgim, 2003). A detailed discussion of 
this is beyond the scope of this thesis, but an increasing acknowledgment of the 
empirical and conceptual limitations of the existing ways of understanding 
delusional beliefs has called into question the existing process of identifying 
them (Boyle, 2002; David, 1999; Gipps & Fulford, 2004; Harper, 1996, 2004; 
Maher, 2001; Spitzer, 1990). 
One of the basic problems with the diagnostic process is one of naïve 
realism and thus the assumption that beliefs are straight-forwardly empirically 
verifiable, whereby it is possible to verify the falsity of a person’s belief. For 
example, within psychiatric and psychological practice, delusions are often 
treated as something that exist separately from the individuals making 
judgements and the individuals making belief claims (Fernando, 1997). Based 
on the rational and empiricist paradigms that inform modern science and thus 
the psychiatric literature (and diagnostic interview), there is an assumption that 
there exists an external reality. This reality can be perceived and understood 
through universal innate perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. Based on these 
assumptions, therefore, implausibility is thought to reflect difficulty with 
corresponding to this external reality (Gergen, 1985), which arises from bias or 
fault in an individual’s innate mechanisms. The diagnostic interview thus rests 
on the premise that beliefs can be judged against an external reality and that 
these biased or faulty internal mechanisms can be analysed by scrutinising an 
individual’s thought processes which can be clearly expressed through speech 
(Gillett, 1994; Harper, 1996).   
Moreover, within the diagnostic interview, the onus is generally on the 
believer to present evidence to support their belief claims. However, most 
beliefs cannot be directly proven or investigated (Harper, 2011b), especially 
within the interview process. This means that most people are diagnosed as 
delusional without independent empirical investigation, except perhaps on 
occasion when there is discussion with family members (Georgaca, 2004), or 
when CBT practitioners design behavioural experiments to test delusional 
beliefs (Chadwick & Lowe, 1994). Nonetheless, most evidence suggests that 
mental health professionals rarely present counterevidence to the believer 
(Maher, 1992). This is despite researchers often reporting examples where 
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beliefs judged to be delusional have actually been true, or at least hold an 
element of truth (Barrett, 1988).  
It has also been observed that when assessing the plausibility of beliefs, 
mental health professionals usually judge this on the basis of ‘common-sense’ 
(Maher, 1992). This is supported by evidence which suggests that diagnosers 
demonstrate significant flexibility in the criteria they use to interpret delusions 
(Harper, 1994, 1999; Rosenham, 1973). In a study examining how psychiatrists 
decide whether individuals have paranoid delusions, for example, Harper (1999) 
argued that professionals used rhetorical resources, rather than objective 
criteria. This was found to vary between patients, and was suggested to be 
influenced by factors such as their physical characteristics, social status, gender 
and emotional state. Diagnosing a delusion based more on individual 
judgement than empirical investigation would thus mean that different 
professionals may reach different conclusions, which poses a significant threat 
to the validity and reliability of the process. Zangrilli, Ducci, Bandinelli, Dooley, 
McCabe and Priebe (2014) also studied the first meeting between psychiatrists 
and inpatients who have seemingly delusional beliefs. They found that 
psychiatrists generally used three approaches to assess patients’ delusions, 
which included eliciting the content of the beliefs, understanding the impact of 
the beliefs and questioning the beliefs validity, though the latter approach was 
used much less frequently.  
Studies have also shown problems with reliability and validity when using 
standardised measures (based on the DSM-5 understanding of delusions). Bell, 
Halligan and Ellis (2006) reviewed the reliability of diagnosing delusions when 
using structured interview schedules and standardized instrument methods. 
Whilst they found an acceptable level of inter-rater reliability, this was only 
attained through the use of structured interviews. Such interviews are 
suggested to be much more reliable than the unstructured interviews that are 
most commonly used in everyday practice. Moreover, a subcategory of 
delusions (‘bizarre delusions’) showed poor reliability even with the structured 
interview, suggesting little clinical validity. A second study found low accuracy, 
reliability and validity of for certain diagnoses and secondary diagnoses when 
clinicians conducted unstructured clinical examinations in acute psychiatric 
wards (Zander, Wyder, Holtforth, Schnyder, Hepp & Stulz, 2018). 
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A further difficulty relates to the notion that the violation of epistemic 
irrationality is a key component of what makes a belief delusional, and yet not 
all instances of irrationality can be considered to be delusional (Sanati & 
Kyratsous, 2015). Moreover, the current understanding of delusions within the 
DSM-5 does not offer clear criteria for differentiating delusions from other false 
or unjustified beliefs which may satisfy the criteria of a delusion. These may 
include self-deceptive beliefs or pathologies involving cognitive impairments 
where beliefs deviate from reality (e.g., the beliefs of an individual with Capgras 
syndrome) (Bortolotti, 2018). However, the diagnostic interview process rests 
on the assumption that delusional beliefs can be easily demarcated from other 
types of belief (Sanati & Kyratsous, 2015).  
Overall, this research suggests that there are significant challenges to 
the validity, reliability and conceptual consistency of the diagnostic criteria for 
delusions. Such difficulties have been suggested to reflect the contextually 
dependent and multidimensional nature of a delusion (Gilleen & David, 2005). It 
also potentially reflects a lack of homogeneity within the concept, and so most 
of the proposed criteria for delusions do not apply to all delusions. For example, 
a belief may be unfounded but not held with strong conviction, or implausible 
but shared by others (Freeman, 2006).  
This has led some to propose that instead of trying to create a fixed 
definition of delusions, there are certain ‘defining characteristics’ (such as the 
conviction with which the belief is held and how preoccupying it is) by which 
delusions can be recognised. Oltmann (1998), for example, postulates that 
determining whether a belief is delusional may be best achieved by considering 
a series of characteristics, where none of them alone are sufficient, but 
increasing endorsement brings greater agreement. For example, if a belief is 
characterised by implausibility, resistance to change, is distressing or 
unfounded, not held by others, preoccupying and held with strong conviction, 
the more likely it is to be considered delusional. This fits with a dimensional 
view of delusions which suggests that delusions are not distinct entities but are 
multidimensional and complex. This suggests the need for diagnosers to be 
flexible in the use and interpretation of the current criteria (Harper, 1994). The 
author will next consider how this process may also be influenced by cultural 
differences.  
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2.4.2.2. Assessing delusions and culture  
The increasing evidence which suggests that delusions are not concrete, 
measurable entities which exist separately from an individual and their context 
has led to an increasing awareness of the importance of context. This has been 
mirrored by the evolution of the DSM over time, which has demonstrated 
increasing consideration of the importance of cultural factors when assessing 
beliefs. Whilst the DSM-III made no mention of culture at all, the DSM-III-
Revised briefly introduced the idea (Rogler, 1993), and the DSM-IV clearly 
stated that culture should be considered. The current APA (2013) definition of 
delusions in the DSM-5 asserts that a belief cannot be delusional if it is 
“ordinarily accepted by other members of the individual’s culture or subculture 
(e.g., it is not an article of religious faith)”. This definition thus encourages the 
consideration of culture during the assessment of delusions, and acknowledges 
religion as a subculture which should be exempt from pathology. 
However, despite this attention to the cultural context of beliefs, this has 
not led to any significant change in how delusions are thought about in Western 
society. There is also little to answer the question of how to conceptualise 
culture when assessing beliefs. O’Connor and Vandenberg (2005), for example, 
argue that according to the DSM-5 definition, if a belief is thought to be cultural 
or religious, it is exempt from the criteria. Thus, even if one considers a belief to 
be delusional in content and form, and regardless of the consequences of 
holding such belief, it is not labelled as delusional if it is also held by other 
members of a culture or religion. This may cause uncertainty for mental health 
professionals who cannot know or understand the norms of all religions and 
cultures. Moreover, the context and situation-specific details of the belief is 
important. For example, some beliefs may be praised as mystical powers in one 
culture but perceived as a sign of madness in another, and so interpreted 
positively in one context but negatively in another (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014).  
The details and understanding of all these contexts are unlikely to be accessible 
to all mental health professionals, thus highlighting the need for further 
clarification, exploration and research into this area (Boyle, 1997).  
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2.4.3 Implicit Biases within the Diagnostic Interview 
2.4.3.1. Social inequalities and implicit psychiatric norms 
In addition to not being aware of all of the contexts in which beliefs may 
have meaning or value, it has been argued that judgements about whether 
something is unusual or pathological may be obscured by implicit assumptions 
about those contexts and cultures. Some research suggests that social 
inequality, moderated by dominant social categories (e.g., gender, class, race 
and culture) may have two important effects on the diagnostic process.  
Firstly, it has been argued that one’s position within certain social 
categories may vary their experiences of distress. This may be seen through 
greater prevalence of specific diagnoses in certain social groups. For example, 
there are higher rates of disorders such as schizophrenia in BAME communities 
living in Western cultures (Fearon et al., 2006; Read & Dillon, 2013), and 
particularly high rates of psychotic diagnoses for young black men (Schwartz & 
Blankenship, 2014). Higher prevalence of disorders for BAME communities may 
thus potentially reflect experiences of discrimination and increased distress 
because of adversities amplified by social inequality (Parker, Georgaca, Harper, 
McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995).  
Secondly, an individual’s membership of these categories may affect 
how their distress is perceived, which may alter the way an observer 
understands their experiences and judges them (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; 
Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003). Thus, how an individual’s belief is understood and 
responded to may vary significantly, dependent on the social group of the 
believer and who is hearing the belief. Within mental health contexts, this may 
affect how professionals diagnose, treat and interact with service-users. Using 
discourse analysis to explore interviews with service-users who had been 
diagnosed as delusional, Georgaca (2000, 2004) argued that the hearer’s 
assumptions about the world had an influential impact on the interview process. 
For example, for one interviewed patient, Georgaca (2004) suggested that 
‘however well Don argues his case in interactions within the ward, he cannot but 
argue it from the institutional position of a patient’ (p. 22). Research thus 
suggests that although it is widely assumed that the diagnostic judgements of 
mental health professionals are based on universal implicit psychiatric and 
psychological norms, they are actually culturally-specific and gendered (Caplan 
& Cosgrove, 2004). Gaines (1995) referred to this cultural norm within 
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psychology and psychiatry as the ‘universal standard’, which constructs a reality 
where anything that differs from the Western Euro-American or European 
Protestant male is more likely to be seen as irrational. 
Research also suggests that mental health professionals may be 
influenced by similar negative stereotypes about individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia as members of the general public (Nordt, Rossler & Lauber, 
2006). Therefore, despite being professionally trained, those working within the 
healthcare system are also a sub-group of the general population, with their 
own cultures, biases and experiences which may influence how they evaluate 
and diagnose the beliefs of others (Coulter, 1973). This is a particular problem if 
one was to consider that when mental health professionals decide that 
another’s belief claims are delusional, they are essentially making this decision 
on behalf of the rest of the population (Harper, 2011). If they were to differ from 
the general population in some way, the implicit standards against which the 
speaker of the belief are judged would differ from the overall population. 
Differences between mental health professionals and the general population 
have been observed, such as in the case of religious beliefs. In a survey by 
Delaney, Miller and Bisonó (2013), for example, psychologists were found to be 
significantly less religious than service-users, and so the implicit criteria of this 
group of professionals cannot be assumed to be representative of the general 
population. As research suggests that mental health professionals may be less 
religious than the general population (an issue coined the ‘religiosity gap’), this 
may make them more prone to interpreting religious beliefs as pathological 
(Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1992).  
These two lines of argument thus suggests that judgements of plausibility 
are complex, relatively automatic and inextricably linked to social practices. One 
of the biggest potential dangers of the subjective and implicit nature of 
diagnosis is that the word of societal groups who lack power may be granted 
less credibility. When the hearer’s prejudices about an individual’s social identity 
causes them to deflate the level of credibility given to that persons’ word, this 
has been suggested to reflect a specific type of injustice, termed ‘testimonial 
injustice’ (Fricker, 2007). Fricker (2007) argues that this form of injustice plays 
an important role in the everyday exchange of information, as hearers regularly 
and automatically use stereotypes as heuristics to make judgements more 
quickly. Testimonial injustice would be said to occur, for example, when the 
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account of someone from a different ethnic background to the hearer is seen to 
lack credibility, and so their testimony is disregarded or given less weight. 
Testimonial injustice was also seen in the study by Georgaca (2004), where the 
claims of an individual placed in the category of ‘psychiatric patient’ were not 
seen as persuasive to others.   
Previous research has paid little attention to how the plausibility of one’s 
belief claims may be given less credibility as a result of their membership of a 
social category. However, the research that does exist supports the idea that 
biased implicit norms may lead to less tolerance for beliefs that are not 
associated with socially dominant groups (e.g., white, middle class, Western, 
Christian men). O’Connor and Vandenberg (2005), for example, showed that 
mental health professionals judged the beliefs of members of the less familiar 
Islamic religion as pathological, but not members of the more familiar Mormon 
or Catholic religions. In a second study, they also found that psychology 
undergraduate students appeared to evaluate beliefs in terms of their familiarity 
and the level of similarity to their own beliefs (O’Connor & Vandenberg, 2010). 
This research thus suggests that beliefs that are implausible to some may be 
considered plausible to others if legitimised by a socially accepted category, 
such as a religion (Coulter, 1973). Loring and Powell (1988) further 
demonstrated the value of information about social categories using a vignette 
study to look at whether the sex and race of the psychiatrist and service-user 
affected diagnosis. They found that black men were the most severely 
pathologised, and were most likely to receive a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia. They also found that both black men and women were more 
likely to be diagnosed with paranoid personality disorder than white people. 
Psychiatrists were more likely to agree on the diagnosis when no information 
about the service-users’ race or gender was available, and more likely to be 
correct when the race and sex were the same as their own. 
Overall, therefore, this research suggests that the general public and 
mental health professionals hold biases that may affect how they evaluate the 
plausibility of another’s beliefs. The injustice that people from certain social 
groups experience may not only mean that the plausibility of their beliefs is 
called into question, but that there may be less opportunity for them to explore 
and develop alternative ways of understanding their contexts. The everyday 
implications of these injustices, particularly in clinical settings, is concerning. 
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Mental health professionals have an ethical responsibility to fairly judge the 
plausibility of another’s beliefs, especially when misdiagnosis can lead to 
detrimental consequences for the individual and their wider systems. Despite 
this, very little research has attended to the impact of social factors, beliefs and 
biases that may cause a hearer to question the plausibility of a speakers 
account. The author thus aims to explore and better understand how people 
conceptualise, understand and judge the beliefs of others. To explore this, the 
author will focus specifically on conspiracy beliefs which will be discussed 
further in the following sections.  
 
2.5. Conspiracy Beliefs 
 
The author chose to further examine conspiracy beliefs within this study 
because it has been suggested that people who make conspiratorial belief 
claims may serve as a general population, non-clinical analogy for individuals 
who hold ‘delusional’ beliefs (Dagnall, Parker, Denovan & Parton, 2015) and 
thus may share some features of the rarer kinds of unusual beliefs seen in 
mental health services. For example, research suggests that delusional beliefs 
and conspiracy beliefs are both held with conviction despite lacking supporting 
evidence (Corlett, 2015), and despite overwhelming contradictory evidence 
(Dagnall et al. 2015). Evidence also suggests that they share important 
cognitive characteristics, such as ‘magical’ thinking, fear of external agencies 
and persecutory (or paranoid) claims (e.g., Brotherton & Eser, 2015). Some 
also argue that both belief types reflect a distorted view of reality which may 
pose a threat to mainstream views and values (Kay, 2011), and are thus both a 
form of ‘stigmatised knowledge’ (Barkun, 2003). 
Given the evidence to suggest the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs 
within everyday discourse (see section below), it is clear that members of the 
general population will be more familiar with and perhaps have first-hand 
experience of conspiracy beliefs. This should mean that they have a more 
concise understanding of what a conspiracy is which they may not have for the 
less familiar and concrete concept of ‘delusional belief’. This would also 
hopefully mean that their input to the study would be less hypothetical and so 
more reliable. The author also hopes that by focussing on conspiracy beliefs, 
which are an unusual but non-psychiatric belief type, this will prevent 
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participants from confusing or associating how they judge plausibility with a 
particular diagnostic or disordered understanding of beliefs.  
 
2.5.1. What is a Conspiracy Belief? 
Many discussions about conspiracy beliefs begin with disagreements 
about how they are defined or understood and thus remains a point of 
controversy (Bjerg & Presskorn-Thygesen, 2017; Smallpage, 2018). Douglas et 
al., (2019), for example, argue that whilst the term “conspiracy” represents an 
accurate series of causal events, a “conspiracy theory” describes an accusation 
of conspiracy that may or may not be accurate.  
Within the literature, a conspiracy theory is broadly understood as an 
attempt to make sense of the cause of an important social or political 
occurrence, or any circumstance which includes a secret collusion between two 
or more dominant actors (Aaronovitch, 2010; Dentith & Orr, 2017). Whilst 
typically considered to involve governments, conspiracy theories have also 
been shown to target any group considered to be powerful or malevolent 
(Douglas et al., 2019). There are thus many different types of conspiracy 
theories, including event conspiracies (e.g., concerning events such as 9/11 or 
the death of a public figure), technology conspiracies (e.g., relating to 
surveillance systems and artificial intelligence), conspiracies involving religion, 
occult and the paranormal (e.g., concerning aliens or conspiracies against 
Jewish people), and health conspiracies (e.g., the link between vaccination and 
autism, or the creation of AIDS) (Samory & Mitra, 2018). Despite such 
differences in content, Freeman and Bentall (2017) suggest that conspiracy 
theories share four underlying characteristics: 1) that an event or the world is 
not as it seems; 2) that something is covered-up by powerful others; 3) that the 
explanation of an event is only accepted by a minority; and 4) that the 
explanation is not supported by evidence. 
Conversely, within the literature, a “conspiracy belief1” is sometimes 
suggested to describe a belief in a specific conspiracy theory or series of 
theories (Douglas et al., 2019). For example, approximately half of Americans 
do not believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted independently when assassinating 
                                                          
1 For consistency within this thesis, the author will use the term “conspiracy belief” rather than alternating 
between the other variants of this term. This variant has been selected deliberately as the aim of the 
research is to focus specifically on individual belief claims.   
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John F. Kennedy (Jensen, 2013), and prior to the UK’s 2016 EU membership 
referendum, approximately 46% of individuals who intended to vote ‘leave’ 
believed that the votes would be fixed (Drochon, 2018). Based on the grounds 
of logic or scientific knowledge, research suggests that some of these beliefs 
can be considered to be theoretically plausible (e.g., accusations that secret 
services regularly breach privacy laws), whilst others are considered too “crazy” 
and thus highly implausible (e.g., flat-earth beliefs) (Sparkman, 2012). This is 
despite some conspiracy beliefs that were previously considered to be 
implausible were actually true (e.g., cases of corporate exploitation, Watergate) 
(Pipes, 1997). 
Besides some confusion in definition, research also suggests that there 
may be a relatively stable predisposition towards “conspiracy thinking,” or a 
“conspiratorial mind-set” (e.g., Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Uscinski 
& Parent, 2014). Despite differing widely in content, therefore, some research 
suggests that conspiracy beliefs may have similar and predictable psychological 
processes (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). This idea is generally derived from 
research which suggests that the best predictor of believing in a conspiracy is 
believing in another (Lewandowski, Oberauer & Gignac, 2013; Sutton & 
Douglas, 2014). This holds even if the beliefs are unrelated (Wood, Douglas, & 
Sutton, 2012) or if they are mutually incompatible (e.g., believing that Princess 
Diana was murdered, as well as believing that her death was staged) (Wood et 
al., 2012). This may suggest that the propensity to believe in conspiracies may 
be reinforced by beliefs that support conspiratorial thinking in general. This may 
include a belief in cover-ups (Wood et al., 2012), prejudice against unpopular 
dominant groups and suspicion around official accounts (Wood et al., 2012; 
Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018), or other intra-psychic cognitive biases and heuristics 
(e.g., Brotherton, 2015).  
Finally, there is also some ambiguity over the term “conspiracy theorist” 
which is used both colloquially and within the research literature. To some, this 
term refers to an individual who has a strong belief in a specific conspiracy or a 
general propensity towards conspiracy thinking. It is also sometimes used to 
reference authors who write about or strongly advocate for certain conspiratorial 
beliefs (e.g., David Icke or David Irving).  
It is thus important to clearly explain what is meant when referring to a 
“conspiracy belief” or other variants of this term, particularly as evidence 
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suggests that such terms receive very mixed receptions, with some attracted to 
them and others repelled by them (Wood, 2016). Due to their association with 
irrationality, it has also been argued that labelling someone as a conspiracy 
theorist or their belief as conspiratorial is a strategy used to disqualify their 
argument, delegitimize them or exclude them from public debate (Harambam & 
Aupers, 2017; Orr & Husting, 2018). It has, for example, been suggested that 
some politicians may accuse a critic of being conspiratorial to deflect criticism 
back onto them (Coady, 2006; Hall & Hewitt, 1970).  
Such evidence thus suggests that the term conspiracy belief may be 
used as a stigmatising label to undermine and thus call into question the 
plausibility of another’s belief claim. Moreover, the ambiguity around how a 
conspiracy belief is understood, the broad range of content, and the variance in 
the theoretical possibility of these beliefs being true suggests implications for 
how each hearer understands and responds to these belief claims. Moving on 
from trying to understand what a conspiracy belief may mean to different 
people, the author will now consider the prevalence and some of the underlying 
features behind conspiracy beliefs.  
 
2.5.2. Prevalence and Socio-psychological Characteristics of Conspiracy 
Believers 
Whilst conspiracy beliefs were historically considered to be pathological 
(Hofstadter, 1966), increasing evidence suggests that they are common (Oliver 
& Wood, 2014; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). In a 2011 survey of 1,935 
individuals in the USA, Oliver and Wood (2014) found that almost the entire 
sample had heard of at least one conspiratorial belief, over 55% of people 
believed in at least one, and of those, only half endorsed just one. The 
prevalence and impact of conspiracy beliefs within society was further 
demonstrated when Donald Trump was elected as President of the USA despite 
promulgating an array of implausible conspiratorial beliefs claims during his 
campaign. His claims included that Barack Obama was not an American citizen 
and that climate change was a lie spread by the Chinese government (van 
Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). More recently than that, however, was the 2019 
global pandemic of covid-19. A YouGov survey revealed that approximately 
25% of those surveyed in the UK believed that covid-19 originated in a 
laboratory in China (Prescott-Smith, 2020), thus showing the prevalence of 
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conspiracy beliefs within everyday discourse.  
Other general population surveys have also provided insight into which 
beliefs are commonplace and more acceptable than others. In a UK YouGov 
survey, Moore (2016) found widespread scepticism about elites, with 51% of 
respondents stating that they believe that despite the UK being a democracy, 
only a select few run the country. Moreover, 13% agreed with the more 
conspiratorial view that a secret group of powerful elites control world events 
like economic crises and wars. In another UK YouGov survey, Rogers de Waal 
(2015) found that conspiratorial beliefs about immigration (55%) and the EU 
(52%) were very common, though beliefs about aliens (14%), the 9/11 attacks 
(11%) and AIDS (8%) were much less common. This can be likened to research 
by Hallin (1986) who suggests that certain characteristics of everyday political 
discourse makes it more likely to fall into different spheres of social 
acceptability. For example, well accepted conspiracies (e.g., Watergate) can be 
considered within a ‘sphere of consensus’, whilst other narratives (e.g., debates 
between political parties) can be considered within the ‘sphere of legitimate 
controversy’. Conversely, narratives that are seen as illegitimate or deviant, and 
which are ignored or ridiculed by others (e.g., beliefs from individuals like David 
Icke) are considered to be in the ‘sphere of deviance’. Hallin (1986) also argues, 
however, that beliefs can move from one sphere of discourse to another, and so 
become more or less acceptable over time. For example, evidence suggests a 
brief spike in media interest in UFOs in the 1990s (Eghigian, 2017).  
Research thus also suggests that conspiracy beliefs are sensitive to 
social context (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2018). For example, evidence suggests 
that people are more likely to favour conspiracy beliefs at times of crisis, such 
as floods, earthquakes, wars or societal change (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 
2018). It has also been suggested that conspiratorial beliefs may reflect a 
symptom of systematic societal inequality. In a 2016 survey of the UK and five 
other European countries, Drochon (2017) found that countries which were 
considerably more democratic and equal (e.g., Sweden) reported up to four 
times less belief in conspiracies than countries considered to be more unequal 
and less democratic (e.g., Portugal). Moreover, research suggests that 
individuals who feel powerless are more prone to belief in conspiracies (Imhoff 
& Bruder, 2014), and so belief in conspiracies may be particularly high among 
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individuals who are marginalised within society (Davis, Wetherell & Henry, 
2018).  
This has been supported by studies which have investigated the 
intrapsychic factors associated with conspiratorial believers. For example, 
conspiracy believers have been associated with lower self-esteem and with 
holding more hostility towards authority (Swami et al., 2011). They have also 
been found to be more prevalent in less educated individuals or individuals of 
African American origin (Oliver & Wood, 2014). In a survey of US citizens, 
Freeman and Bentall (2017) found that individuals who were more prone to hold 
conspiracy beliefs were unmarried males, were less educated, with lower 
economic status and from BAME groups. They were more likely to have poorer 
psychological and physical health, higher rates of suicidal ideation and weaker 
social networks. They were also more likely to have experienced difficulties in 
their childhoods and a greater propensity to meet the criteria for a psychiatric 
disorder. The authors thus suggested that a propensity to see conspiracies 
behind life and world events was linked to a range of negative conditions, 
including adverse life experiences, unhappiness and isolation. They also 
suggested that most of the factors associated with conspiratorial beliefs were 
similar to those associated with paranoia. Given the research which links 
conspiratorial beliefs, lower incomes and lower levels of education (Uscinski & 
Parent, 2014), it has been suggested that certain unusual belief narratives 
might be adopted because of a lack of access to other explanatory narratives 
(Drochon, 2017; McKenzie, 2015; Rogers de Waal, 2015).  
Overall, therefore, previous research has suggested a lack of clarity 
around how conspiracy beliefs are understood. The broad range in content of 
these beliefs and the ambiguity in how they are defined may have implications 
for how they are understood. Research also suggests that people have mixed 
reactions to conspiracy beliefs, with some having much greater tolerance than 
others. This was made especially apparent by events such as Donald Trump 
becoming president despite frequent propagation of conspiracy beliefs. Similar 
to those who have delusional beliefs, however, research suggests that 
conspiracy believers may also experience structural inequalities and may thus 
experience similar injustice as their beliefs are granted less credibility.  
Despite this, very little research has explored why some conspiracy 
beliefs are persuasive and others are not, and what combination of factors 
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people hold in mind when determining how persuasive a belief is. Most 
research has focussed almost exclusively on the demographic, psychological 
and intra-psychic characteristics of conspiracy believers. The author thus 
suggests that it may be useful to begin by broadly exploring these areas in an 
attempt to gain an understanding of how people make sense of conspiracy 
beliefs, and then to try to determine which criteria they consider important for 
judging the plausibility of conspiracy beliefs.  
  
2.6. Aims and Justification  
 
As suggested within this chapter very little research has paid attention to 
the specific processes and factors that influence people’s decisions about what 
makes belief claims persuasive. Such judgements may have significant 
implications in numerous contexts, including legal and social, but of particular 
importance to this study is the decisions made in clinical contexts, where 
deeming that someone’s belief claim is delusional may have significant 
ramifications. The overall aim of the current study, therefore, is to explore what 
influences a hearer when they are assessing the credibility of a speakers belief 
claims.  
As discussed above, to make this more specific, the author has chosen 
to focus on conspiracy beliefs, which are a subset of ‘unusual beliefs’, with the 
intention of providing more insight into how people make judgements about 
delusional or unusual beliefs in general. These beliefs have been selected as 
research suggests that they serve as a general population, non-clinical analogy 
for delusional beliefs (e.g., Dagnall et al., 2015) and share some similarities with 
delusional beliefs (i.e., they are both held with conviction despite deficient 
supporting evidence or in the presence of contradictory evidence, and share 
numerous cognitive characteristics). The author also postulates that they are a 
type of belief that members of the general public will be more likely to be 
familiar with due to their prevalence within everyday discourse, meaning that 
the participants in this study may have a clearer conceptualisation of what a 
conspiracy belief is, making them better able and more willing to engage with 
this study. 
The author also chose to recruit from the general population, as studies 
which just focus on subgroups rest on the assumption that there exists 
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qualitative differences between members of that group and the rest of the 
population which would make generalisation difficult. Whilst mental health 
professional training may differentiate professionals from the rest of the 
population to some extent, the author has previously described research that 
suggests that mental health professionals are influenced by the same biases, 
prejudices and range of experiences as the general public. Moreover, the 
general public regularly make decisions about the belief claims of others, and 
thus influences who will access mental health services and who will not, and as 
it is not yet clear which factors influence how they judge plausibility, it is 
important to explore this population. Focussing exclusively on specific 
subgroups within the population (e.g., mental health professional) would limit 
the claims that can be made about everyday judgements of plausibility. Overall, 
in addition to being significantly under-researched, the author proposes that this 
research is important for the following reasons:  
1) Ethically, the subjugation of individuals who hold delusional or 
conspiratorial beliefs to epistemic injustice has serious implications as 
they are denied their right as a knower. Judging someone as ‘delusional’ 
exposes them to negative public attitudes (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006), 
and prejudice and stigmatisation (Rüsch, Angermeyer & Corrigan, 2005), 
which has implications for how they are treated within society 
(Thornicroft, Rose, Kassam, & Sartorious, 2007). Understanding how 
hearers of a belief make judgements about its plausibility may make it 
possible to explore ways of overcoming epistemic injustices (Crichton, 
Carel & Kidd, 2017).  
2) Before this can be achieved, however, an overall problem which has 
clear clinical relevance relates to the uncertainty around how delusions 
are firstly understood, and then identified. As discussed above, the 
conceptualisations of both conspiratorial beliefs and delusions have been 
criticised for being subjective, ambiguous and open to influence by a 
wide variety of factors which remain unclear. The diagnostic definition of 
delusions focusses on factors such as falsity, preoccupation and 
conviction, but it would be helpful to understand what other factors 
influence this, and how people make judgments about unusual beliefs in 
general. Trying to understand the factors, or combination of factors, that 
inform how the general population (and thus perhaps mental health 
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professionals) make judgements about unusual beliefs would thus be 
important for addressing the significant inequalities within the healthcare 
system and for informing future research.  
 
To attempt to shed light on this under-researched area, the author will use 
Q-methodology, which allows for an exploration of the diversity of available 
constructions on a specific topic but without prioritising any particular way of 
understanding (Stenner, Cooper & Skevington, 2003). Such an approach 
moves away from realist and essentialist understandings and so the author will 
adopt a social constructionist epistemological position. This fits with the aim of 
this study which is not to start from an a priori position, but to explore how 
sense and meaning have been made by experience, where constructions are 
“socially and historically contingent” (Eccleston, Williams, & Stainton Rogers, 
1997). This also deviates from vignette studies which are more typical ways of 
researching delusional beliefs (e.g., Mojtabai & Nicholson, 1995; O’Connor & 
Vandenberg, 2005). Such studies are based on realist ideas and a priori 
assumptions about which factors are important (i.e., by systematically modifying 
predetermined important factors).  
Since it might be hard to interpret how people are judging the plausibility of 
conspiratorial beliefs unless they have first considered what a conspiracy belief 
is, there will be two separate two Q-sorts. The first Q-sort will explore the 
participants’ general understandings of conspiracy theories, and so the first 
research question will be: 
“How do individuals identify certain beliefs to be conspiracy beliefs and 
the people who believe them to be conspiracy believers?”  
The second Q-sort will relate to the decision-making processes and the specific 
factors that influence an individuals’ judgement and so the second research 
question is:  
“What factors of a conspiratorial belief (i.e. a ‘conspiracy theory’) make it 
seem implausible to participants?”  
A detailed description of the methodology will be outlined in the next chapter.  
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3.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the author discussed some of the conceptual 
issues associated with defining, understanding and then assessing delusional 
beliefs, as well as the lack of research focussing on which factors may influence 
how hearers make judgements about their plausibility. The author then 
discussed similar issues with the current understanding of conspiracy beliefs, 
which the author postulates are a non-clinical analogy to delusional beliefs and 
will be explored further within this study. Due to the lack of a priori assumptions 
about what this study may uncover, Q-methodology was considered to be an 
appropriate methodology. Further information about this methodology, as well 
as the rationale for choosing Q-methodology, will be given more consideration 
in the following sections. Prior to discussing this, however, it may be useful to 
reiterate the two research questions. Each research question will be analysed 
and discussed separately, and so the study will have two separate Q-sorts (a 
full glossary of Q-methodology terms can be found in Appendix A). The two 
research questions are as follows: 
 
1. How do individuals identify certain beliefs to be conspiracy beliefs and 
the people who believe them to be conspiracy believers? 
2. What factors of a conspiratorial belief (i.e. a ‘conspiracy theory’) make 
it seem implausible to participants?  
 
3.2. Overview of Q-methodology and the Epistemological Position  
 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, studying the diversity of 
available constructions for how people judge the plausibility of belief claims 
requires an approach that moves away from realist and essentialist 
understandings. Such understandings would rest on the assumption that there 
is a universal standard for objectively judging the plausibility of belief claims. In 
contrast, the author will adopt a social constructionist position as the aim of this 
study is not to seek out one objective “truth”, but to explore how sense and 
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meaning have been made by experience and are thus “socially and historically 
contingent” (Eccleston, Williams & Rogers, 1997). 
Social constructionism is a theory of knowledge that observes the 
constructed understanding of the world and thus the basis of shared 
assumptions about reality. According to this perspective, the majority of human 
life exists in the form that it does due to social and interpersonal influences and 
centres on the notion that meanings are developed in coordination with others 
(Gergen, 1985). Hence, the prevalence of a particular view is not dependent on 
empirical legitimacy but on changes in social processes (Gergen, 1985). Social 
constructionism thus postulates that the way we understand the world is 
historically and culturally specific, and there is danger in prioritising one view as 
the ‘truth’ over another (Burr, 1995). Such an approach questions claims on 
‘reality’ and ‘normality’ and can be used to explore how constructs are 
continuously evolving within a social context which actively shapes 
understandings of reality. 
This particular epistemological stance lends itself easily to Q-
methodology, which was developed as a scientific means of collecting multiple 
viewpoints on a specific topic (Stenner et al., 2003). The aim of Q-methodology 
is not to prove or disprove hypotheses but to acknowledge an extensive range 
of discourses, opinions and stories about a particular issue. Q-methodology 
thus involves the measure of subjectivity, with an overall aim of uncovering both 
different and collective understandings of a particular topic, and so can be used 
to explore ‘complex and socially contested concepts’ (Watts & Stenner, 2005). 
The author deemed Q-methodology to be a useful approach as it does not 
prioritise any one way of understanding a topic, and so allows each individual 
participant to offer their own perspective but also identifies clusters of 
participants who ranked the statements in a comparable way. 
Within this approach, therefore, the data is considered in terms of each 
individual’s pattern of responses, and so an individual statement item only has 
significance when considered within the overall configuration of an individual’s 
responses. Once the Q-sort has been completed, the individual patterns of each 
participants’ responses are inter-correlated and then factor analysed (Watts & 
Stenner, 2005). This analysis generates a series of factors which participants 
may load onto, based on their configurations (Coogan & Herrington, 2011). This 
is in contrast to the R-technique which is concerned with the measure of traits 
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upon which individuals differ (Stainton Rogers, 1995), and so the participants 
are applied to the sample of statements, as opposed to the statements being 
applied to the sample of participants as in Q-methodology (Stephenson, 1953). 
In other words, the factors are people who respond similarly, rather than 
clusters of similar items.  
This methodology (as well as the epistemological position of this study) 
will thus allow the author to examine the numerous available and diverse ways 
of understanding social reality within a culture, as well as the potential 
implications of these diverse constructions (Willig, 2008). It will also allow 
subjugated discourses to be brought to the fore, and will give voice to those 
silenced and marginalised by dominant knowledges. Nevertheless, the author is 
aware that the research process itself is also a product of its context, and thus 
no more exempt from distortions than any other social enterprise (Stainton 
Rogers, 1991). With this in mind, however, the author will now outline the 
rationale for choosing this methodology instead of other methodologies. 
 
3.3. Rationale for Choosing Q-Methodology  
 
Q-methodology is an exploratory, mixed-methods approach which offers 
a clear and structured way to elicit participants’ viewpoints on specific issues 
(Zabala, Sandbrook & Mukherjee, 2017). Besides fitting with a social 
constructionism position, the author describes three primary reasons for 
selecting Q-methodology for this study. Firstly, as a mixed-methods approach, 
Q-methodology merges the benefits of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. It is thus argued to have the same level of mathematical rigour as 
quantitative methodologies, as well as an interpretative component comparable 
to that of qualitative methodologies, and so provides numerical data to support 
the perspectives gathered (Saeed Bashatah, 2016). Q-methodology thus 
provides structure and form to the range of opinions gathered (Brown, 1986).  
Secondly, Q-methodology synthesises multiple viewpoints into a 
manageable dataset by focussing on any differences and similarities between 
individuals, and how they relate to each other (Burke, 2015). Unlike other 
methods, it captures the collective opinions of a particular topic, while 
simultaneously identifying dissimilarities (Coogan & Herrington, 2011). Q-
methodology differs from methods such as factor analysis which examines 
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similarities between questions or variables. It also differs from surveys, 
interviews or focus groups in that the participant is the response variable, not 
the participants’ responses to a series of questions (McKeown & Thomas, 2013; 
Watts & Stenner, 2012). In comparison to surveys, Q-methodology is argued to 
yield more nuanced and sophisticated opinions (Kamal, Kocór & Grodzinska-
Jurczak, 2014). Whilst surveys can offer a snapshot of how participants think 
about the different aspects of a particular issue, they are less able to provide an 
understanding of how participants think about that issue. It is also argued that 
Q-methodology has less freedom of interpretation than interviews and other 
qualitative analyses (i.e., discourse or thematic analysis) as perspectives in Q-
methodology are restricted to the specific statements presented to participants 
and, to some extent, to the quantitative results (Zabala et al., 2017). Moreover, 
although qualitative approaches may provide an understanding of how 
participants think about a specific topic, they only offer qualitative data, making 
comparisons between perspectives difficult. Q-methodology thus provides a 
middle ground between the depth of interviews and the structure of surveys, as 
well as the advantages of both (Zabala et al., 2017).  
Lastly, Q-methodology can be argued to alleviate certain response 
biases as participants are asked to explicitly engage with viewpoints that they 
may consider too inappropriate to voice or which may be unexpected (Zabala et 
al., 2017). Such an approach can thus be helpful for extracting perspectives 
without requiring participants to clearly articulate themselves. Many scholars 
also argue that this mixed-methods approach facilitates “the orderly measure of 
human subjectivity” and thus mitigates some of the effects of researcher bias 
(Brown, 1980; Ramlo, 2016). The author will now consider the design and 
implementation of the study using this methodology. 
 
3.4. Study Design 
 
3.4.1. Sampling the Concourse  
To conduct a Q-sort, one first has to obtain an appropriate set of 
statements from the concourse that surrounds the specific issue in question. 
Stephenson (1953) described the concourse as the exhaustive ‘full range’ of 
everyday discourse that exists around a particular topic and so there should be 
statements that participants can both agree and disagree with (Coogan & 
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Herington, 2011). The concourse should be gathered from numerous sources, 
including academic literature, interviews, novels, films and newspapers (Van 
Exel & De Graaf, 2005).  
Within this study, all of these sources (as well as numerous internet 
forums) were thoroughly examined to extract a series of statements which fully 
captured the elements of the research questions. As there were two separate 
research questions in this study, the author developed two different concourses. 
The first concourse contained statements related to defining or understanding 
what a conspiracy belief was, whilst the second comprised statements that were 
suggested to potentially play a role in influencing how people make judgements 
about the plausibility of belief claims. 
As is common practice within Q-methodology studies, the author also 
informally interviewed four members of the general public (recruited informally 
from colleagues and friends of the author) to add another layer of available 
information to the concourse. These individuals were first asked “what do you 
think a conspiracy belief is or how would you define it?” and were then asked 
“what makes a conspiracy belief more or less believable?” (see Appendix B for 
each concourse). The first resulting concourse thus reflected all available 
research findings, beliefs, opinions and ideas concerning how people 
understand what a conspiracy belief is, and the second included all available 
information about how individuals may determine the plausibility of beliefs. For 
each concourse, statements were divided into different themes to ensure that all 
important aspects of the topic were covered. 
 
3.4.2. Development of a Q-set  
Once the concourse was adequately sampled, a reduced but 
representative selection of statements was narrowed down to form two separate 
Q-sets. Most Q-studies use between 30-80 statements within each Q-set 
(Stainton Rogers, 1995) and so the author ensured that each Q-set was within 
those parameters. The author also removed most of the statements that 
mentioned specific content or examples of particular conspiracy beliefs as these 
change over time and so agreement with an item may be influenced by the 
example given. Occasionally it was felt that a specific example was helpful to 
include (e.g., vaccinations). The author also tried to make sure that there was a 
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balance of positively and negatively phrased statements, and removed any 
repetitive statements.  
It was also important to check that the statements actually answered the 
research question (Watts & Stenner, 2005). The research team (the primary 
researcher and research supervisor) reviewed statements from each theme of 
the concourse to check for this, and to refine the clarity and conciseness of the 
statements. Four members of the general population (separate to those earlier) 
were also asked to review the statements. This resulted in changes to the 
phrasing of some statements, the reversal of the proposition of some 
statements, and a few items being removed due to duplication. 
Following several reviews, Q-set one had 34 statements remaining from 
the original 73 concourse items, which were grouped under 8 different themes. 
Q-set two had 37 statements from the original 63 concourse items, which were 
grouped under 5 separate themes (see Appendix C for both Q-sets). Once this 
had been established, a pilot study was conducted (with another sample of five 
members of the general public) to ensure that the final set was quick and easy 
for participants to sort (see Stainton Rogers, 1995, for details on this 
procedure). It also ensured that there was a roughly equal balance of items that 
could be agreed or disagreed with, and also allowed the author to check 
whether any key aspects were missing or with too few or too many items.  
 
3.4.3. Resources, Planning and Execution  
The study was conducted online using a free programme called Q-
sortware. Participants were sent the link to the study if they contacted the 
researcher (via e-mail) and expressed a wish to participate. By clicking on the 
link, all participants were presented with Q-set one first. For each Q-set, the 
sorting process was split into two parts. The aim of the first part of the sorting 
process was to help participants begin to think about their responses to the 
statements, and to categorise them in terms of how much they agreed or 
disagreed with them. In this part of the sorting process, therefore, participants 
were shown each statement individually on the centre of the screen, one at a 
time. Underneath the statement were three columns, labelled: ‘I agree with this 
statement about conspiracy beliefs’, ‘neutral’ and ‘I disagree with this statement 
about conspiracy beliefs’. Participants were required to place (sort) each 
individual statement into one of these three columns.  
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Once each of the statements had been placed into one of the three 
columns, the participants clicked to move onto another screen and the second, 
more refined part of the sorting process began. In this section, participants were 
asked to make more fine-grained decisions about how much they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement, and had to be more selective in terms of what 
statements they agreed or disagreed with the most. On this screen, the three 
columns from the first part of the sorting process remained on the screen, with 
all of the statements that had been placed in to the columns, but they were also 
presented with another nine columns underneath. Of the nine columns, the 
furthest left column was again labelled ‘I strongly disagree with this statement 
about conspiracy beliefs’ and the furthest right was again labelled ‘I strongly 
agree with this statement about conspiracy beliefs’. The centre column was 
again labelled ‘neutral’.  
The columns for this part of the study were formatted so that a fixed 
number of statements could be placed into each column. Six statements could 
be placed into the central (neutral) column, and this number decreased with 
each column moving out towards the two furthest end columns, such that only 
two statements could be placed into the final two columns. The programme 
would not allow more than the stated number of statements to be placed into 
the column. 
To aid the statistical analyses, each of these columns were assigned a 
number, with the furthest right hand (‘agree’) column labelled +5, the one to the 
left of that +4, the one to the left of that +3, and so on, decreasing in ascending 
order until the middle (neutral) column, which was assigned a value of 0. The 
column pattern was symmetrical, so as the furthest right column was +5, the 
furthest left column was -5, and the number of statements that could be put into 
each column was also symmetrical, forming a quasi-normative distribution (see 
Figure One). A quasi-normal distribution means that the statements in the Q set 
are sorted according to how much the participant agrees or disagrees with them 
and a limited number of places for statements requires participants to decide 
which statements they agreed or disagreed with most strongly. The columns 
were labelled so that participants knew how many statements could go into 
each column.  
For this stage of the Q sort, participants were first asked to consider all of 
the statements that they had put in the ‘I agree with this statement about 
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conspiracy beliefs’ column in the first stage of the sorting process. Of all of 
those statements, they were asked to select the two statements that they 
agreed with the most and then drag these two statements from the column that 
they were in, and place them in the farthest column of the new series of 
columns. They were then instructed to select the three statements that they 
next most agreed with and place them in the column directly left to the one they 
had just worked into. They were then asked to continue to work inwards until 
they had sorted all of the statements from the ‘I agree with this statement about 
conspiracy beliefs’ column from the first stage of the sort.  
Participants were then asked to do the same for the ‘I disagree with this 
statement about conspiracy beliefs’ column; starting with the two statements 
they most disagreed with, and place these on the furthest left column. Once 
they had sorted all of the ‘disagree’ statements, participants were then asked to 
sort the statements that they had placed in the ‘Neutral’ column by moving them 
to either the central column or by working slightly outwards (dependent on how 
much space there was left in each column).  
After the sorting process, the participants clicked onto the next screen 
and were given the opportunity to take a short break before moving onto the 
second Q set. For this Q set, the same process was followed as for the first Q 
set. However, the columns were labelled differently. The left hand column was 
labelled ‘Makes me think that a conspiracy is less plausible’, the middle was 
labelled ‘Neutral’, and the furthest right was labelled ‘Makes me think that a 
conspiracy is more plausible’. The number of statements that fit into each 
column was also slightly different, but this was explained to the participants and 
again made clear at the top of each column (see Appendix D for a more 
detailed explanation of the method with visual supplements).  
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Figure One. Visual depiction of a quasi-normal distribution  
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Once both Q-sorts were completed, the programme moved onto a page 
that collected various demographic details. Following that, participants moved 
onto another page where they were asked to qualitatively answer three 
questions to help gain some reflection on how they made their decisions. 
Participants were asked: (1) How did you find the process of completing the Q-
sort? (2) Did any of the statements stand out to you? and (3) Was there 
anything that you think is important that was not included in this study? The 
questions were written on the screen, with a space next to them for participants 
to type their responses. These responses were generated in the output, which 
was recorded (alongside the Q–sort data) on an excel sheet. 
 
3.5. Participants  
 
Q studies usually sample between 40–100 participants (Brown, 1986). 
Larger numbers are not required as the aim is not to determine the level of 
agreement on accounts, but rather to explore the diversity of stories. As the 
author wanted to sample from the general population, there were few 
requirements for who was to be recruited, besides that they needed to be over 
18-years old, with the ability to speak and read English.  
Participants were recruited through opportunity sampling via social 
media. This was done predominantly through Facebook, where the author 
contacted numerous regional Facebook group administrators who run pages 
where people can post general news relevant to their geographical area. The 
author asked the administrators to post an advert about the study anonymously, 
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in an attempt to try and recruit people from different geographical locations and 
demographics. The author posted their email address and asked people to 
make contact if they were interested. Of the 88 pages contacted, 56 replied and 
agreed to post the advert (see Appendix E for the advert, the list of locations 
contacted and the locations that posted).  
If someone made contact, the author sent them an email with an 
information sheet (see appendix F) and consent form (see appendix G). Once 
the consent form was returned, all participants were sent a detailed instruction 
sheet for the study which included screen-prints of the programme to illustrate 
how it worked (see appendix H).  In total, 57 participants were recruited. The 
demographic information for these participants is presented in Table 1.  
 
3.6. Ethical Considerations  
 
Prior to recruitment, ethical approval was obtained from the University of 
East London ethics committee (see appendix I). Before agreeing to participate 
in the study, all participants were sent the information sheet, and asked to read 
and return a signed informed consent form. The information sheet and consent 
form informed participants of the confidentiality policy of the study. Before 
starting the study, participants were also asked again to click on a button to 
agree that they were consenting to participate. 
Confidentiality was maintained by assigning a code to each participant 
before analysing the data (which was removed from the online programme and 
stored on an excel sheet) in a password protected file, on a password protected 
computer. In accordance with the General Data Protection Regulations 2018, all 
data was stored where only the author had access. Participants names and 
email addresses (which was the only identifiable information obtained) were 
kept on a separate excel sheet and were stored in a separate password-
protected file. This information was retained to ensure that participants could 
remove their data if they wanted to, and to disseminate the results of the study 
once they had been analysed.  
The consent form also made participants aware that they could withdraw 
from the study at any time during completion, without any negative 
consequences and without having to provide an explanation. They were also 
informed that they could withdraw their data after participating, but that they had 
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a three week period to do so, as after that window, analysis may have 
commenced and data would thus be anonymised within the analysis.  
Participants were also emailed a debrief form after participating (see 
appendix J), which was also displayed on the computer screen once 
participants had completed the programme. It was anticipated that the distress 
caused to participants by participating would be minimal as the study did not 
involve discussing anything of a personal nature. However, to mitigate any risk 
of participants becoming distressed, it was made clear both before and after 
participating that they could withdraw from the study at any time, without giving 
a reason and without repercussion. The debrief also provided the details of 
support lines that they could contact if needed (e.g., the Samaritans and Mind), 
and the details of who they could contact with any concerns at the University if 
they needed to.  
 
Table 1 
Number (N) of participants within each demographic category within this study 
 
Category Sub-Category N 
Age 18-25 7 
 26-34 20 
 35-45 10 
 46-55 11 
 56-65 7 
 66-75 2 
 75+ 0 
Ethnicity  White English/ Northern Irish/ Welsh/ Scottish/ 
British 
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 White Irish 0 
 White Gypsy or Irish Traveller 0 
 Any Other White Background 5 
 White and Black Caribbean 1 
 White and Black African 1 
 White and Asian 0 
 Any Other Mixed/ Multiple Ethnic Backgrounds 0 
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 Indian 2 
 Pakistani 0 
 Bangladeshi 2 
 Chinese 0 
 Any Other Asian Background 0 
 Black African 3 
 Black Caribbean  0 
 Any Other Black/ African Caribbean Background  0 
Religion Christianity  20 
 Islam 4 
 Hinduism 1 
 Sikhism 0 
 Judaism 1 
 Buddhism 0 
 Other 2 
 None 29 
Gender Male 32 
 Female  25 
Employment  Working (full- or part-time) 43 
 At College or University 7 
 In Training 0 
 Unemployed  2 
 On Long-Term Sick 0 
 Retired 4 
 Other  1 
Education  Left School Before 16 2 
 Secondary School Qualification 4 
 College/ Sixth Form Qualification  11 
 Diploma/ Vocational Qualification  7 
 Undergraduate Degree 17 
 Postgraduate Degree 15 
 Other 1 
Relationship  Single 16 
 In a Relationship but not Living with Partner 7 
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 Living with Partner 11 
 Married/ Civil Partnership 23 
 Widowed 0 
Occupation Professionals (e.g., doctors, surgeons, solicitors) 17 
 Jobs that Hold Responsibility (e.g., lecturers, local 
government, managerial position) 
19 
 Non-Manual Jobs (e.g., nurses, pharmacists, 
salesmen) 
9 
 Skilled Manual Workers/ Craftsmen  3 
 Semi-Skilled and Unskilled Workers  8 
 Lowest Levels of Subsistence (e.g., pensioners, 
casual workers) 
1 
Political Affiliation  Conservative 17 
 Labour 14 
 Liberal Democrat 11 
 The Independent Group 2 
 Green Party 2 
 Democratic Unionists  0 
 Plaid Cymru  2 
 SNP 1 
 Other 8 
 
 
3.7. The Analysis Process 
 
The Q-sorts of all 57 participants were analysed using PQMethod version 
2.11 (Schmolck, 2002). A principal component analysis was conducted, 
followed by a varimax rotation which generated fourteen factors with 
eigenvalues over 1.0. Eigenvalues are the standard criterion for helping to 
decide how many factors should be extracted from a dataset and how many 
should be retained in the final solution. According to the Kaiser-Guttman 
criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 1960, 1970), any factors with Eigenvalues 
over 1.0 are generally acceptable to extract and retain. As discussed in Watts 
and Stenner (2012), this criterion is generally accepted within the factor analytic 
community, though it is also widely acknowledged that it can result in an overly 
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large number of factors when datasets are large (Wilson & Cooper, 2008). It is 
also suggested that this method can lead to the extraction of meaningless or 
‘spurious factors’, and so some maintain that eigenvalues themselves are 
meaningless in Q-studies (Brown, 1980).   
In light of this, Watts and Stenner (2012) discussed other parameters 
which can aid this decision-making process. One criterion that they cited was 
Brown’s (1980) equation for calculating significant factor loadings at the 0.01 
level, and the suggestion that factors with two or more significant factor loadings 
after extraction should be retained. They also referenced Humphrey’s rule, 
which posits that ‘a factor is significant if the cross-product of its two highest 
loadings (ignoring the sign) exceeds twice the standard error’ and provided an 
equation to calculate this. They also suggested Humphrey’s rule can be applied 
less stringently, where the cross-product of the two highest factor loadings just 
have to exceed the standard error. 
Overall, however, Watts and Stenner (2012) conclude that this is an area 
of professional debate with no clear guidance. They argue that although 
eigenvalues, total variance and other objective criteria are helpful parameters 
for guidance, they must not be deployed systematically or without careful 
consideration of the meaning and significance of the factor in light of the 
research question. They suggest that deciding how many factors to extract and 
retain should account for as much of the variance as possible, but that as long 
as decisions are fully informed, they are defendable.  
In light of Watts and Stenner’s (2012) discussion, therefore, the author 
explored different objective criteria for each Q-sort separately, whilst keeping in 
mind each specific research question and the overall aim of eliciting a range of 
views on a specific topic. For each Q-sort, therefore, the author chose the 
parameter which provided the best balance of the following criteria:  
 Generated a range of coherent factors  
 The factors accounted for a large percentage of the variance 
 A large number of participants loaded onto the factors (i.e., factors with 
very small numbers of participants loading were excluded) 
 No factor only had one participant loading  
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3.7.1. Q-Sort One 
For the first Q-sort, the author observed that Brown’s (1980) equation 
best satisfied these criteria as it accounted for the highest level of variance, with 
the greatest sample of viewpoints. The employment of Brown’s criteria involved 
calculating the number of significant factor loadings at the 0.01 level and was 
calculated using the following equation:  
 
2.58 x (1/√no. items in Q-sort) = 0.44 
 
By checking the factor loadings listed in the PQMethod ‘Unrotated factor 
matrix’ output, any factors with two or more significant factor loadings (>0.44) 
could legitimately be extracted and rotated (see Appendix K) 
Overall, five factors satisfied this criterion and were retained in the final solution. 
The other criterion did not fit as well, as they either had too few factors (and so 
did not represent some viewpoints that were seen in other factor solutions), did 
not account for enough of the variance, or had too many factors with very small 
numbers or just one participant loading. The other factor solutions that were 
analysed but did not form the final solution can be seen in Appendix L.  
3.7.2. Q-Sort Two 
For the second Q-sort, the author observed that applying Humphrey’s 
equation less stringently best satisfied these criteria (the other factor solutions 
for the second Q-sort can be seen in Appendix M). Deploying the same criteria 
for both Q-sorts would have seen lower variance in one final solution, or factors 
with only one participant loading, or a final solution that did not best represent 
the available viewpoints on the given topic. The author thus observed that it was 
more sensible to employ slightly different objective criterion to inform each Q-
sort.  
A less stringent version of Humphrey’s rule, which ‘states that a factor is 
significant if the cross-product of its two highest loadings (ignoring the sign) 
exceeds twice the standard error’ can be applied by the cross-products simply 
exceeding the standard error (Watts & Stenner, 2012). The standard error is 
calculated by the following equation: 
Standard error = 1 / (√no. of items in qset) = 0.164.  
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This thus required the author to examine the ‘Unrotated factor matrix’ 
(see Appendix N), extract the two highest loadings of each factor, ascertain if 
the cross-product of these two loadings exceeded the standard error, and if so, 
the factor was retained in the final dataset. Using this criteria as a guide, four 
factors were retained in the final dataset. Again, the other potential factor 
solutions either had too few factors (and so did not represent some of the 
viewpoints that were seen by using other criteria), did not account for enough of 
the variance, had too many factors with small numbers of participants, or factors 
with just one participant loading.  
 
3.7.3 Interpreting the Data 
Once the number of factors to retain had been decided, the next step in 
the process was to try and interpret the data. The author attempted this by 
initially considering all of the characteristic statements for each factor separately 
and looking for commonalities within those statements which led to the creation 
of small subthemes within each factor. The author then attempted to create a 
narrative around these subthemes and present various hypotheses for how they 
fit together. The author then considered the relationship between the different 
factors, and thus what themes are emphasised in one factor in comparison to 
the others. To achieve this, the author created a table which listed all of the 
statements and how they were ranked within each factor.  The characteristic 
statements for each factor were highlighted, and the author noted which 
characteristic statements were shared with other factors (and whether they 
were agreed or disagreed with), and which statements were unique to that 
particular factor. Within the results section, the author then tried to incorporate 
some reflections on the areas of commonality and difference between the 
different factors.   
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4.0 RESULTS: HOW ARE CONSPIRACY BELIEFS DEFINED 
 
 
4.1. Chapter Introduction  
 
This thesis has two research questions which were addressed in two 
separate Q-sorts. Each of these Q-sorts have been analysed independently and 
presented in separate chapters for greater clarity. The research question 
addressed by the first Q-sort was: How do individuals identify certain beliefs to 
be conspiracy beliefs and the people who believe them to be conspiracy 
believers? The aim of this first Q-sort was to try to determine what participants 
considered to be the defining or most important factors for understanding 
conspiracy beliefs. Participants were presented with a series of statements 
related to how conspiracy beliefs may be understood within the media, 
literature, research and popular culture. Each participant then selected the 
statements that they considered were the most important aspects of deciding 
whether a belief is conspiratorial out of the possible options available to them.  
The author will discuss each of the five factors of Q-sort one separately 
(the factor loadings for this Q-sort can be seen in appendix N). The factors have 
been presented in a way that tries to form a coherent narrative. When 
discussing each factor, the author will consider the characteristic statements 
and how they differ from statements in the other factors, the demographics of 
the sorters in each factor, and any qualitative comments from the sorters. The 
author notes that full analysis of these questions was not possible, however, 
due to numerous participants not writing anything into the space provided. 
Instead, the few quotes from participants who did answer those questions will 
be used to aid the interpretation of the factors. Before discussing this, however, 
the author has presented the average rating of each item by the sample as a 
whole to demonstrate the level of agreement between each item (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.  
Table showing the average rating of each item and standard deviation. 
 
Statement Mean (SD) 
Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time reading about 
conspiracies on the internet 
1.35 (1.79) 
Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators act in secret 0.81 (2.14) 
Conspiracy beliefs can be fun and entertaining   0.26 (1.98) 
People enjoy talking to conspiracy believers 0.02 (1.42) 
Conspiracy beliefs are logical and rational       -0.89 (1.90) 
Conspiracy believers are crucial in exposing real-life 
conspiracies (e.g. Watergate) 
-1.53 (2.04) 
Conspiracy believers think that the media routinely expose 
conspiracy theories 
0.40 (2.09) 
Conspiracy believers distrust academic researchers and 
scientists 
-1.39 (1.74) 
Conspiracy believers think that all important information is being 
shared with the public 
0.32 (1.90) 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often powerful elites -2.86 (1.14) 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often governments or 
officials 
1.09 (2.00) 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs rarely involve people from 
religious groups (e.g. Jews, Muslims etc.)   
0.86 (1.94) 
Conspiracy beliefs take accepted facts but then make a big leap 
of faith to reach conclusions that aren’t supported by the facts 
-1.07 (1.67) 
Conspiracy believers think events happen because of the 
planned actions of small groups, rather than broader forces like 
economic or political systems 
0.49 (2.32) 
Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators manipulate events 
to serve their own interests 
0.16 (1.65) 
Conspiracy believers do not believe that there is an intentional 
plan behind world events 
1.46 (1.58) 
Conspiracy believers believe that they are the only ones who 
understand ‘what is really going on’ 
-1.68 (1.61) 
Conspiracy beliefs are so complex that it can be hard to 
definitively disprove them      
1.53 (1.84) 
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Conspiracy believers think that all politicians and officials are 
corrupt 
0.02 (1.89) 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs do not typically involve 
intelligence agencies 
-0.35 (1.64) 
Conspiracy beliefs can have serious negative consequences, 
such as parents not vaccinating their children 
-1.53 (1.38) 
A lot of people believe in conspiracies        1.93 (1.85) 
Conspiracy beliefs lead to some groups of society being treated 
badly  
0.53 (1.92) 
Conspiracy believers see those who disagree with them as 
hoodwinked or deluded 
0.47 (1.57) 
People use the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ as a way of 
undermining a view they disagree with 
1.09 (1.83) 
Conspiracy believers assume that there is only one explanation 
for an event when, in fact, there are a number of equally 
plausible explanations 
0.44 (1.94) 
Conspiracy believers think that there are no hidden connections 
or patterns behind world events 
1.02 (1.72) 
Conspiracy beliefs have caused a destructive level of mistrust in 
society 
-1.84 (1.45) 
Conspiracy believers interpret facts to fit their predetermined 
theory 
0.39 (1.77) 
Conspiracy beliefs are based on evidence, rather than innuendo 
and suspicion 
1.65 (1.90) 
Conspiracy believers reinforce each other's ideas -1.53 (2.11) 
Conspiracy beliefs prevent elites from gaining too much power 1.58 (1.56) 
Conspiracy believers are happy to change their belief when they 
are presented with evidence which challenges it 
-1.42 (1.38) 
Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time reading about 
conspiracies on the internet 
1.75 (1.92) 
 
 
4.2. Interpretation of Factors 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the eigenvalue and variance for each factor, both 
before and after rotation. After rotation, the five factors accounted for 63% of the 
total variance. The table also shows the participants who were exemplars for 
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each factor, which allowed the author to identify any characteristic 
demographics for each factor, and any qualitative comments from those 
participants. 
 
Table 3.  
Eigenvalues and percentage of variance for each factor 
Factor Eigenvalue % of 
Variance 
before 
rotation 
% of 
Variance 
after rotation 
Number of Sorts (Ps) 
Loading 
1 20.82 37 25 1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 19, 24, 
25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 37, 
38, 48, 49, 50, 53, 56 
2 5.41 10 15 5, 7, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23, 
40, 45, 46, 47 
3 3.37 6 7 4, 6, 44, 55 
4 3.01 5 10 11, 16, 22, 26, 42, 51 
5 2.57 5 6 3, 21 
 
 
Each of the statements included in Q-sort one, as well as the items which were 
rated highly (characteristic statements) for each factor are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. 
Table Highlighting the Characteristic Statements for Each Factor  
 
  Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
1 Conspiracy believers spend a lot 
of time reading about conspiracies 
on the internet 
 +3 +3 +3  
2 Conspiracy beliefs assume that 
conspirators act in secret 
  -4 +4  
3 Conspiracy beliefs can be fun and 
entertaining   
  +4 +4  
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4 People enjoy talking to conspiracy 
believers 
  +3   
6 Conspiracy beliefs are logical and 
rational       
-4     
7 Conspiracy believers are crucial in 
exposing real-life conspiracies 
(e.g. Watergate) 
 +4   -3 
8 Conspiracy believers think that the 
media routinely expose 
conspiracy theories 
 -3    
9  Conspiracy believers distrust 
academic researchers and 
scientists 
     
10 Conspiracy believers think that all 
important information is being 
shared with the public 
-3 -4 -3 -4  
11 The conspirators in conspiracy 
beliefs are often powerful elites 
 +4  +3  
12 The conspirators in conspiracy 
beliefs are often governments or 
officials 
 +3    
13 The conspirators in conspiracy 
beliefs rarely involve people from 
religious groups (e.g. Jews, 
Muslims etc.)   
  -3  -4 
14 Conspiracy beliefs take accepted 
facts but then make a big leap of 
faith to reach conclusions that 
aren’t supported by the facts 
+3  -4   
15 Conspiracy believers think events 
happen because of the planned 
actions of small groups, rather 
than broader forces like economic 
or political systems 
    +3 
16 Conspiracy beliefs assume that 
conspirators manipulate events to 
serve their own interests 
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17 Conspiracy believers do not 
believe that there is an intentional 
plan behind world events 
 -3  -4  
18 Conspiracy believers believe that 
they are the only ones who 
understand ‘what is really going 
on’ 
+3     
19 Conspiracy beliefs are so complex 
that it can be hard to definitively 
disprove them      
    -4 
20 Conspiracy believers think that all 
politicians and officials are corrupt 
    +3 
21 The conspirators in conspiracy 
beliefs do not typically involve 
intelligence agencies 
 -3    
22 Conspiracy beliefs can have 
serious negative consequences, 
such as parents not vaccinating 
their children 
+4  +4   
23 A lot of people believe in 
conspiracies        
  +3 +3 -3 
24 Conspiracy beliefs lead to some 
groups of society being treated 
badly  
     
25 Conspiracy believers see those 
who disagree with them as 
hoodwinked or deluded 
    +4 
26 People use the term ‘conspiracy 
theorist’ as a way of undermining 
a view they disagree with 
 +3  -3  
27 Conspiracy believers assume that 
there is only one explanation for 
an event when, in fact, there are a 
number of equally plausible 
explanations 
+3     
28 Conspiracy believers think that 
there are no hidden connections 
or patterns behind world events 
-3 -4  -3  
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29 Conspiracy beliefs have caused a 
destructive level of mistrust in 
society 
     
30 Conspiracy believers interpret 
facts to fit their predetermined 
theory 
+4    +4 
31 Conspiracy beliefs are based on 
evidence, rather than innuendo 
and suspicion 
-4  -3   
32 Conspiracy believers reinforce 
each other's ideas 
    +3 
33 Conspiracy beliefs prevent elites 
from gaining too much power 
   -3  
34 Conspiracy believers are happy to 
change their belief when they are 
presented with evidence which 
challenges it 
-3    -3 
 
 
4.2.1. Factor One – Conspiracy beliefs are False, Illogical and Harmful Beliefs  
This factor was endorsed by nineteen Q-sorts and accounted for 25% of 
the variance. 
 
4.2.1.1. Characterising statements 
Participants loading onto this factor emphasise the serious and harmful 
consequences that conspiracy beliefs may have at a societal level (22: +4). 
They also suggest that conspiracy believers hold steadfastly onto their beliefs 
and these beliefs would not be revised even when presented with contradictory 
evidence (34: -3).2 Sorters in this account also consider beliefs to be held rigidly 
and informed by a pre-determined set of beliefs or theory (30: +4), and so 
suggest that conspiracy believers will only consider one possible explanation for 
an event or occurrence (27: +3). Participants in this factor thus view the extent 
                                                          
2 Within these analyses, negative ratings within exemplar factors have been analysed as simply the 
opposite to positive ratings. However this is not necessarily the only possible meaning of a negative 
rating. It is also important to keep in mind the potential influence of how items are phrased on how 
participants interpreted these items.  
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to which a believer interprets facts to fit their belief as an important defining 
feature. Participant 1 explained that “while scoring the statements I was thinking 
about specific people I know to be conspiracy believers and their unwillingness 
to listen to alternative explanations for the ‘evidence’ they have”. Those who 
load onto this factor also did not seem to consider conspiracy beliefs to be 
factual or rational (6: -4), and so suggest that believers do not base their 
arguments on a series of facts but involve large sweeping generalisations and 
conclusions (14: +3).  
Those who load onto this factor also suggest that conspiracy beliefs are 
defined by information about hidden connections or patterns underlying world 
events (28: - 3). They suggest that conspiracy believers are naturally suspicious 
(31:-4), and believers do not feel that important information is shared with the 
general public (10: -3). They also understand conspiracy believers to consider 
themselves to be the only ones in society who really know what is going on (18: 
+3), and so there is a sense that conspiracy believers are a minority group who 
consider themselves to be more enlightened than the general public. Participant 
14 also suggested that, “it would be important to reference the impact of 
traumatic events in their past” and so in defining something as conspiratorial, 
some participants may emphasise why people might make certain kinds of 
belief claims (e.g., as a way of coping with past adversity). 
 
4.2.1.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
The demographic details of the sorters who loaded onto this factor were 
analysed to check for any similar characteristics between them. It was found 
that the average age of the sorters was 45, with a large range from 28 to 69. 
Broadly similar numbers of men and women loaded onto this factor, with 11 
women and 8 men. The highest level of educational attainment of the sorters 
was mixed, where six had qualifications up to postgraduate level, two left school 
before the age of 16 and the rest varied in between. The political belief system 
of the group was very varied, with little uniformity.  
Conversely, the religious beliefs held by the group were roughly split 
between the Christian faith and being atheist, though one individual identified as 
Muslim, and one as Jewish. The relationship status was also mixed, though 
most were in relationships (to varying levels of commitment). Most of the sorters 
were White British (which was reflective of the overall sample within this study), 
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though two individuals were from other white backgrounds, one was mixed 
White and Black Caribbean, and another was mixed White and Black African.  
 
4.2.1.3. Factor summary  
This factor had the most participants loading and so it could be argued 
that this is a majority viewpoint. Overall, participants in this factor appeared to 
emphasise the importance of facts, evidence and logic for defining conspiracy 
beliefs. They also appear to orientate towards the harmful nature of conspiracy 
beliefs, and reject the idea that conspiracy beliefs were fun or entertaining. This 
did not appear to be moderated by the type or content of the beliefs. This was in 
contrast to all of the other factors which suggested that to some extent, 
conspiracy beliefs can be fun and entertaining.  
Those in this factor also did not appear to understand conspiracy beliefs 
in terms of who the conspirators might be, or who the targets of the conspiracy 
beliefs are. However, they suggested that the believers of conspiracy beliefs are 
naturally suspicious, have very rigid and fixed belief systems, and believe that 
only they are privy to secret information which is not widely accessible to the 
general public. There is thus a sense that the sorters of this factor deem 
conspiracy believers to consider themselves different to others, and one person 
who endorsed this factor suggested that this may be related to previous 
autobiographical experience.  
 
4.2.2. Factor Two – What gets Labelled as a Conspiracy Belief are Attempts to 
Expose the Truth  
This factor was endorsed by eleven Q-sorts and accounted for 15% of 
the variance. 
 
4.2.2.1. Characterising statements   
This factor only shared two characterising statements with factor one, 
implying that the aspects that were important to the sorters in factor one were 
not important to the sorters in this factor for defining conspiracy beliefs. In 
contrast to the previous factor, key aspects in this definition are the identity of 
conspirators, and the suggestion that the conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are 
generally powerful elites (11: +4), particularly government officials (12: +3) or 
from intelligence agencies (21: -3). Sorters in this factor also understand 
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conspiracy believers to see patterns or plans in historical forces, and thus 
suggest that believers see intentional, coordinated plans behind world events 
(17: -3), and hidden patterns behind real-life events (28: -4). Participant 13 
expressed that “conspiracy beliefs tend to believe that events are caused by an 
identifiable group of people rather than something more abstract”.  
For sorters in this factor, another key aspect of the definition is that there 
are potentially positive societal effects. They suggest that important information 
is routinely withheld from the general public (10: -4), that the media consistently 
hides conspiracy beliefs (8: -3), and thus conspiracy believers are crucial for 
exposing these real-life events (7: +4). They also feel that conspiracy believers 
spend a lot of time researching this information on the internet (1: +3). As 
suggested by Participant 7, “some world leaders hide the truth and treat people 
like idiots by feeding them lies”. Those in this factor thus suggest that 
conspiracy believers are vital for opening the eyes of a deceived world. This 
was echoed by Participant 23 who claimed that they prefer the term “truth 
seeker, or agenda researcher” to conspiracy believer, supporting the idea that 
‘conspiracy belief’ is a derisive term used by the general public to undermine 
views they disagree with (26: +3).  
 
4.2.2.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
The demographic details of the sorters in this group were again analysed 
to check for similarities or disparities. The average age of the sorters in this 
group was 34, with a range of 26 to 48 and so slightly younger than in the 
previous factor. The occupation and educational attainment of the group was 
also varied, ranging from three having postgraduate qualifications to one 
leaving school before the age of 16. The political beliefs of the group also 
reflected a full range, though no individuals identified as having Conservative 
political beliefs, and two people cited “other”. 
Conversely, the gender divide was disproportionate, with 9 men and only 
2 women. Moreover, all of the sorters were employed full-time besides one 
student, and the majority of the group were White British, though two were from 
other White backgrounds, one was Indian, and another was Bangladeshi. 
Approximately half of the sorters were in relationships (to varying levels of 
commitment), though four were single. Approximately half also had no religious 
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beliefs, yet there was one who identified as Christian, two were Muslim, and 
one cited other.  
 
4.2.2.3. Factor summary  
This factor had the second most participants loading but shared very few 
of the same defining characteristics as factor one. Unlike in factor one, those in 
this factor placed particular emphasis on the identity of the conspirators (elites, 
government officials and those from intelligence agencies) and suggest that 
believers consider historical events to be orchestrated by groups of people, 
rather than random, abstract forces.  
They also emphasised the potential positive and important effects of 
conspiracies, with the idea that conspiracy believers represent a check on the 
power of powerful individuals and thereby seek to delegitimise their authority. 
Unlike any of the other factors, there is thus an emphasis on the idea that 
conspiracy believers are important for enlightening the general public of real-life 
conspiracies, and that this information is routinely kept from them. There is also 
a sense that they see conspiracy believers to be “truth seekers”, and in contrast 
to the previous factor, they reject the notion that conspiracy believers are 
illogical or make evidence fit their pre-defined beliefs.  
As sorters in this account appear to emphasise the importance of 
conspiracy believers and also suggest that the term ‘conspiracy believer’ is 
used to undermine views that people disagree with, it might be hypothesised 
that this group might not agree with the notion of conspiracy beliefs at all. At the 
very least, it might suggest that they define very different kinds of beliefs as 
conspiracy beliefs (compared to the other factors), or that they might view 
conspiracy beliefs as potentially true. Those in this factor might thus suggest 
that what gets labelled as a conspiracy belief is an attempt to expose the truth 
about the powerful. 
The sorters in this factor also appear to be younger men, and arguably 
not representative of the overall population in the UK which is currently a 
predominantly Christian, Conservative country. This may relate to the literature 
which suggests that those who endorse conspiracy beliefs tend to be younger, 
males (e.g., Freeman & Bentall, 2017) who are marginalised within society 
(e.g., Davis et al., 2018). 
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4.2.3. Factor Three – There are Different Kinds of Conspiracy Beliefs, with 
Different Consequences   
This factor was endorsed by four Q-sorts and accounted for 7% of the 
total variance. 
 
4.2.3.1. Characterising statements  
Sorters in this factor emphasise the idea that conspiracy beliefs are not 
homogenous. This was one of only two factors to say that conspiracy beliefs are 
common (4: +3). They suggest that some conspiracy beliefs can have 
potentially serious, negative and harmful consequences at a societal level (22: 
+4), but that they can also be fun and entertaining (3: +4), with members of the 
general public enjoying engaging in discussions with believers (4: +3). 
Participant 44 explained that they “are inquisitive and find the subject interesting 
to consider”.   
Participants in this factor also suggest that some conspiracy beliefs 
involve conspirators acting in the open (2: -4), and information is readily 
accessible on the internet which believers spend a lot of time engaging with (1: 
+3). Alternatively, they also feel that some conspiracy beliefs involve information 
being hidden and do not feel that all important information is shared with the 
general public (10: -3). This is reinforced by Participant 44 who suggested that 
“conspiracy believers question the official information the public have been 
given, such as moon landings”.  
They also suggest that conspiracy beliefs may not be evidence-based 
(31: -3), implying that they lack scientific rigour, though they also suggest that 
conspiracy beliefs can be rational or logical and do not make big sweeping 
generalisations, or draw unsupported conclusions (14: -4). This appears to 
indicate that the sorters in this account acknowledge numerous different types 
of conspiratorial beliefs and effects, though they do suggest that conspiracy 
beliefs are more likely to involve people from religious groups (13: -3).  
 
4.2.3.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
The average age of the sorters in this group was 36 and ranged from 19 
to 55. The occupation type of the participants was varied and each individual 
endorsed different political beliefs.  
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Three out of four group members had religious beliefs (two Christians 
and one Muslim). Similarly, three out of four of the group members were men, 
three of which identified as white (though one was not British), and another was 
Bangladeshi. Three were employed full-time besides one who was a student, 
and three were single, whilst one was married. The educational attainment was 
uniform, where the highest educational attainments of all four was a college 
qualification.  
 
4.2.3.3. Factor summary 
Overall, those who endorsed this factor seemed to hold the idea that 
conspiracy beliefs are not a rare, homogenous construct, but are common, with 
varied content and a diverse range of consequences. One interpretation of this 
is that they have different conspiracy beliefs in mind when rating different 
elements – so some conspiracy beliefs can be entertaining (and this is the only 
factor to claim that people enjoy talking to conspiracy believers), whilst others 
are more harmful. Some conspiracy beliefs involve conspirators acting in the 
open whereas others involve information being hidden and not shared with the 
public.  Moreover, some conspiracy beliefs may be based on evidence, whilst 
others lack scientific-rigour.   
The sorters in this factor were more likely to have religious beliefs, and 
was one of only two factors pointing to religious groups being the targets of 
conspiracy beliefs. It could be that this is something personally relevant to them 
or something they may be more sensitive to. The sorters in this factor were also 
more likely to be single men, with lower levels of educational attainment. 
Conspiracy beliefs are more common amongst these demographics (e.g., 
Freeman & Bentall, 2017; Uscinski & Parent, 2014) and so it may be possible 
that the sorters in this account are more likely to encounter a range of friends 
and co-workers who hold conspiracy beliefs.  
 
4.2.4. Factor Four – Conspiracy Beliefs involve Entertaining Beliefs about Elites 
Acting Conspiratorially but do not Prevent them from Gaining Power 
This factor was endorsed by six Q-sorts and accounted for 10% of the 
variance. 
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4.2.4.1. Characterising statements  
Similar to factor three, sorters in this factor appear to suggest that 
different elements characterise conspiracy beliefs. They also see conspiracy 
beliefs as common (23: +3), fun and entertaining (3: +4) and widely accessible 
on the internet (1: +3).  
Moreover, sorters in this account do not emphasise the relationship with 
evidence but, instead, focus on common tropes. These include conspirators 
acting in secret (2: +4), information not being shared with the public (10: -4), 
and that world events are not spontaneous or due to chance but reflect hidden 
connections or patterns (28: -3), and are coordinated, pre-planned and 
intentional (17: -4). Participant 51 suggested that “the media has a big influence 
on the information being shared with the public”.   
The only target that participants mention in this factor are elites (11: +3). 
This is the only factor to suggest that conspiracy beliefs do not prevent elites 
from gaining power (33: -3), so it appears that those in this factor do not see 
conspiracy beliefs as having societal purpose. They also differ from participants 
in factor two and do not agree that people use the term ‘conspiracy believer as 
a way of undermining a view that they do not agree with (26: -3).  
4.2.4.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
The average age of the sorters in this group was 31, ranging from 25 to 
50. The group was half men and half women, and all were white British besides 
one who was Indian. All were employed full-time besides one who was a 
student, but their occupations were varied. The educational status and 
relationship status were also varied. Four out of the six identified as having 
religious beliefs (two Christian, one Hindu and one Muslim), though unlike in 
factor three, they did not suggest that religious groups were the targets of 
conspiracy beliefs. The political beliefs were all varied.   
 
4.2.4.3. Factor summary 
Overall, the sorters in this factor focussed on different elements when 
defining conspiracy beliefs. Similarly to factor three, they suggest that 
conspiracy beliefs are common and involve entertaining beliefs but in contrast 
to factor three, they do not see them as varied enough to include harmful 
beliefs. The sorters in this account also focus on more typical definitions of 
conspiracy beliefs and thus focus on themes of mistrust and power (i.e., 
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conspirators act in secret, information is not routinely shared with the general 
public, and that there are plans and connections behind world events). 
The only target that participants mention in this factor are elites (not 
government officials, intelligence agencies, religious groups or corrupt 
politicians). Unlike in factor Two, however, this factor focusses more on the 
target of the belief and does not emphasis any societal value (i.e., limiting the 
power of the elites). Moreover, participants in this account do not agree that the 
term ‘conspiracy belief’ is used to undermine an argument. In pointing to this as 
an important aspect, this implies that they think that ‘conspiracy belief’ is a 
legitimate label. 
 
4.2.5. Factor Five – Conspiracy Beliefs are Unsophisticated Beliefs about 
Religious Groups and Politicians Held by a Self-Reinforcing Minority  
This factor was endorsed by two Q-sorts and accounted for 6% of the 
variance. 
 
4.2.5.1. Characterising statements  
The two participants in this factor suggest that conspiracy beliefs relate 
to the idea that events happen because of the planned actions of small groups, 
as opposed to broader forces like economic or political systems (15: +3). They 
suggest that the targets of conspiracy beliefs are individuals from religious 
minorities (13: -4), as well as politicians or officials (20: +3).  
Those in this factor see conspiracy beliefs as held by a small number of 
people (23: -3), who believe that they are enlightened, whilst non-believers are 
naïve or deluded (25: +4). Similarly to those in factor one, they suggest that 
conspiracy believers are wedded to their beliefs and so will not revise them 
despite being presented with challenging evidence (34: -3). They also suggest 
that conspiracy believers are reductive and will only consider one explanation or 
pre-determined belief for an event (30: +4). 
Unlike participants in any of the other factors, however, those in this 
factor suggest that conspiracy believers reinforce each other’s ideas (32: +3) 
but suggest that conspiracy beliefs are easy to disprove (19: -4). Sorters in this 
factor disagree with those in factor two, as they suggest that conspiracy 
believers have minimal impact on society, and thus do not believe that 
conspiracy beliefs help to expose real conspiracies (7: -3).  
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4.2.5.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
There were only two sorters in this account who were both young (22 
and 25 years old) but different genders. They were both white British, worked 
full-time in highly responsible jobs, lived with their partners and voted Labour. 
One was qualified to undergraduate degree level and the other had attained 
college qualifications. One held no religious beliefs, whilst the other identified as 
Christian.  
 
4.2.5.3. Factor summary 
Since there were only two participants in this factor, the author was 
slightly circumspect when interpreting this factor.  This factor had the highest 
number of unique characterising statements (though this may have reflected the 
small number of participants).  Sorters in this factor disagree with factor two that 
conspiracy beliefs help expose real conspiracies and unlike factor one they do 
not focus on the issue of harm or many of the issues of logic or 
evidence. However, they do not consider conspiracy beliefs to be fun and 
entertaining.  
Instead, this factor tends to attend more to the dynamics of the belief and 
the kind of relationship conspiracy believers have with their beliefs.  This is the 
only factor to suggest that conspiracy believers reinforce each other's ideas and 
that they see those who disagree with them as hoodwinked or deluded.  Like 
those in factor one they also disagree that conspiracy believers will change their 
belief when presented with contradictory evidence and agree that conspiracy 
believers interpret facts to fit their predetermined theories.  
Those in this factor also consider the targets of conspiracy beliefs to be 
religious groups and corrupt politicians but not intelligence agencies or 
elites. They were the only factor to suggest that targets may be politicians. They 
also uniquely endorsed the idea that conspiracy believers think events happen 
because of the planned actions of small groups, rather than broader forces like 
economic or political systems. They also suggest that conspiracy beliefs are 
held by a small number of people with relatively simple beliefs which are easy to 
disprove, which implies they think that conspiracy believers adopt an 
unsophisticated view of events.   
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4.3. Chapter Summary 
 
Overall, the five factors extracted by analysing the first Q-sort 
demonstrated numerous different ways of understandings conspiracy beliefs. 
The factors varied greatly, ranging from conspiracy beliefs being innocuous and 
fun, to having serious and harmful consequences. The implications of this 
variation in understanding will be explored in chapter six.  
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5.0 RESULTS: HOW DO PEOPLE JUDGE THE PLAUSIBILITY OF 
CONSPIRACY THEORIES  
 
 
5.1. Chapter Introduction  
 
This chapter will address the second research question, which was: 
“What factors of a conspiratorial belief (i.e. a ‘conspiracy theory’) make it seem 
implausible to participants?” The aim of this Q-sort was to explore which factors 
impacted how participants’ judge the plausibility of belief claims. Participants 
were presented with a series of statements (obtained from the media, research, 
literature and popular culture) about factors which may influence how credible 
they consider a belief to be. Each participant then individually selected from 
these statements which factors they considered to be the most and least 
important for influencing their judgements of plausibility.  
The author has presented the average rating each item and the standard 
deviation to demonstrate the level of agreement between each item (see Table 
5).  
 
Table 5. 
Table showing the frequency with which each item was agreed with. 
 
Statement Mean (SD) 
When a majority of academic researchers and scientists endorse 
the belief 
3.04 (1.58) 
When the believer is very sociable and has lots of friends -0.19 (0.93) 
When the belief appears to be hypothetically possible  1.74 (1.28) 
When the believer is highly educated  1.18 (1.15) 
When the evidence for and against the belief is confusing -1.07 (1.74) 
When the believer seems indiscriminately suspicious -1.61 (1.50) 
When the believer is from a different social group (cultural, ethnic, 
religious, political etc.) to you 
-0.11 (0.98) 
When the belief seems to involve jumping to a particular conclusion 
not supported by the evidence 
-2.89 (1.36) 
When most people you know don’t believe it -0.54 (0.95) 
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When the belief pins the blame for something on an identifiable 
group of people rather than something more abstract 
-0.21 (1.48) 
When the conspiracy would have required lots of different people to 
co-operate  
-0.14 (1.94) 
When someone you think is credible believes it  1.54 (1.13) 
When the belief is based on several different independent sources 
of evidence 
2.95 (1.39) 
When the believer will change their mind in light of evidence which 
contradicts the belief 
0.09 (2.06) 
When the believer seems to spend a lot of time on conspiracy 
websites  
-1.02 (1.27) 
When official sources (e.g. government reports) do not support it  -0.07 (1.45) 
When the believer does not seem gullible or naïve 1.05 (0.95) 
When the belief is presented in an incoherent and hard to follow 
manner 
1.54 (1.57) 
When the belief is supported by a whistleblower who has had 
access to secret information 
2.14 (1.27) 
When the believer only seems to talk to people who agree with 
them 
-1.56 (1.13) 
When experts seem to disagree about the belief -1.21 (1.82) 
When the believer is not obsessed by the belief 0.63 (1.08) 
When the belief seems to be the simplest explanation of the 
evidence 
1.04 (1.58) 
When the believer can provide persuasive evidence for it 2.51 (1.14) 
When the believer seems eccentric or odd  -0.91 (0.97) 
When the believer seems to be open-minded about alternative 
explanations when they weigh up the evidence  
2.18 (1.40) 
When the conclusions reached seem to go beyond the evidence -0.84 (2.02) 
When you are aware of strong evidence which contradicts the 
belief 
3.04 (1.38) 
When the belief fits with my own political views 0.49 (1.04) 
When the believer appears to have mental health difficulties  -1.04 (1.13) 
When the belief seems to be based on opinion rather than fact -2.44 (1.21) 
When the argument for a belief seems circular -0.98 (1.66) 
When the belief doesn’t involve making too many assumptions 1.60 (1.49) 
When the belief just seems intuitively right 1.44 (1.32) 
When the believer does not get overly emotional about the belief 0.65 (1.33) 
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When the believer only cites evidence which supports their belief 
and does not mention anything which might contradict it 
-1.70 (1.69) 
When the belief seems to be unquestioned within the believer’s 
social group 
0.95 (1.29) 
 
 
5.2. Interpreting Factors 
 
Table 6 displays the eigenvalues and total variance for the four factors, 
both before and after rotation. After rotation, the factors accounted for 70% of 
the total variance. The table also shows the participants who were exemplars 
for each factor, which allowed the author to identify characteristic demographics 
for each factor, and any qualitative comments from those participants.  
 
Table 6.  
Eigenvalues and total variance for the four extracted factors 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance 
before 
Rotation 
% of variance 
after Rotation 
Number of Sorts (Ps) 
Loading  
1 33.1943 58.24 26 1, 8, 9, 11, 17, 22, 23, 
31, 36, 38, 39, 41, 47, 
48, 50, 54, 55  
2 2.5487 4.47 14 5, 13, 15, 29, 37 
3 2.1273 3.73 20 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 
24, 40, 44, 46, 53, 56 
4 1.9077 3.35    10    3, 26, 27 
 
Each of the four factors will be discussed in turn, with consideration of 
how they relate to each other. The factor loadings for all four factors can be 
found in Appendix P and table 7 for statements in Q-sort two, as well as the 
most highly ranked statement for each factor (characteristic statements). 
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Table 7. 
Table Highlighting the Characteristic Statements for Each Factor of Q-sort Two 
 
  Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
1 When a majority of academic 
researchers and scientists endorse the 
belief 
+4 +3 +3 +4 
2 When the believer is very sociable and 
has lots of friends 
    
3 When the belief appears to be 
hypothetically possible  
 +4   
4 When the believer is highly educated      
5 When the evidence for and against the 
belief is confusing 
 -3   
6 When the believer seems 
indiscriminately suspicious 
 -4   
7 When the believer is from a different 
social group (cultural, ethnic, religious, 
political etc.) to you 
    
8 When the belief seems to involve 
jumping to a particular conclusion not 
supported by the evidence 
-3 -4 -4  
9 When most people you know don’t 
believe it 
    
10 When the belief pins the blame for 
something on an identifiable group of 
people rather than something more 
abstract 
    
11 When the conspiracy would have 
required lots of different people to co-
operate  
   +3 
12 When someone you think is credible 
believes it  
+3    
13 When the belief is based on several 
different independent sources of 
evidence 
+4  +4  
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14 When the believer will change their 
mind in light of evidence which 
contradicts the belief 
    
15 When the believer seems to spend a lot 
of time on conspiracy websites  
    
16 When official sources (e.g. government 
reports) do not support it  
    
17 When the believer does not seem 
gullible or naïve 
   +3 
18 When the belief is presented in an 
incoherent and hard to follow manner 
-3   -3 
19 When the belief is supported by a 
whistleblower who has had access to 
secret information 
+3  +4  
20 When the believer only seems to talk to 
people who agree with them 
  -3  
21 When experts seem to disagree about 
the belief 
 -3  -3 
22 When the believer is not obsessed by 
the belief 
    
23 When the belief seems to be the 
simplest explanation of the evidence 
    
24 When the believer can provide 
persuasive evidence for it 
+3  +3  
25 When the believer seems eccentric or 
odd  
    
26 When the believer seems to be open-
minded about alternative explanations 
when they weigh up the evidence  
 +3 +3 +4 
27 When the conclusions reached seem to 
go beyond the evidence 
-3    
28 When you are aware of strong evidence 
which contradicts the belief 
-4 -3 -4  
29 When the belief fits with my own 
political views 
    
30 When the believer appears to have 
mental health difficulties  
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31 When the belief seems to be based on 
opinion rather than fact 
-4  -3 -3 
32 When the argument for a belief seems 
circular 
   -4 
33 When the belief doesn’t involve making 
too many assumptions 
   +3 
34 When the belief just seems intuitively 
right 
 +4   
35 When the believer does not get overly 
emotional about the belief 
 +3   
36 When the believer only cites evidence 
which supports their belief and does not 
mention anything which might 
contradict it 
  -3  
37 When the belief seems to be 
unquestioned within the believer’s 
social group 
   -4 
 
5.2.1. Factor One – A Beliefs Plausibility is Judged through Evidence, 
Consensus and Credibility  
This factor was endorsed by seventeen Q-sorts and accounted for 26% 
of the variance. 
 
5.2.1.1. Characteristic statements 
Participants loading onto this factor emphasise the importance of 
evidence, facts and logic when determining the plausibility of conspiracy beliefs. 
They suggest that a belief is much more plausible when it is based on several 
independent sources of evidence (13: +43), and in the absence of evidence that 
contradicts the belief (28: -4).  
They also seem to consider beliefs to be less plausible when the 
conclusions drawn do not logically fit the evidence (27: -3), or when it involves 
jumping to conclusions (8: -3). They also appear to find a belief less believable 
when it is not presented in a coherent or logical manner (18: -3), when the 
                                                          
3 In this factor, positively ranked items meant that participants considered them to be more 
plausible, and negatively ranked items were less plausible  
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believer does not provide persuasive evidence for the belief (24: +3) and when 
it seems to be based on opinion rather than fact (31: -4). There thus appears to 
be an emphasis on how the believer presents the belief.  
There is also a sense that participants in this factor find a belief 
particularly believable when it is endorsed by someone that they consider to be 
credible (12: +3), particularly academics and scientists (1: +4). However, it also 
appears that they find information that has been exposed by a whistle-blower 
who has access to secret information as more credible (19: +3). As suggested 
by Participant 54, their perception of whether a belief is credible is somewhat 
“determined from where the information originates”. 
 
5.2.1.2. Characteristics of the sorters  
The demographic details of the sorters in this factor were analysed to 
check for any similarities between them. It was found that the average age of 
the group was 40.1, ranging from 25 to 65. Of the seventeen participants, 5 
were women and 12 were men. The majority of participants were White British 
besides one who was Indian, and one who was White but not British. The 
majority were in full-time employment, though two were students, and two were 
retired. All were in relationships to varying levels of commitment (nine were 
married), except three who were single.  
The educational status of the participants was more varied, with seven 
having postgraduate qualifications to one being educated up until secondary 
school. The type of occupation was also varied, ranging from seven 
professionals to one semi-skilled worker. The identified religious beliefs were 
also more diverse, with four identifying as Christians, one as Muslim, one as 
Jewish, over half (ten) having no religious faith and one selected “other”. The 
political beliefs of the participants was also varied with little consensus.  
 
5.2.1.3. Factor summary  
This was the most widely endorsed factor. Overall, sorters in this factor 
emphasise the strength of evidence, consensus and credibility as important 
factors when judging the plausibility of a belief, and placed no importance on 
the characteristics of believers. For the sorters in this factor, there was thus a 
particular focus on how scientific, evidence-based and logical the belief is, and 
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the suggestion that beliefs are more plausible when there is consensus from 
several different sources of evidence. 
Unlike any of the other factors, participants in this factor also suggest 
that a belief is more plausible when endorsed by someone they consider to be 
credible. One suggestion for this was when it was endorsed by academics and 
scientists. They also find information exposed by a whistle-blower who has 
access to secret information as more credible, suggesting that they may 
mistrust official streams of information. It thus appears that the source of the 
information (though they do not emphasise information from the government or 
their social groups) is important to sorters in this group. It also seems that the 
credibility of a belief may be somewhat determined by how the argument is 
structured, how factual it is, and how coherently or logically the believer can 
present the argument.  
 
5.2.2. Factor Two – The Plausibility of a Belief Involves Judgements of the 
Evidence and the Credibility of the Believer  
This factor was endorsed by five Q-sorts and accounted for 14% of the 
variance. 
5.2.2.1. Characteristic statements 
Participants in this factor appear to emphasise the importance of both 
evidence and intuition when determining the plausibility of a belief. It appears 
that they consider a belief to be more credible when it feels intuitively right (34: 
+4), or when it can be hypothetically possible (3: +4).  
However, they also seem to value evidence and suggest that a belief is 
more plausible when the majority of academic or scientists also endorse the 
belief (1: +3). They also seem to consider a belief to be less plausible when the 
evidence is confusing (5: -3) or contradictory (28: -3), when experts disagree on 
the evidence (21: -3), and when conclusions drawn are not supported by the 
evidence (8: -4). 
It also appears that participants in this factor consider a belief to be less 
plausible when the believer is indiscriminately suspicious (6: -4), or when the 
believer becomes very emotional about the belief (35: 3). They suggest that a 
belief is more plausible when a believer is open-minded and will consider 
alternative evidence (26: +3). This is supported by Participant 13 who stated 
that “I feel that my judgement is influenced by the personality of the person who 
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believes in the conspiracy theory, e.g., if they are introverted or social etc.”. 
Participant 15 made similar claims, stating that they “may judge a statement as 
less plausible if the believer has mental health difficulties”. Such statements 
appear to suggest that sorters in this factor are influenced by certain 
characteristics of the believer and how they interact with the belief.   
 
5.2.2.2. Participant characteristics  
The average age of the sorters in this factor was 36.2 and ranged from 
27 to 48, so a marginally younger demographic than in the previous factor. The 
gender divide was approximately equal, with three women and two men. Four 
were employed full-time and one was unemployed. Of those employed, they 
were either professionals, held responsible or non-manual jobs. All sorters were 
in relationships, and all of them lived with their partners or were married.   
Within this factor, two sorters were White British, one was Bangladeshi, one 
was White and Black Caribbean, and one was Black African, and so the group 
was more ethnically diverse than the other factors. The educational attainment 
was also mixed, though all had qualifications post-school. In terms of religious 
beliefs, two of the sorters identified as atheist, one as Christian and two as 
Muslim. For political beliefs, three held Conservative beliefs, one was Green 
Party and the other cited other.   
 
5.2.2.3. Factor summary 
Overall, participants in this factor emphasise evidence, intuition and 
certain characteristics of the believer when evaluating the plausibility of a belief. 
It appears that the sorters in this factor would consider a belief to be less 
plausible if the evidence supporting the belief was illogical, inconsistent or 
confusing. Similar to participants in factor one, they also consider a belief to be 
less plausible when academic or scientific experts do not agree, suggesting that 
they place importance on consensus between relevant experts.  
However, unlike any of the other factors, the sorters judgements also seemed to 
be influenced by what feels intuitively right, or if something is common-sense, 
imaginable or possible. This emphasis on intuition and whether a belief is 
hypothetically possibly may relate to the importance placed on consensus. If 
there is not consensus and thus experts disagree, or the evidence is confusing, 
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they may instead judge the plausibility of a belief on whether it is hypothetically 
possibly and intuitive.  
However, like the sorters in factor three, judgements of plausibility also 
appear to be influenced by certain characteristics of the believer. Sorters in this 
factor suggest that beliefs seem less credible when the believer is suspicious, 
overly emotional about the belief or is rigidly attached to the belief. Of these 
three characteristics, two of them may give one reason to doubt the rationality 
or motives of the believer. If they were indiscriminately suspicious or overly 
emotional then one may think that their beliefs are not based on evidence. As 
the two quotes suggest, they might instead imply something to do with the 
personality or mental health of the believer. This may also be why they suggest 
intuition is important, as they are making implicit judgements about the believer 
as well as the belief. Interestingly, however, sorters in this factor did not rate the 
statements specifically about mental health or eccentricity highly, possibly 
because they felt them to be too judgemental.  
  
5.2.3. Factor Three – Judgements of Plausibility are Influenced by Evidence, 
Credibility and Consensus, but also Characteristics of the Believer   
This factor was endorsed by twelve Q-sorts and accounted for 20% of 
the variance. 
 
5.2.3.1. Characteristic Statements 
Similar to the previous two factors, the participants that load onto this 
factor emphasise the importance of information and evidence. They suggest 
that a belief is more plausible when there are several independent sources of 
evidence (13: +4), and when the participant is not aware of any convincing 
evidence that contradicts the belief (28: -4). They suggest that a belief is less 
plausible when the conclusions drawn are not supported by evidence (8: -4) and 
when it is based on opinion and not fact (31: -3).  
Similar to factor one, participants in this factor suggest that a belief 
needs to be endorsed by the majority of academic researchers and scientists 
(1: +3). They also suggest that it is more plausible when the information comes 
from a whistle-blower and so when the information is not readily available to the 
general public (19: +4). This was supported by Participant 7, who claimed that 
they “trust whistle-blowers who expose secret information as some world 
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leaders and the media hide the truth and take people for idiots by feeding them 
lies”. Participant 53 also suggested that “the power of the media and what they 
do not say has a big impact on beliefs”.  
The participants in this factor also suggest that the believer’s relationship 
with their beliefs can have an impact on their judgements of plausibility. They 
suggest that they consider a belief to be less plausible when the believer only 
talks to those who agree with them (20: -3), or when the believer only cites 
evidence that supports the belief and does not consider anything that 
contradicts it (36: -3). Conversely, they suggest that a belief seems more 
plausible when the believer is open-minded and objectively appraises the 
evidence (26: +3), and if they can provide persuasive evidence for their belief 
(24: +3).   
 
5.2.3.2. Characteristics of the sorters 
The average age of the sorters in this factor was 39.9, and ranged from 
27 to 61. Of the twelve participants, 8 were men. All of the participants were 
White, though three were from countries besides Britain. All of the participants 
were employed full-time besides one who was retired.  
The highest level of educational attainment for the sorters was varied, 
ranging from postgraduate degree to secondary school qualification, as did the 
occupation of the sorters. The relationship status was also varied, though most 
were in a relationship and only three were single. Approximately half of the 
sorters (five) identified as atheist. Six identified as Christian, and one selected 
“other”.  
The political beliefs of the sorters was also very varied. Three were 
Conservatives, three were Labour supporters, one was Liberal Democrats, two 
were Green party supporters, and three selected “other”, suggesting that a 
quarter of the group did not have mainstream political beliefs.  
 
5.2.3.3. Factor summary 
This factor had the second highest number of participants. Similar to the 
sorters in factor one and two, the participants in this factor emphasise the 
strength of evidence for influencing their judgements of plausibility, and also like 
factor one, they valued consensus and evidence derived from numerous 
sources. They also emphasise the structure of the argument and consider a 
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belief to be more plausible when it does not involve sweeping conclusions or 
opinions.  
Like all of the other factors, participants in this factor consider a belief to 
be more plausible when it is supported by academic researchers and scientists 
and like factor one, they suggest that evidence is more credible when it 
originates from a whistle-blower. Whistle-blowers may be more credible 
because they have access to hidden information, or revelatory evidence, and 
take risks to expose that information. Whistle-blowers can thus provide new and 
striking evidence but here, as the quotes illustrate, they can also provide 
evidence that is not readily available such as by the media or politicians. One 
hypothesis for this is that they do not consider the media or world leaders to be 
trustable, and so hidden information has more value. It may be that participants 
in this factor focus on how powerful groups might propound self-interested 
narratives and conspiracy beliefs expose this hidden information.  
Similar to factor two, the sorters in this factor also emphasise the 
influence of the believer when making judgements of plausibility. In this factor, 
however, the focus was on the open-mindedness of the believer, whether they 
only talk to people who agree with them and whether they only cite evidence 
which supports their beliefs. Unlike in factor two, therefore, there is no 
insinuation that the believers are not rational, but that they may be biased and 
may not expose themselves to different kinds of information that may enable 
them to revise their opinions. Therefore, these participants may question a 
believer’s credibility if they stay within a silo and are members of self-reinforcing 
groups.  
 
5.2.4. Factor Four – Plausibility is Influenced by Consensus and Incoherence, 
but also How People Engage with their Beliefs  
This factor was endorsed by three Q-sorts and accounted for 10% of the 
variance. 
 
5.2.4.1. Characteristic statements 
The participants that load onto this factor are focused more on the 
process of the belief and how people judge evidence. Like with the other 
factors, the sorters in this factor consider a belief to be more plausible when it is 
endorsed by researchers and scientists (1: +4), but to be less plausible when 
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experts disagree about the belief (21: -3) and when it is believed 
unquestioningly by the believer’s social group (37: -4). This implies that the 
context from which the belief comes from, and the consensus with which it is 
held seems to be important.  
The participants in this factor also suggest that a believer is more 
credible when they are open-minded about alternative evidence (26: +4), and 
when they are not too gullible or naïve (17: +3). They also suggest that 
plausibility is influenced by how a believer interacts with, make decisions or 
presents their beliefs. They thus suggest that a belief is less plausible when its 
presentation is incoherent or hard to follow (18: -3) and when the argument is 
circular (32: -4). It is also less credible when it is based on opinion (31: -3), 
involves making lots of assumptions (33: +3), or when the narrative of the belief 
is less plausible by requiring the cooperation of lots of different people (11: +3).  
 
5.2.4.1. Characteristics of the sorters 
The average age of sorters in this factor was 40.6 and ranged from 22 to 
50. There were two women and one man. The ethnicity of the group differed, 
with one White British, one Indian and one White and Black African individual. 
Two of the members were atheists, and one held Hindu beliefs. Two worked 
full-time and one was a student. All were educated to degree standard or 
further, and all were in committed relationships (cohabiting or married). All 
identified as having responsible or professional jobs, and all held Conservative 
political beliefs.  
 
5.2.4.2. Factor summary  
This factor had the smallest number of sorters and was more focussed 
on how people engage with their beliefs. Whilst it shared several items with 
factors one, two and three (e.g., consensus between experts, coherence, open-
mindedness, experts disagreeing and opinion versus fact), there were five 
unique items which seemed to focus more on the process of judging the belief.  
Sorters in this factor emphasise the idea that a believer presenting the belief is 
not just naively accepting information from their social group. The belief also 
becomes less plausible when it assumes an improbable number of people co-
operating and thus the narrative becomes too complex. It thus seems that they 
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consider a belief to be less plausible when it involves making too many 
assumptions.  
Judgements of plausibility also seems to be dependent on the reasoning 
for the belief, with a belief appearing less credible when the argument is 
circular. Unlike in any of the other factors, the sorters in this factor also 
suggested that the gullibility of the believer is important. Perhaps this group 
views these beliefs as unsophisticated and their believers as not able to 
properly reason about their beliefs.  
 
5.3. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed four different accounts for how participants 
judge the plausibility of a belief. The author has offered some interpretation of 
these factors, with some focus on their similarities and differences. These 
factors will be further discussed in the discussion chapter, with consideration of 
how they fit to the wider literature.  
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6.0 DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.1. Chapter Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the author will start by summarising the main findings of 
this study in relation to the research questions, before contextualising these 
findings within the wider research literature. The author will initially focus on 
what has been learned about conspiracy beliefs in general and then how the 
findings may relate to the literature on delusional beliefs. This will be followed 
by a critical evaluation of the study and then discussion of the wider 
implications.  
 
6.2. Summary of Research Questions  
 
The aim of the first Q-sort was to address the research question: How do 
individuals identify certain beliefs to be conspiracy beliefs and the people who 
believe them to be conspiracy believers? Of those participated in this study, five 
factors were extracted and interpreted, suggesting five separate ways of 
conceptualising what conspiracy beliefs are. These five factors and an 
overarching summary of each factor are listed in table 8. 
 
Table 8.  
Summary of the Factors for Q-sort one  
Factor Description of the Factor 
Factor One Conspiracy beliefs are false, illogical and harmful beliefs 
Factor Two What gets labelled as a conspiracy belief are attempts to 
expose the truth 
Factor Three There are different kinds of conspiracy beliefs, with different 
consequences 
Factor Four Conspiracy beliefs involve entertaining beliefs about elites 
acting conspiratorially but do not prevent them from gaining 
power 
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Factor Five Conspiracy beliefs are unsophisticated beliefs about religious 
groups and politicians held by a self-reinforcing minority 
 
 
The aim of the second Q-sort was to address the research question: 
“What factors of a conspiratorial belief (i.e. a ‘conspiracy theory’) make it seem 
implausible to participants?” From the participants in this study, four factors 
were extracted and interpreted. Although there was some overlap between 
these factors, the results suggest four different narratives for judging the 
plausibility of a belief. These four factors are listed in table 9.  
 
Table 9.  
Summary of the factors for Q-sort two 
Factor Description of the Factor 
Factor One A beliefs plausibility is judged through evidence, consensus 
and credibility 
Factor Two The plausibility of a belief involves judgements of the 
evidence and the credibility of the believer 
Factor Three Judgements of plausibility are influenced by evidence, 
credibility and consensus, but also characteristics of the 
believer   
Factor Four Plausibility is influenced by consensus and incoherence, but 
also how people engage with their beliefs 
 
 
6.3. Discussing Findings within the Context of the Literature 
 
Previous research exploring unusual beliefs has downplayed the role of 
the hearer of beliefs and implicitly assumed that they share the same ideas 
about the characteristics that make a belief unusual or seem implausible. 
Previous research has also rested on the assumption that the concept of a 
delusional belief is unproblematic, though debates about definitions of delusions 
suggest that this is not the case (e.g., Fulford, 1991; Harper, 1994; Oltmanns, 
1998).  Although some studies (e.g., O’Connor & Vandenberg, 2005, 2010) 
have looked at the potential influence of diagnoser’s assumptions (e.g. about 
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religious beliefs), this study looks at how members of the general public 
understand a belief to be unusual and how they judge its plausibility.  
This is important as members of the general public regularly make 
decisions about the beliefs of others, and mental health professionals that 
diagnose delusional beliefs are also drawn from this population.  Continuum 
approaches (e.g., Freeman, 2006; Johns, 2005; Peters et al., 1999a, 1999b) 
also suggest that a significant minority of the general population hold unusual 
beliefs without experiencing any difficulties. There is thus a risk of 
inappropriately pathologising beliefs and diagnosing beliefs as delusional on the 
basis of ‘taken for granted’ assumptions (e.g. common-sense judgements of 
plausibility).  
 
6.3.1. Conspiracy Beliefs 
6.3.1.1. Conceptualisations  
Within this study, conspiracy beliefs were explored due to evidence that 
suggests that they share many of the same features of delusional beliefs (e.g., 
Corlett, 2015; Dagnall et al., 2015; Sutton, 2004). However, a focus on 
conspiracy beliefs is also arguably important in its own right, specifically in 
terms of how people evaluate information. This is particularly significant given 
the prevalence and impact of conspiracy beliefs in everyday discourse and 
debate, and the harmful effects that they may have (e.g. leading to cynicism or 
apathy about political topics, understanding of science or decisions about 
health). Such beliefs may be particularly dominant at times of uncertainty, such 
as when information is conflicting or when there is debate. This may be 
because conspiracy beliefs can help people to find meaning when events 
appear random (Douglas, Sutton & Cichocka, 2017), or give people a sense of 
control by rejecting official narratives (Goertzel, 1994).  
As discussed in the introduction, there is significant debate about how 
conspiracy beliefs are defined, with the current understanding being fairly 
abstract and based on an implicit homogenising assumption (i.e., that the term 
conspiracy belief represents one universal construct). Broadly speaking, 
previous definitions suggest that conspiracy beliefs involve a secret group of 
dominant others, who plot destructive or adverse events which have negative 
consequences (e.g., Aaronovitch, 2010; Byford, 2011; Dentith & Orr, 2017). 
They are also generally assumed to include powerful and malevolent groups 
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(Douglas et al., 2019), vary significantly in terms of their content (Samory & 
Mitra, 2018) and are not supported by evidence (Freeman & Bentall, 2017). 
Moreover, whilst there is some research examining the psychological or 
cognitive processes of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Brotherton & French, 2014; 
Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Swami et al., 2014; van 
Prooijen, Douglas, & De Inocencio, 2018) and some of the causal factors which 
increase the propensity of holding conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 
2011; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), no previous research (to the authors 
knowledge) has focussed on the hearer of conspiracy beliefs.  
The first Q-sort highlighted five separate narratives for understanding 
conspiracy beliefs. Whilst the first factor suggests a dominant understanding of 
conspiracy beliefs, the other factors suggest that there are other interpretations. 
In contrast to the generic conceptualisation of conspiracy beliefs, therefore, this 
study highlights a multiplicity of understandings, with some participants 
endorsing more typical tropes (e.g., conspirators acting in secret, information 
not being shared, that there are plans and connections behind world events), 
and others holding views that diverge from typical understandings. For example, 
whilst this study supports the classic idea that conspiracy beliefs are harmful 
and negative (e.g., Lamberty & Imhoff, 2018; Lantian et al., 2018; Thorburn & 
Bogart, 2005), it also supports the limited research that suggests that 
conspiracy beliefs can have benefits and positive consequences, such as by 
inspiring and justifying protest movements (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) or increasing 
government transparency (Clarke, 2002). This disparity in understanding 
conspiracy beliefs was further highlighted by some participants suggesting that 
conspiracy beliefs are benign, with neither helpful nor harmful properties.  
Another example of difference was that whilst some participants 
emphasised the idea that conspiracy beliefs involve powerful or hostile 
outgroups (e.g., Douglas et al., 2019), others did not. There was also 
divergence in who they considered the conspirators to be. This could in some 
way perhaps be related to the demographics of the sorter (Imhoff & Lamberty, 
2018; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014). In factor three, for example, the 
sorters were more likely to have religious beliefs and to also consider the target 
of conspiracies to be religious groups, and so those sorters may have had 
different exposure or experiences of conspiracy beliefs.  
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The first Q-sort also showed an apparent difference in how participants 
felt about conspiracy beliefs, with some demonstrating more positive views than 
others. There also appeared to be divergence in the perceived legitimacy of the 
term ‘conspiracy belief’, with some refuting its legitimacy and thus suggesting 
that it is used as a term to discredit or disqualify a belief (Harambam & Aupers, 
2017; McKenzie-McHarg & Fredheim, 2017; Räikkä & Basham, 2018). 
Interestingly, the demographics of the sorters in factors that appeared to hold a 
more favourable view of conspiracy beliefs tended to fit with the more typical 
demographic features of conspiracy believers, such as that they were younger 
men (e.g., Freeman & Bental, 2017). It is thus possible that some of the 
participants in this study held conspiracy beliefs or at least viewed them 
positively. The first Q-sort thus clearly demonstrated a broad range in 
understanding conspiracy beliefs, and thus further questioned the validity and 
reliability of the existing conceptualisation.  
 
6.3.1.2. Judgements of plausibility  
The second Q-sort also elicited four separate narratives of how hearers 
of conspiracy belief claims judge their plausibility. The author found no previous 
research exploring this, and so therefore suggests that the current study has 
opened a new channel of information, and thus further potential avenues for 
research. Overall, the first factor suggests a dominant approach to assessing 
plausibility, though the other factors suggest a range of other indications. 
Though certain statements were important features of all four factors (e.g., the 
evidence and credibility of the belief, and the consensus with which it is held), 
each factor varied in the extent to which it was influenced by other variables, 
with some emphasising features such as the characteristics of the believer, and 
others stressing the coherence of the argument. 
Given the lack of previous research, the author attempted to consider 
whether this research fit with broader claims about how the public assess the 
evidence of scientific information. There are a small number of studies that 
consider public understandings of science. Of these, evidence suggests that 
approximately half of the public implicitly trust scientific claims with no specific 
reason and without verification of the claims. However, they are considered to 
be more plausible when heard directly from a scientist and not via a journalist, 
and so the source of the information appears to be important (Castell et al., 
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2014). Other evidence suggests that consensus for the scientific claims can 
increase judgements of plausibility, but that this is moderated by a participants 
overall trust in science (Chinn, Lane & Hart, 2018). This fits with research 
examining the decision-making around climate change. Evidence suggests that 
despite scientific uncertainty, because the vast majority of scientists endorse 
the same viewpoint, the general public are also more likely to endorse that 
viewpoint (Bertoldo et al., 2019). Other evidence also suggests that judgements 
of plausibility are influenced by people’s emotional responses to the scientific 
information being presented (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2020). The current study 
thus appears to offer some support for the research examining judgements of 
scientific claims in general, as well as highlighting other factors that can 
influence decision-making.  
Overall, therefore, this study suggests a range of different factors that 
appear to influence how conspiracy beliefs are constructed and the plausibility 
of  belief claims are judged. These factors will now be further considered in 
terms of how they relate to research concerning the conceptualisation and 
assessment of delusional beliefs.  
 
6.3.2. Delusions 
6.3.2.1. Conceptualisations  
Of most relevance to the aims of this study is what can be learned and 
applied to the existing literature concerning how delusional beliefs are 
understood and evaluated. The author was interested in how judgements of 
plausibility occur within everyday social contexts, but also how this can be 
applied to mental health settings, as the study design rests on the premise that 
despite training, professionals are a sub-population of the general population. 
Unlike previous research, this study attempts to extract the assumptive 
framework of the hearer. The author will begin by considering the implications of 
the first Q-sort. 
As the different factors extracted from the first Q-sort highlight, there are 
numerous different understandings of conspiracy beliefs and so they cannot be 
categorised as one homogenous construct. Whilst some focus on different 
targets (e.g., religious groups, officials or elites), others do not make any 
inferences about who the targets are. Moreover, others disagree in terms of 
how helpful, benign or harmful they can be. Similar to the concept of a 
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conspiracy belief, there is also significant debate about how delusional beliefs 
are conceptualised. This construct has been criticised for problems of reliability 
and validity, heterogeneity and co-morbidity (e.g., Bentall, 2004; Kirk & 
Kutchins, 1992; Kutchins & Kirk, 1999; Rogers & Pilgim, 2003), and so these 
findings may also be helpful for understanding the conceptual limitations 
observed in delusional beliefs.  
This research may help to explain, for example, why diagnosers do not 
always agree when trying to determine if someone is ‘delusional’. Current 
understandings of delusional beliefs within mental health contexts are based on 
the assumption that beliefs lie in the head of the believer (Gergen, 1985) or 
exist separately from the individuals who make the judgements and the 
individuals who make the belief claims (Fernando, 1997). There is also an 
assumption that diagnosers have a list of criteria that they just apply in a 
straightforward way, yet research suggests that despite being trained to use 
diagnostic criteria, mental health professionals only agreed on approximately 
50% of occassions (Kirk & Kutchins, 1994).  
There is also evidence to suggest that diagnosers demonstrate flexibility 
in the criteria they use to interpret a delusion (Harper, 1994; Rosenham, 1973). 
Harland et al., (2009) used a questionnaire to assess the attitudes of trainee 
psychiatrists towards four mental illnesses and eight models of mental illness 
(e.g., psychodynamic, biological). They found that they were not fully committed 
to one particular explanatory model. Attitudes to schizophrenia were the most 
uniform, with the biological model most strongly endorsed, though the model 
used generally varied according to the illness in question. Dependent on the 
model drawn upon, therefore, a diagnoser may have a completely different 
conceptualisation of a delusional belief. This study thus supports research that 
suggests that hearers of belief have different criteria for understanding them, 
and that this is influenced by numerous factors.  
Such factors may include the content of the beliefs, whether people 
agree with them, their underlying meaning or the identity of the believer. 
O’Connor and Vandenberg (2010), for example, suggest that the background of 
a hearer may cause them to perceive a belief differently (i.e., the perception of a 
belief was influenced by a hearers level of familiarity with the belief and how 
similar it is to their own beliefs). This may thus explain why some consider a 
delusion to be a meaningless symptom of an illness, whilst others consider it to 
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be related to the meaning of someone’s life. This would thus have significant 
implications for how an individual is diagnosed and then treated within mental 
health settings. 
The variation in how beliefs are conceptualised in this study may thus 
also offer support for the idea that delusional beliefs are contextually dependent 
and multi-dimensional (Gilleen & David, 2005). This would also fit better with 
more dimensional and less absolutist views of delusions. Oltmann (1998), for 
example, postulates that whether a belief is delusional or not may be best 
determined by flexibly considering a list of characteristics where none alone are 
sufficient.  
Both Q-sorts also emphasised the interactional process of attempting to 
make sense of a belief claim, and trying to judge its plausibility. For example, 
some participants suggest that the term “conspiracy belief” can be used by a 
hearer to undermine a believer’s argument, whilst others suggest that certain 
characteristics of the believer will influence the decision of a hearer. This fits 
with research by Lemert (1962; 1967) who focused on the interactional context 
of deciding that a belief may be delusional and suggested that the judgement 
about whether a belief is unusual is not determined by the believer but how the 
person listening makes sense of the belief. The second Q-sort in this study also 
suggests that numerous other factors may influence how members of the 
general population judge the plausibility of a belief. Given that trying to better 
understand these decision-making processes was the overarching aim of this 
study, the author will consider the implications of each factor separately.   
 
6.3.2.2. Judgements of plausibility  
The first and most widely endorsed of the factors suggested that the 
participants focussed almost exclusively on evidence, consensus and credibility 
when trying to assess the plausibility of a belief. This relates to one of the basic 
problems with the diagnostic process and the assumption that beliefs are 
straight-forwardly empirically verifiable. Within the diagnostic interview, the 
believer is expected to present evidence to support their belief claims despite 
the fact that most beliefs cannot be directly proven or investigated (Harper, 
2011a), especially within the interview process. Therefore, this reliance on 
evidence and proof to attempt to verify someone’s belief claims may not be 
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feasible, particularly as it is difficult to provide formally incontrovertible proof 
against most belief claims (Harper, 1994).  
The sorters in this factor also suggested that the coherence of the 
narrative and how the argument is presented will influence their judgements of 
plausibility. This fits to some extent with research looking at how jurors make 
decisions about the credibility of someone’s testimony in courtrooms. Bennett 
and Feldman (2014) suggested that a narrative becomes less plausible when 
there are numerous ambiguities, incomplete information or gaps in the story. 
This also supports the limited previous research which has tried to explore how 
judgements of the plausibility of delusional beliefs are made, which has 
suggested that it may be influenced by how a speaker communicates their 
belief claim (McCabe et al., 2004).  
Moreover, the sorters in factor one were predominantly White British men 
who were in full-time employment. Their factual and logical approach to 
plausibility resonates with research that suggests that cultural norms within 
psychology and psychiatry reflect a ‘universal standard’, where anything that 
differs from the Western Euro-American or European male is considered 
irrational (Caplan & Cosgrove, 2004; Gaines, 1995). This may mean that 
anyone with beliefs that deviate from these Western normative values may be 
considered to be unusual, e.g., people from different religious backgrounds 
(O’Connor and Vandenberg; 2005, Rogers & Pilgrim, 2014).  
The second and third factors incorporated judgments about believers and 
what factors may diminish their credibility. This ties into research which 
suggests that service-users beliefs may be considered less plausible because 
of judgments made about them as a person, as well as the beliefs, perceptions 
and the cultural assumptions of the hearer (e.g., Bennett, 1997). 
In factor two, the participants suggested that their judgments of 
plausibility were particularly influenced by how emotional the believer is, or how 
suspicious they are. This has implications for mental health settings if mental 
health professionals are assumed to be influenced, at least to some extent, by 
the same factors as the general public. This may mean that if they consider 
someone as too emotional about their belief, the rationality of that person may 
be dismissed. However, in clinical settings, becoming emotional about ones 
belief may be justified as the implications of holding a belief are greater, 
especially as mental health professionals have the capacity to section someone 
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on the grounds of their belief. There was also suggestion that a belief would be 
less plausible if someone has a mental illness which supports the idea that the 
claims of an individual are seen as less persuasive to others if they are 
positioned as a psychiatric patient (e.g. Rosenhan 1973; Sanati & Kyratsous, 
2015).   
The participants in factor two also suggested that they relied upon more 
intuitive reasoning processes, which they may employ in the absence of 
evidence. This fits with research that suggests that within the diagnostic 
interview, mental health professionals usually judge the plausibility of a belief on 
the basis of ‘common-sense’ (Maher, 1992) and rhetorical resources, rather 
than rigidly employing objective criteria. Research suggests that this is often 
influenced by factors such as the physical characteristics, social category and 
emotional state of the believer (Harper, 1999). The sorters in this factor were 
also more ethnically diverse than in the other factors. One potential hypothesis 
for the importance of intuition for this group of sorters may be that certain 
cultures place more emphasis on different types of reasoning, with some 
cultures preferring more intuitive reasoning than others (e.g. Epstein, Pacini, 
Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). It could 
also be that individuals from different ethnic backgrounds have had more 
exposure to a greater range of beliefs (e.g., in religious or political circles etc.) 
which may perhaps include beliefs where evidence is not available or is hard to 
judge. 
In factor three, there was suggestion that a believer is less credible if 
they exist within a self-reinforcing social circle and thus do not access 
alternative information. The same sort of scenario is less easy to apply to 
mental health settings as beliefs are generally idiosyncratic, though there are 
instances to suggest that a shared delusional belief system can develop within 
families (La folie à deux; Lasègue & Falret, 1877). They also indicate that they 
consider a belief to be less plausible when a believer makes too many 
assumptions, thus suggesting that their narrative may be biased. The sorters in 
this factor also suggest that information that is kept from the public, or 
revelatory evidence from whistle-blowers is particularly persuasive which may 
imply that they do not consider the media or world leaders to be trustworthy. 
This could in some way reflect the divergent political views of the group, with a 
quarter of them not holding mainstream political beliefs. This would further 
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indicate that the particular ideological worldview of a hearer may influence how 
they judge the plausibility of a belief.  
The participants in both the second and third factors thus appear to be 
influenced by certain characteristics of the believer. This supports research that 
suggests that an individual’s membership of a certain social category may affect 
how their distress is judged by others (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003; Rogers & 
Pilgrim, 2003), and that the assumptions and worldview of the hearer may have 
a very influential impact on how beliefs are judged (Georgaca, 2000, 2004). 
Diagnosing a delusion based on facets of individual judgement may be a further 
reason for why professionals reach different diagnostic conclusions. This may 
lead to serious epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007), which will have significant 
implications within everyday contexts, but particularly in mental health settings.  
The fourth factor also considered factors such as consensus and 
coherence, but also focussed on the belief process and reasoning. There is 
much discussion in clinical psychology and cognitive behavioural approaches 
which focus on appraisal and reasoning biases when trying to understand the 
processes underlying delusional beliefs. For example, cognitive behavioural 
approaches suggest that those holding delusional beliefs are more prone to 
reasoning biases or certain thinking styles (e.g., Freeman et al., 2002; Garety & 
Freeman, 1999; Freeman & Garety, 2014). Those in this factor suggest that if a 
believer appears gullible their beliefs will be judged as less plausible, 
suggesting that they do not consider believers to be able to adequately reason 
when considering their beliefs. The belief also becomes less plausible when the 
narratives become less probable, the argument is not logical or it involves 
making too many assumptions.  
Overall, therefore, this study supports the literature that suggest that a 
delusional belief is not a homogenous construct. It also suggests that people 
emphasise different aspects of a belief when judging its plausibility. The 
possibility that mental health professionals might have different implicit 
assumptions about what a delusion is and what makes a belief seem more (or 
less) plausible will have important implications. How delusional beliefs are 
conceptualised thus requires further exploration, with particular emphasis on the 
impact of this in clinical settings. This study thus suggests the need to answer 
new questions about delusional beliefs, instead of trying to find new ways to 
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answer old ones. With this in mind, the author will now discuss some of the 
limitations of the current study. 
 
6.4. Critical Review  
 
6.4.1. Evaluation of the Research 
The author will begin the critical review with an evaluation of the research 
process and design. This will be followed by a critical appraisal of some of the 
limitations of the study. To evaluate the quality of this study, the author will use 
the markers for qualitative research. This is because despite being a mixed-
methods design, the typical markers of quantitative research (i.e., reliability, 
validity, generalisability, representativeness and objectivity) cannot be readily 
applied to Q-methodology (Kitzinger, 1999). Spencer and Ritchie (2012) 
identified three recurring principles (applicable across most epistemological 
perspectives) that underpin concepts of quality for qualitative studies. Each of 
these principles will be considered in turn, whilst keeping in mind that due to the 
qualitative nature of these criteria, they are susceptible to alternative 
interpretations (Yardley, 2000).  
 
6.4.1.1. Contribution 
Contribution is the first criteria and refers to the relevance and value of 
the research evidence in terms of theory, practice or policy, and requires that 
the study develops existing understandings. Some of the implications of this 
study have been discussed later in this chapter. The author hopes, however, 
that the biggest impact of this work is to create positive changes in clinical 
settings by trying to improve ethical practice, particularly in settings which are 
typically dominated by medical discourses. The author anticipates that this 
study can contribute to this aim by demonstrating several equally valid accounts 
for how unusual beliefs are understood and assessed, and by encouraging 
mental health professionals to question their own worldviews, biases and 
assumptions. The author also hopes that this study will open up new avenues of 
research that considers how unusual or delusional beliefs are conceptualised 
and how people make judgements of their plausibility.  
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6.4.1.2. Credibility  
Credibility refers to the plausibility and defensibility of the claims made by 
the research. It thus relates to how believable the findings are, as well as how 
compellingly a claim is made and supported by evidence (Seale, 2007; 
Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 2001). This criterion suggests that interpretations 
must be grounded in the data collected within the study, especially if the 
findings were not as expected, and there must be demonstration that alternative 
explanations have been considered.   
As credibility rests on the evidence presented, the author tried to 
demonstrate this through the inclusion of data extracts and verbatim quotations 
to show how interpretation was grounded in the data and through transparent, 
clear and reflexive documentation of the research process (see Appendix D). Q-
methodology also provides statistical credibility to these interpretations by 
extracting statistical patterns across a large group. The author also attempted to 
check credibility by using two analysts (the author and research supervisor), by 
elucidating transparent criteria to select appropriate factors, through peer 
reviews of the study design at every step of the process and by asking 
participants to comment on the study process.  
 
6.4.1.3. Rigour  
Rigour is postulated to be synonymous with validity and relates to the 
defensibility of the approach. This includes having a convincing rationale for the 
choice of methodology (Mason, 2002; Patton, 2002), a clear logic of inquiry and 
ensuring that the study meet its aims (Fournier & Smith, 1993), and 
thoroughness throughout the processes of data collection, analysis and 
reporting the findings.  
The importance of transparency and reflexivity is thus important, and the 
author attempted to ensure this through careful documentation of the research 
process, clearly outlining and justifying any decision-making processes, trying to 
obtain as representative a sample as possible, acknowledging the limitations of 
the design and by including the factor loadings in the document (as shown by 
presenting the full factor arrays in appendices N and Q). Viewing something 
from only the author’s perspective will limit the insights that can be made but by 
including the factor arrays in this document, the author hopes to enable open 
discussion of their interpretations. This may open new ways of understanding 
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the data and new potential areas of investigation. This is also argued to be 
more in keeping with a social constructionist approach of making sense of 
knowledge. The author has also detailed any assumptions made and where 
relevant has critically reflected upon the work.  
 
6.4.2. Study Limitations  
6.4.2.1. Limitations of the methodology 
Despite increasing in popularity, Q-methodology is still not a commonly 
used methodology within psychological research (van Exel & de Graaf, 2005) 
and so may be misconstrued by other researchers (Kitzinger, 1999). As the 
method is a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative factors, it may be 
criticised by both types of researchers which may be inappropriate as it should 
not be evaluated against criteria that are not appropriate or applicable 
(Kitzinger, 1999).  
As discussed in chapter two, the author chose to apply different criteria 
for selecting how many factors to extract and retain in the final solution. The 
author chose this due to the context of this research, as within clinical settings 
and through application of the DSM-5, a belief would be dismissed as 
implausible due to a series of fixed, rigid criteria. The author thus considered 
that it would contradict the aims and the epistemological position of the study to 
rigidly apply the same criteria to both Q-sorts when this would limit the wealth of 
knowledge and the number of accounts that could be elucidated from the study.  
Nevertheless, deciding which criteria to use (alongside other qualitative 
aspects of the research) are evidently limited by the author’s experience, 
assumptions and context as a researcher. The author has attempted to provide 
alternative interpretations as much as possible. However, it is possible that if 
someone else were to look at the data from this study they may have alternative 
interpretations or ideas. Rather than this becoming a debate over one particular 
‘truth’, this methodology can readily accommodate multiple ‘truths’ within the 
factors extracted from the study, which also fits with the epistemological position 
espoused throughout the study. Another potential limitation to the design, 
however, is that the factors extracted from this particular study might look 
completely different if another sample of participants were to complete the 
study, or even if the same participants were to complete the study again but at a 
different time.  
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Moreover, as Q-methodology adopts a quasi-normal distribution for 
arranging the statements, some participants may have felt constrained in how 
they could respond. This was suggested in a comment by two of the 
participants who felt that they agreed or disagreed with more statements than 
they could select. This may have caused participants to feel frustrated and may 
not have enabled participants to provide a full description of their perspective. It 
is also possible that participants may have felt that they could not have agreed 
or disagreed with most/ all of the statements if they wished to. The author tried 
to circumvent this problem by creating a representative and balanced Q-set that 
captured an unbiased full range of possible opinions in relation to each research 
question. This was designed to ensure that participants could respond to the 
research questions in any way that they wanted using the items provided with a 
range of contrasting opinions and items that they could both agree and disagree 
with.  
 
6.4.2.2. Limitations of the design  
Q-methodology provides a series of statements and thus a broad range 
of different viewpoints to select from and then rank. As there were two Q-sorts, 
the author tried to keep the Q-sets as short as possible to avoid participants 
becoming bored, and to avoid issues of complexity. As Brown (1980) 
suggested, with just 33 statements there would be over 11000 possible ways for 
statements to be arranged.  
However, although the author attempted to ensure that all of the themes 
identified in the concourse were sampled in each Q-sort, it may have meant that 
some areas were overlooked. Moreover, the concourse sampled was generated 
by the author and research supervisor, and thus subject to their biases and 
assumptions. Most previous research examining conspiracy beliefs has 
focussed more on the content of the beliefs and the characteristics about 
believers. Without previous research to draw upon, it was hard to know what 
items to focus on. There are thus potentially lots of other factors that are still 
unknown. 
The author tried to rectify these potential problems by asking a small 
sample of the general public to review the statements once they had been 
generated, and by conducting a small pilot study. This was designed to help to 
ensure that the statements were clear and understandable, streamlined, and 
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enabled the author to ensure that there were other perspectives involved. 
Reassuringly, however, Stainton Rogers (1995) suggests that important 
information can still be gathered from Q-sorts that do not have perfect Q-sets. 
 
6.4.2.3. Online difficulties  
Besides the apparent benefits of cost, time and effort of conducting the 
study online, this also meant that the author was unable to know who completed 
it, who did not and who dropped out. There were two comments that the 
software programme was confusing, and the author had one person email to 
say they found it too confusing to complete. The researcher’s absence thus 
meant that they were unable to answer questions about the logistics of the 
study, the meanings of the statements, or gain further understanding of 
participants’ subjectivity. It was also not possible to ascertain whether it was 
completed in a sensible way.  
Whilst having a pre-developed programme to conduct a Q-methodology 
study online was very helpful, future programmes may want to consider making 
the completion of the follow-up questions a requirement of the study, as well as 
collecting basic data about participants who started and did not complete the 
study. The design was also somewhat difficult to use and so making the 
instructions larger on the screen, and perhaps having an interactive trial at the 
start to the study would have been helpful.  
Moreover, it may have been more helpful for the author to have 
conducted a brief semi-structured telephone interview after each Q-sort. This 
could increase the quality and amount of feedback obtained from participants 
about how they rated the statements. If this study were replicated in the future, 
this would certainly be one way of assisting the interpretation of the data that 
was generated from this study. However, this adjustment would need to be 
considered alongside the time implications for participants as any increase in 
the amount of time required to complete the data collection might act as a 
deterrent from participating.   
 
6.4.2.4. Recruitment of participants  
One further potential limitation of this study was the use of opportunity 
sampling to recruit participants. Though the author attempted to recruit from 
around the UK and thus achieve a sample representative of the UK population, 
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people from non-White backgrounds were under-represented. Gathering the 
perspectives of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds would be invaluable for 
exploring cultural differences in the judgments of plausibility. It is thus important 
that future research incorporates a more varied demographic sample of 
participants to attempt to understand whether the factors extracted in this study 
are also important across other cultures and ethnicities. With these limitations in 
mind, the author will next consider the wider implications of this study.  
 
6.4.3. Reflexivity  
As this thesis is an exploration of subjectivity, the author considered it to 
be particularly pertinent to reflect upon their personal influence on the research 
process. The author considers their influence to be inherent from the very 
beginning of this process, from when the author decided to research this 
particular topic area. The author was personally attracted to this area due to 
personal motivations to better understand the processes that influence how 
decisions of plausibility are made by mental health professionals. This was 
predominantly motivated by the author’s values and beliefs about the 
importance of equality, and in light of research that suggests that the 
judgements of mental health professionals around whether something is 
unusual or pathological may be obscured by their own implicit assumptions and 
biases. The author was personally motivated to better understand this due to 
the potential injustices that may arise as a result of biased judgements, and the 
everyday implications that these injustices may have in clinical settings and 
numerous other contexts, including legal and social. With these wider 
implications in mind, the author was also interested in how judgments of 
plausibility are made by members of the general population, and why the 
testimony of some individuals is given less credible than others.  
The author thus decided that a useful way of exploring this would be by 
studying the general population. The author also made the assumption that as 
mental health professionals are a subset of the general population, any 
conclusions drawn about the general population sample could also be applied 
(at least to some extent) to mental health professionals. The author also made 
the assumption that delusional or unusual beliefs could be explored by 
focussing specifically on conspiracy beliefs. The author based this rationale on 
research which suggests that delusional and conspiratorial beliefs share certain 
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similarities. Whilst the author has tried to justify these claims and find evidence 
to support them, there is a possibility that such assumptions are misinformed or 
biased, and so the conclusions that were drawn from this particular research 
project may be influenced by these factors. The author also acknowledges that 
they lean towards a particular way of understanding unusual beliefs, which is 
from the perspective that they may make sense when considered within the 
context of an individual’s social reality. The author has tried to remain neutral 
and not allow their personal views of unusual beliefs to influence the items 
presented to the participants, though the likelihood is that it will have had some 
impact on the overall design process.  
The author’s influence was also present at every further step of the 
design process. For example, the author selected the items that were included 
in the concourse and then in each Q-set. Although the author tried to sample as 
broad of range of sources as possible, it is possible that they missed something, 
that certain areas were over- or under-represented, or that they interpreted the 
information in line with their own perceptions, which may have impacted on the 
quality and breadth of the data. The author also selected how many factors to 
retain in the final solution, and then how these were interpreted. It is likely, 
however, that the interpretation of the accounts was influenced to some extent 
by the author’s context as a researcher, and their social, cultural and 
psychological understanding of conspiracy beliefs, as well as their beliefs about 
the issues of injustice surrounding judgements of plausibility. The author was 
also aware of issues of power when interpreting the data as the author had 
access to certain theories that they were able to draw upon to make 
interpretations about what the sorters in each account may have thought. The 
author was thus aware that they must be sensitive to researcher dominance 
and miscommunication (Cohn & Lyons, 2003).  
One attempt to overcome these issues was through the inclusion of 
qualitative questions to enrich the information gathered and to allow participants 
to discuss their choices, but the information gathered was minimal and an area 
that needs to be improved in future studies. The author also attempted to follow 
the standard procedures for designing a Q-methodology study as much as 
possible, be transparent about any assumptions made and ground the 
interpretations in the data. One of the reasons that attracted the author to Q-
methodology was because it allows for multiple truths. The author felt that 
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making the data available in the appendices was important, and reflected their 
position as a researcher which is to invite open discussion of their 
interpretations and to enrich the narratives that they extracted from this study. 
The author felt that their main aim as a researcher was to open up new ways of 
understanding these issues, to obtain multiple perspectives and to create 
further avenues of investigation, which they hope was apparent throughout the 
research process.  
 
6.5. Implications  
 
The findings of this study have important implications for future research, 
social policy and within clinical practice. The author will initially consider the 
implications for conspiracy beliefs in general, before attempting to relate this to 
the broader concept of delusional beliefs and thus mental health contexts.  
 
6.5.1. Conspiratorial Beliefs  
Whilst this study focused on conspiracy beliefs as they share many 
characteristics with delusional beliefs, this study may have important 
implications for future research concerning conspiracy beliefs. Whilst the 
previous literature has traditionally focussed on how people reason, the 
characteristics of the believer and intrapsychic factors, this study offers new 
territory for conspiracy belief research by potentially opening up other ways of 
understanding how members of the general public think about conspiracy 
beliefs (and thus a shift away from broader, homogenous descriptions). It also 
offers an exploration of how people weight different factors when judging how 
plausible conspiracy belief claims are.  
The findings of this study may also have important implications for social 
policy and how conspiracy beliefs affect the way important topics such as 
politics, science and health are spoken about. As research suggests, 
conspiracy beliefs can have potentially harmful effects, such as by not engaging 
with public health interventions (e.g., Thorburn & Bogart, 2005), through social 
exclusion (e.g., Lantian et al., 2018) and through exclusion from political 
discourse (Goertzel, 1994; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a).  When trying to counter 
conspiracy belief claims, it is thus important to understand that people have 
different worldviews and thus alternative ways of determining whether a belief is 
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conspiratorial or not. It is generally assumed that people try to judge the 
plausibility of a belief through fact checking, reasoning or evidence, but this 
study demonstrates that there are numerous other factors involved. Thus, whilst 
it is important to try to teach people how to reason or properly weigh evidence, it 
is also clear that counter conspiracy arguments need to be framed in different 
ways. This study begins by suggesting that people with different worldviews will 
need to be approached differently.  
Similarly, educators may use the findings to develop educational 
programmes that move away from the current focus on fact-checking and 
reasoning skills to evaluate evidence and instead emphasise more relevant 
criteria. For example, factor two in Q-sort one indicates that some people feel 
that conspiracy beliefs may be attempts to expose the truth (and are thus 
sceptical about the media and the influence of elites), and so may be wary of 
messages that stress how the majority of scientists think about a topic. For 
these kinds of views, a more nuanced approach might be useful. Educators 
could perhaps draw on the history of science to demonstrate that some ideas 
that are now accepted were originally a minority view but that this only occurred 
through empirical research that gradually developed enough facts to enable 
paradigm change. The second Q-sort also suggests that simply focusing on the 
reasoning behind a belief may be inadequate.  For example, factors two and 
three suggest that educators might encourage people to consider the credibility 
of those propounding conspiracy beliefs (e.g., are they open-minded or existing 
in a self-reinforcing echo chamber?  What motives or conflicts of interest might 
they have?). For example, Andrew Wakefield’s claims about the MMR vaccine 
were questioned not only because of his inadequate approach to science but 
because he was found to have committed fraud and to have conflicts of interest. 
Journalists and editors could also draw upon similar learning to consider 
how to pitch their messages and develop alternative strategies for presenting 
information. The media often focuses on a consensus view which serves 
powerful interests but the media can also expose powerful elites (e.g., current 
debates about government inaction about the risk of pandemics). This may also 
provide members of the general public with the tools to engage with public 
discourse in a way that better fits their understanding of information.  
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6.5.2. The Diagnosis of Delusional Beliefs  
In terms of delusional beliefs, these findings may encourage researchers 
to question and then further deconstruct the existing conceptualisation and 
criteria for diagnosing delusional beliefs. Further studies are needed to build 
upon the O’Connor and Vandenberg studies (which focussed only on religious 
themes) to investigate the influence of other kinds of implicit assumptions. 
Moreover, drawing upon the Harland et al. (2009) study which explored the 
different causal models that psychiatrists use to assess service-users, it would 
be helpful to look at other assumptive frameworks that may influence this 
process (e.g., service-user demographics or knowledge about the belief claims). 
One way of exploring this could be to use a vignette study to investigate the 
extent to which diagnosers judge a belief as delusional despite a lack of 
evidence to substantiate this, and vary the information that is provided to them. 
It could also be interesting to use observational studies of psychiatric 
assessments followed by interviews with service-users and diagnosers to 
further explore the factors involved in the assessment process.  
Within mental health settings, this study suggests the need to facilitate 
greater tolerance and understanding of different conceptualisations of 
delusional beliefs, as well as questioning the pathologising and taken-for-
granted assumptions that appear to occur when assessing whether beliefs are 
unusual. This is particularly important due to the significantly harmful 
implications of not doing so, with evidence suggesting that a person considered 
to be delusional is more likely to be exposed to coercive practice, deprivation of 
liberty and thus the infringements of their human rights (Sanati & Kyratsous, 
2015). This can also have significant implications within other societal systems, 
such as within the legal system. Research suggests, for example, that many 
lawyers and judges operate under the premise that mental health professionals 
are infallible and their judgements represent an objective science (Caplan & 
Cosgrove, 2004). Evidence also shows that employers are less likely to recruit 
someone with a psychiatric diagnosis (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004), as well as 
other prejudices and negative public attitudes (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; 
Rüsch et al., 2005). 
This could be achieved within mental health training programmes (e.g., 
for psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses etc.) by helping professionals to 
examine their assumptive frameworks and worldviews. Training programmes 
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should thus facilitate the development of competencies such as respecting 
different belief systems, holding a non-judgemental attitude and critically 
reflecting upon one’s own assumptions. This might encourage professionals to 
ask different kinds of questions (e.g., about the meaning and context of a 
belief), instead of just focussing on whether a belief seems delusional on 
common-sense grounds. Programmes should also encourage professionals to 
adopt a more modest position and thus unless they have attempted to 
empirically investigate or test a belief, they should be cautious about inferring its 
falsity. This approach should also be exemplified when interacting with 
members of the general public to facilitate their understanding of delusional 
beliefs beyond conventional psychiatric conceptualisations, and to encourage 
them to become aware of their biases when judging the beliefs of others.  
 
 
6.6. Final Comments 
 
This exploration of the judgements of plausibility has made a starting 
point for making implicit social norms more explicit. It calls for members of the 
general public, and especially mental health professionals, to further question 
whether their judgements lead to socially unjust outcomes. Only by 
acknowledging one’s own biases and prejudices can they be either revised or 
abandoned.   
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Appendix A – Glossary of Key Q methodology Terms 
Q-Methodology  Q-methodology is a mixed-method design and so 
incorporates both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. Within Q-methodology, participants are 
applied to a sample of statements (the Q-set).  
Q-methodology is concerned with measuring how the 
statements in the Q-set are rated in similar ways by 
different participants. Different accounts or narratives 
are thus interpreted by analysing the Q-sorts, and 
demonstrating similar ways of understanding or 
conceptualising the topic under investigation. 
 
  
Concourse  The hypothetical full range of viewpoints that there may 
be about a particular topic. 
 
  
Q-Set  This refers to the series of statements that are rated by 
participants. 
  
Q-Sort When all of the statements in the Q-set have been 
arranged according to the fixed quasi-normal 
distribution layout, the finished product is referred to as 
the Q-sort. 
  
Q Study A study employing Q-methodology.   
Sort  The process by which participants rank a series of 
statements in terms of how much they agreed or 
disagreed with them.  
  
Quasi-Normal 
Distribution 
 
A quasi-normal distribution refers to the arrangement 
of how the statements in the Q-set are sorted. The 
distribution ranges according to how much the 
participant agrees or disagrees with a statement. In a 
quasi-normal distribution there are a limited number of 
places for the statements that are most agreed or 
disagreed with. 
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R-methodology R-methodology refers to the traditional psychometric 
paradigm of applying a set of items or tests to a 
sample of participants to be analysed. 
  
PQMethod  This a Q-methodology computer programme designed 
to enter and then analyse the data gathered from Q-
sorts. 
  
Characterising 
Statement 
 
A statement that is at one of the extreme ends of the 
factor array, i.e. a statement that is strongly agreed or 
disagreed with. They are shown by the PQMethod 
computer package. 
  
Factors Q analysis reduces the many participant viewpoints to 
a few "factors," which are suggested to represent 
collective ways of thinking about the particular topic. 
Factors (onto which participants load based on the Q-
sort configurations they produce) are represented by 
all of the presented items configured in different but 
characteristic ways.  
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Appendix B – The Concourse for Each Research Question  
 
First Q-Set  
How do individuals identify certain beliefs to be conspiracy beliefs and the 
people who believe them to be conspiracy believers? 
 
THEME- Topics 
 Conspiracy theories tend to involve suspicion about the government and the 
official explanations of events  
 Some conspiracy theories view governments or officials as the group behind 
particular plots 
 Some conspiracy theories view a historically marginalised group (e.g. Jews, 
Catholics, Muslims etc.) as behind particular plots 
 Conspiracy theorists seem to have greater distrust of authority  
 Conspiracy believers tend to think there are exotic technologies like mind 
control via TV or phenomena like flying saucers etc. 
 Conspiracy believers may believe that certain people have been cloned (e.g. 
Meghan Markel)  
 Conspiracy theorists may believe that people are not dead (e.g. Elvis) or 
have been assassinated 
 Some conspiracy theories can be more commonplace, such as the belief 
that the rich get richer  
 Conspiracy theories are often about groups trying to cover-up something 
that has happened  
 
THEME- Textual form of conspiracy narratives 
 Conspiracy theories can involve linking a whole series of world events 
together as something planned 
 Conspiracy beliefs hold that there are secret patterns in the world  
 Conspiracy theories occur when there is confusion and ambiguity, or 
contradictory information about events 
 Conspiracy theories can be about one off events  
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 Conspiracy theorists believe that they have privileged access to secret 
knowledge that separates them from the masses who believe the official 
account  
 Conspiracy theorists think that there is a deeper truth behind the visible 
reality  
 
THEME - ‘Cock-up’ or conspiracy view of history 
 Conspiracy theorists tend to subscribe to the idea that history is the result of 
conspiracies rather than coincidences, confusion and mistakes 
 Conspiracy theorists tend to assume there is one all-encompassing 
explanation for an event whereas in real conspiracies, there are often 
multiple plots which often go wrong or eventually come out  
 Conspiracy theorists tend to assume that there are all-powerful and all-
knowing but secret groups of plotters  
 Conspiracy theories tend to view history as due to the co-ordinated actions 
of small groups rather than more abstract forces like economics or politics 
 
THEME - Involving plotters 
 Conspiracy theories tend to involve a small group of conspirators acting 
in secret who manipulate events  
 Conspiracy theories tend to involve a group acting in a way that serves 
their interests but is against the interests of the majority of people. 
 
THEME - CTs and logic/science 
 Conspiracy theories often involve some accepted facts but then make a 
big leap of faith to reach conclusions that aren’t really supported by the 
facts. 
 Conspiracy theories often provide one explanation where there are a 
number of equally plausible explanations. 
 Conspiracy theories are often very elaborate and complicated 
 Conspiracy believers do not listen to reason  
 Conspiracy theories do not have any definitive proof and so it is hard to 
disprove them  
 Conspiracy theories may have a kernel of truth within them  
 Conspiracy theories are often couched in pseudo-scientific language  
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 Conspiracy theorists confuse the fact that we can never be 100% certain 
of something with the idea that any explanation is plausible  
 Conspiracy theories can sometimes be only believed by a few people but 
others are believed quite widely  
 
THEME - Features of believers 
 Conspiracy theorists tend to see those who disagree with them as 
hoodwinked or deluded 
 People use the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ as a way of undermining a view 
they disagree with 
 Conspiracy theorists often ridicule researchers/journalists for not 
accepting their theories  
 Conspiracy theorists are more likely to question the mainstream media 
than others 
 Conspiracy theorists will always adapt their theory when any 
contradictory evidence arises and so it is hard to disprove them  
 Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time reading about conspiracies on 
the internet  
 Conspiracy theorists tend to reinforce each other's ideas and do not want 
to hear alternative explanations  
 Conspiracy theorists believe that nothing happens by accident  
 Conspiracy believers tend to reinforce each other's ideas 
 People avoid talking to conspiracy theorists because they are so 
obsessed with conspiracies 
  People enjoy talking to conspiracy theorists because their theories are 
interesting  
 Conspiracy theorists take scepticism of official accounts too far 
 Conspiracy theories are generally only believed in by a minority of the 
population  
 
THEME- Causes/effects as possible defining features 
 Conspiracy theories happen because people have become disenchanted 
with the mainstream of politics. 
 Conspiracy theorists think big events can’t be due to mundane causes  
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 Conspiracy theories help conspiracy theorists to feel they are ‘in the 
know’  
 Conspiracy theories can have negative consequences (e.g. affecting 
whether you will vaccinate or whether a particular group should be 
vilified). 
 Conspiracy theories undermine democracy because they lead to an 
exaggerated suspicion of others 
 Conspiracy theories can lead to some groups of society being treated 
badly  
 Conspiracy theories are generally harmless 
 Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation but there have been some 
well documented conspiracies  
 Conspiracy theories can be quite interesting 
 Conspiracy theories can be fun and entertaining  
 Conspiracy theories are the price we pay for the existence of healthy 
scepticism in a society 
 
Second Q–Set   
What factors of a conspiratorial belief (i.e. a ‘conspiracy theory’) make it seem 
implausible to you?  
 
THEME – Negative representations of those who hold these beliefs  
 Conspiratorial beliefs are less likely to seem plausible if they are held by 
people with a lower IQ 
 Conspiratorial beliefs are less likely to seem plausible if they are held by 
people who are more socially isolated  
 Conspiratorial beliefs are less likely to seem plausible if they are held by 
people with poor social skills 
 Conspiratorial beliefs are less likely to seem plausible if they are held by 
people who have mental health difficulties  
 Conspiratorial beliefs seem less plausible when they are presented by 
people who seem gullible or naïve 
 Conspiratorial beliefs seem less plausible when they are endorsed by 
people who seem a bit eccentric or odd 
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 Conspiracy theories are less believable when they are held by a group that 
you are not part of 
 Conspiracy beliefs become less plausible when the speaker is unable to 
clearly articulate their rationale or their evidence for believing  
 Conspiracy theories are less believable the theorist is extremely and 
indiscriminately suspicious of any and all government agencies or private 
organizations. 
 Conspiracy theories seem more implausible when they are endorsed by 
someone who is politically radical   
 Conspiratorial beliefs seem less plausible when they are held by people 
considered to be somewhat paranoid 
 
THEME – Social Group of a Speaker 
 Conspiracy theories are more likely to appear credible when they are 
presented by a clear and concise speaker 
 Conspiracy theories are more likely to appear believable when the person 
presenting them belongs to a similar social group to you 
 Conspiracy theories are more believable when they are endorsed by 
someone who is well educated  
 Conspiracy theories are less credible when they are held by someone from 
a different ethnic or cultural group  
 Conspiracy theories are more credible when they are held by someone who 
is rich and powerful 
 Conspiracy theories are less believable when they are held by a group that 
you are not part of 
 Conspiracy theories are less believable when they are endorsed by people 
from lower social classes 
 Conspiracy beliefs seem much more plausible when celebrities and other 
popular figures hold them 
 Conspiratorial theories seem more plausible if the person who is delivering 
the evidence is very forceful or strong in their expression of the theory 
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THEME – Motivators 
 Conspiracy theories seem more believable when they fit with our pre-
existing political views 
 Conspiracy theories seem more believable when they are endorsed by 
someone in authority who is speaking against their direct interests 
 Conspiracy beliefs seem less plausible when there is a clear motivation 
behind someone holding that belief 
 
THEME – Volume of Evidence 
 Conspiracy theories are more plausible when a lot of people endorse them 
 Conspiracy theories are less plausible when no one you know believes them 
 Conspiratorial theories are more plausible when there is a lot of evidence to 
suggest that they could be true 
 Conspiratorial beliefs become more believable when you hear them 
regularly  
 Conspiratorial beliefs become more believable when people in your 
friendship group or family also believe them   
 Conspiratorial theories are less plausible when you are aware of strong 
contradictory evidence  
 Conspiracy theories become more credible when they have been around for 
a long time and not gone away 
 
THEME – Source 
 Conspiracy theories seem more believable when they are documented on 
the internet  
 Conspiracy theories can be plausible when they seem to be backed by 
some evidence, e.g. the correlation between vaccinations can cause autism  
 Conspiracy theories are more believable when there is a scientific 
component to them  
 Conspiratorial beliefs seem less believable when they are directly 
challenged by a powerful authority 
 Conspiracy theories seem credible when there is a lot of public knowledge 
and evidence to support them  
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 Conspiratorial beliefs appear less credible when a lot of different authority 
figures are presenting contradictory evidence  
 Conspiracy theories are more credible when alternative perspectives have 
also been taken into account  
 
THEME – Characteristics of the Conspiracy  
 Conspiracy beliefs are less plausible when the explanation can also be 
explained by something more rational  
 Conspiratorial theories are less believable when they are overly complex  
 Conspiracy theories become less reliable when they would involve a large 
number of people who would all need to keep quiet about their secrets  
 Conspiracy beliefs are more believable if they fit in with something that we 
have experienced in the past  
 Conspiracy beliefs feel more plausible when they sound intuitively correct  
 Conspiracy beliefs are considered to be less plausible when they are based 
more in the realms of just faith, rather than something that could potentially 
be proved 
 A conspiratorial theory is less likely to be consider valid if it relates to 
something that we have not had direct experience of or have seldom 
encountered before  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
Appendix C –Q-Sets One and Two 
 
Q-Set One 
1. Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time reading about conspiracies on 
the internet  
2. Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators act in secret 
3. Conspiracy beliefs can be fun and entertaining  
4. People enjoy talking to conspiracy believers 
5. Conspiracy beliefs assume that events are caused by large groups of 
conspirators acting independently 
6. Conspiracy beliefs are logical and rational 
7. Conspiracy believers are crucial in exposing real-life conspiracies (e.g. 
Watergate)  
8. Conspiracy believers think that the media routinely expose conspiracy 
theories 
9. Conspiracy believers distrust academic researchers and scientists 
10. Conspiracy believers think that all important information is being shared 
with the public 
11. The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often powerful elites 
12. The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are often governments or officials  
13. The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs rarely involve people from 
religious groups (e.g. Jews, Muslims etc.)  
14. Conspiracy beliefs take accepted facts but then make a big leap of faith 
to reach conclusions that aren’t supported by the facts. 
15. Conspiracy believers think events happen because of the planned 
actions of small groups, rather than broader forces like economic or 
political systems 
16. Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators manipulate events to serve 
their own interests 
17. Conspiracy believers do not believe that there is an intentional plan 
behind world events  
18. Conspiracy believers believe that they are the only ones who 
understand ‘what is really going on’  
19. Conspiracy beliefs are so complex that it can be hard to definitively 
disprove them 
128 
 
20. Conspiracy believers think that all politicians and officials are corrupt 
21. The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs do not typically involve 
intelligence agencies 
22. Conspiracy beliefs can have serious negative consequences, such as 
parents not vaccinating their children 
23. A lot of people believe in conspiracies 
24. Conspiracy beliefs lead to some groups of society being treated badly  
25. Conspiracy believers see those who disagree with them as hoodwinked 
or deluded 
26. People use the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ as a way of undermining a 
view they disagree with 
27. Conspiracy believers assume that there is only one explanation for an 
event when, in fact, there are a number of equally plausible explanations 
28. Conspiracy believers think that there are no hidden connections or 
patterns behind world events 
29. Conspiracy beliefs have caused a destructive level of mistrust in society 
30. Conspiracy believers interpret facts to fit their predetermined theory 
31. Conspiracy beliefs are based on evidence, rather than innuendo and 
suspicion  
32. Conspiracy believers reinforce each other's ideas  
33. Conspiracy beliefs prevent elites from gaining too much power 
34. Conspiracy believers are happy to change their belief when they are 
presented with evidence which challenges it 
 
Q-Set Two  
 
1. When a majority of academic researchers and scientists endorse the 
belief 
2. When the believer is very sociable and has lots of friends 
3. When the belief appears to be hypothetically possible  
4. When the believer is highly educated  
5. When the evidence for and against the belief is confusing 
6. When the believer seems indiscriminately suspicious 
7. When the believer is from a different social group (cultural, ethnic, 
religious, political etc.) to you 
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8. When the belief seems to involve jumping to a particular conclusion not 
supported by the evidence 
9. When most people you know don’t believe it 
10. When the belief pins the blame for something on an identifiable group of 
people rather than something more abstract 
11. When the conspiracy would have required lots of different people to co-
operate  
12. When someone you think is credible believes it  
13. When the belief is based on several different independent sources of 
evidence 
14. When the believer will change their mind in light of evidence which 
contradicts the belief 
15. When the believer seems to spend a lot of time on conspiracy websites  
16. When official sources (e.g. government reports) do not support it  
17. When the believer does not seem gullible or naïve 
18. When the belief is presented in an incoherent and hard to follow manner 
19. When the belief is supported by a whistleblower who has had access to 
secret information 
20. When the believer only seems to talk to people who agree with them 
21. When experts seem to disagree about the belief 
22. When the believer is not obsessed by the belief 
23. When the belief seems to be the simplest explanation of the evidence 
24. When the believer can provide persuasive evidence for it 
25. When the believer seems eccentric or odd  
26. When the believer seems to be open-minded about alternative 
explanations when they weigh up the evidence  
27. When the conclusions reached seem to go beyond the evidence 
28. When you are aware of strong evidence which contradicts the belief 
29. When the belief fits with my own political views 
30. When the believer appears to have mental health difficulties  
31. When the belief seems to be based on opinion rather than fact 
32. When the argument for a belief seems circular 
33. When the belief doesn’t involve making too many assumptions 
34. When the belief just seems intuitively right 
35. When the believer does not get overly emotional about the belief 
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36. When the believer only cites evidence which supports their belief and 
does not mention anything which might contradict it 
37. When the belief seems to be unquestioned within the believer’s social 
group 
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Appendix D – Detailed Description of the Methodology  
 
All participants were presented with Q set one first, with the first research 
question written on the top of the screen in bold writing. For each Q set, the 
sorting process was split into two parts. The aim of the first part of the sorting 
process was to help the participants begin to think about their responses to the 
statements, and to begin to categorise them in terms of how much they agreed 
or disagreed with them. In this part of the sorting process, therefore, participants 
were shown each of the individual statements on the centre of the screen, one 
at a time. Underneath the statement were three columns, labelled: ‘I agree with 
this statement about conspiracy beliefs’, ‘neutral’ and ‘I disagree with this 
statement about conspiracy beliefs’. Participants were asked to place each of 
the statements into one of these three columns (See Figure One for a visual 
depiction of this).  
 
Figure One: Visual illustration of the three columns shown to participants within 
the first stage of the sorting process 
 
 
 
Once each of the statements had been placed into one of the three columns, 
the participants clicked to move onto another screen and the second, more 
refined part of the sorting process began. In this section, participants were 
asked to make more fine-grained decisions about how much they agreed or 
disagreed with each statement, and had to be more selective in terms of what 
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statements they agreed or disagreed with the most. On this screen, the three 
columns from the first part of the sorting process remained on the screen, with 
all of the statements that had been placed in to the columns, but they were also 
presented with another nine columns underneath. Of the nine columns, the 
furthest left column was again labelled ‘I strongly disagree with this statement 
about conspiracy beliefs’ and the furthest right was again labelled ‘I strongly 
agree with this statement about conspiracy beliefs’. The centre column was 
again labelled ‘neutral’.  
The columns for this part of the study were formatted so that a fixed number of 
statements could be placed into each column. Six statements could be placed 
into the central (neutral) column, and this number decreased with each column 
moving out towards the two furthest end columns, such that only two 
statements could be placed into the final two columns. The programme would 
not allow more than the stated number of statements to be placed into the 
column. 
To aid the statistical analyses, each of these columns were assigned a number, 
with the furthest right hand (‘agree’) column labelled +5, the one to the left of 
that +4, the one to the left of that +3, and so on, decreasing in ascending order 
until the middle (neutral) column, which was assigned a value of 0. The column 
pattern was symmetrical, so as the furthest right column was +5, the furthest left 
column was -5, and the number of statements that could be put into each 
column was also symmetrical, forming a quasi-normative distribution (see 
Figure One). A quasi-normal distribution means that the statements in the Q set 
are sorted according to how much the participant agrees or disagrees with them 
and a limited number of places for statements requires participants to decide 
which statements they agreed or disagreed with most strongly. The columns 
were labelled so that participants knew how many statements could go into 
each column (see Figure Two for a visual depiction of this). 
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Figure Two: Visual depiction of the second stage of the sorting process  
 
 
For this stage of the Q sort, participants were first asked to consider all of the 
statements that they had put in the ‘I agree with this statement about conspiracy 
beliefs’ column in the first stage of the sorting process. Of all of those 
statements, they were asked to select the two statements that they agreed with 
the most and then drag these two statements from the column that they were in, 
and place them in the farthest column of the new series of columns. They were 
then instructed to select the three statements that they next most agreed with 
and place them in the column directly left to the one they had just worked into. 
They were then asked to continue to work inwards until they had sorted all of 
the statements from the ‘I agree with this statement about conspiracy beliefs’ 
column from the first stage of the sort.  
Participants were then asked to do the same for the ‘I disagree with this 
statement about conspiracy beliefs’ column; starting with the two statements 
they most disagreed with, and place these on the furthest left column. Once 
they had sorted all of the ‘disagree’ statements, participants were then asked to 
sort the statements that they had placed in the ‘Neutral’ column by moving them 
to either the central column or by working slightly outwards (dependent on how 
much space there was left in each column).  
After the sorting process, the participants clicked onto the next screen and were 
given the opportunity to take a short break before moving onto the second Q 
set. For this Q set, the same process was followed as for the first Q set. 
However, the columns were labelled differently. The left hand column was 
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labelled ‘Makes me think that a conspiracy is less plausible’, the middle was 
labelled ‘Neutral’, and the furthest right was labelled ‘Makes me think that a 
conspiracy is more plausible’. The number of statements that fit into each 
column was also slightly different, but this was explained to the participants and 
again made clear at the top of each column.  
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Appendix E - The Advert, the List of Locations Contacted and the List of 
Locations that Posted 
 
Could you please post this? I am currently completing my clinical psychology 
doctorate training at the University of East London. As part of my course, I need 
to conduct a research study. I will be looking at how people understand what a 
conspiracy beliefs is, and then how they judge how plausible these beliefs are. 
It is conducted online and takes approximately 20 minutes to complete. If 
anyone has the time and would be interested in participating, please email me: 
………… and I can send more information. Thank you. 
 
 
Abbots Bromley, Staffordshire – posted  
Abingdon, Oxfordshire – posted 
Alvaston, Derbyshire – posted 
Ashbourne, Derbyshire- posted 
Ashby, Leicestershire – posted 
Ashford, Kent – posted 
Basildon, Essex 
Birmingham, West Midland – posted 
Bishops Stortford, Hertfordshire - posted 
Brighton, East Sussex 
Broxbourne, Hertfordshire – posted  
Buntingford, Hertfordshire – posted 
Bury, Greater Manchester  
Canterbury, Kent– posted 
Carlton, Cambridgeshire 
Chelmsford, Essex 
Cheshunt, Hertfordshire – posted 
Chingford, London – posted  
Cleethorpes, Lincolnshire  
Coventry, West Midlands 
Crawley, West Sussex 
Derby, Derbyshire – posted 
Dewsbury, Yorkshire – posted 
136 
 
Didcot, Oxfordshire – posted 
Dunstable, Bedfordshire   
Eastwood, Nottinghamshire – posted 
Ely, Cambridgeshire  
Enderby, Leicestershire – posted 
Enfield, London – Posted 
Epping, Essex – posted  
Evesham, Worcestershire – posted 
Feltham, London 
Folkestone, Kent  
Great Bentley, Essex 
Great Yarmouth, Norfolk – posted 
Harlow, Essex – posted  
Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire   
Hitchin, Hertfordshire  
Hoddesdon, Hertfordshire – posted 
Horley, Surrey – posted 
Hunstanton, Norfolk – posted 
Ilkeston, Derbyshire – posted 
Keyworth, Nottinghamshire – posted 
Kidlington, Oxfordshire  
Kimberley, Nottinghamshire  
Kingston-upon-thames, Surrey – posted 
Kingsway, Essex – posted 
Kirkby, Merseyside  
Langley Mill, Derbyshire – posted 
Leamington Spa, Warwickshire  
Leeds, West Yorkshire - posted 
Leicester, Leicestershire – posted 
Leighton Buzzard, Bedfordshire  
Littlehampton, West Sussex – posted 
Long Eaton, Derbyshire  
Loughborough, Leicestershire – posted 
Louth, Lincolnshire – posted 
Luton, Bedfordshire – posted  
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Mackworth, Derbyshire – posted 
Market Bosworth, Leicestershire – posted 
Marshfield, Gloucestershire – posted 
Melksham, Wiltshire  
Newham, London - posted 
Newmarket, Suffolk  
Newton Abbot, Devon – posted 
North Wingfield, Derbyshire – posted 
Northampton, Northamptonshire – posted  
Nottingham, Nottinghamshire  
Oldbury, West Midlands – posted 
Oldham, Greater Manchester – posted 
Paignton, Devon – posted 
Poole, Dorset – posted 
Portsmouth, Hampshire – posted 
Puckeridge, Hertfordshire – posted 
Radcliffe, Greater Manchester  – posted 
Ramsey, Cambridgeshire – posted 
Reading, Berkshire  
Redhill, Surrey  
Stevenage, Hertfordshire – posted 
Torquay, Devon 
Trowbridge, Wiltshire – posted 
Waltham Cross, Hertfordshire – posted  
Ware, Hertfordshire – posted 
Warwick, Warwickshire  
Watford, Hertfordshire 
Welwyn Garden City - Hertfordshire 
Winchester, Hampshire 
York, Yorkshire 
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Appendix F – Information Sheet 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
xxxx 
[Contact Details: xxx@uel.ac.uk] 
 
What makes a belief seem implausible to others?  A Q methodology study of 
conspiracy beliefs 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research study. Before you decide 
whether to participate, it is important that you understand the purpose of this 
study and what it involves. Please take the time to read this information 
carefully.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
There has been lots of discussion in recent years about conspiracy beliefs but it 
is unclear how people judge how true such beliefs are. Some researchers say 
that many of us may believe at least one. Researching these particular beliefs 
may also shed some light on other beliefs which some feel are unusual or 
unexplained. 
I want to recruit a broad cross-section of people to take part in this study and 
you fit this profile.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide. If you think that you may be interested in participating, I 
will provide you with more detailed information about what is involved. I will then 
ask you to sign a consent form if you agree to take part. However, you are free 
to change your mind, without giving a reason. Should you choose to withdraw 
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from the study, you may do so without any negative consequences and without 
any obligation to give a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to read a number of statements 
about the different reasons why you might judge another person’s belief to be 
plausible and then put them in order of how important you think each statement 
is. You will be given detailed instructions on how to complete the sorting of the 
statements. The study will take place online and will take approximately 30 
minutes to complete. 
 
The study will take place online on a private website platform. If you take part in 
the study you will be given the weblink. It will not be possible for anyone to see 
your answers besides you and the researcher. Alternatively, you can take part 
by visiting the University of East London.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will not directly benefit from participating in this study but and you may find 
it interesting to think about how it will contribute to our understanding of how we 
make judgements about other people’s beliefs.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
Participation in this study poses little risk. In the unlikely event you experience 
some distress, you can discuss this with the researcher. You will be offered the 
opportunity to take a break and/or to withdraw from the study. The researcher 
will also have information on helpful organisations to contact if you wish to 
discuss anything about this research further. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Participation in this study will be completely confidential. After you have finished 
the study online, your answers (which are stored on the online programme) will 
be accessed by the researcher only. This information will be moved to a 
password protected file, on a password protected computer, that only the 
researcher has access to. Before analysing the data all participants will be 
identified by a unique code so that it will be analysed anonymously. Any 
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personally identifiable information will be stored separately and only used so 
that the researcher can sent you a debrief letter once you have completed the 
study, or to enable the research to identify your data if you want it to withdrawn 
from the study. No personally identifiable information will be given in either the 
thesis or any subsequent write-ups of the study (e.g. articles for scientific 
journals). 
 
Once the study is completed, your answers will be kept for 5 years, after which 
they will be securely destroyed. Any demographic information that you provide, 
however, will be destroyed as soon as the study is complete. It is therefore 
important that if you wish to withdraw your answers from the study, you do so 
by the ** *** 2019. We have set a time limit of three weeks following your 
participation. If you withdraw after this cut-off data, the researcher reserves the 
right to use your anonymised data as the analysis will have begun.   
 
Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are happy to continue you will 
be asked to sign a consent form prior to your participation. Please retain this 
invitation letter for reference.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been 
conducted, please contact the study’s supervisor [Dr xxx, School of Psychology, 
University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. Telephone:  020 8223 
4021. Email:  d.harper@uel.ac.uk] 
 
or  
 
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Subcommittee: Dr. Tim 
Lomas, School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London 
E15 4LZ. (Tel: 020 8223 4493. Email: t.lomas@uel.ac.uk) 
 
Thank you in anticipation. 
Yours sincerely, 
xxxxx, 13th March 2019 
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Appendix G – Participants Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
 
Professional Clinical Psychology Doctorate  
What makes a belief seem implausible to others?  A Q methodology study of 
conspiracy beliefs 
I have the read the information leaflet relating to the above programme of 
research in which I have been asked to participate and have been given a copy 
to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, 
and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about 
this information. I understand what it being proposed and the procedures in 
which I will be involved have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this 
research, will remain strictly confidential. Only the researchers involved in the 
study will have access to the data. It has been explained to me what will happen 
to my data once the programme has been completed. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully 
explained to me and for the information obtained to be used in relevant 
research publications.  
 
Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the 
study at any point during the study, and for up to three weeks after completion, 
without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason. 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) 
……………………………………………………………………. 
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Participant’s Signature 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Investigator’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS) 
………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Investigator’s Signature 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date: …………………………. 
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Appendix H – Instruction Sheet 
 
Study Instructions  
 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in this study. Please read this 
sheet for detailed instructions on how to participate. Participation must be on a 
laptop or desktop computer. Your participation is very much valued.  
 
1. There are two parts to this study. Each part is referred to as a Q-sort, which 
is a set of statements that you will be asked to ‘sort’ in terms of how much you 
consider them to be important. The instructions are the same for both Q-sorts. 
 
2. The programme will present you with 'Q-sort Number One' first, followed by 
'Q-sort Number Two'. 
 
3. Starting with ‘Q-sort Number One’, the programme will present you with a 
series of statements one at a time. Please read each statement carefully, as 
they may be phrased in a manner that is opposite to what you might expect. For 
each individual statement, you will be asked to ‘sort’ each statement into one of 
three categories (see below): 
a. I Disagree with this statement about Conspiracy Theories 
b. I Agree with this statement about Conspiracy Theories   
c. Statements that you neither agree or disagree with, or are 
ambiguous/ confusing (neutral) 
 
As you can see in the example below, the first statement is ‘Conspiracy 
believers spend a lot of time reading about conspiracies on the internet’.  
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Click on the statement and drag it to the column that you most agree with (see 
below).  
 
Keep going until you have sorted all of the statements. The programme will 
notify you when you have done so. 
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4. Once you have gone through all of the statements, you will be asked to move 
onto the second part of that Q-sort (Q-sort 1, part B). 
 
5. For this section, the programme will present you with more columns to 
choose from, which relate to the strength with which you agree with those 
statements. You will be asked to refine how you sorted the statements in part A. 
There is a fixed number of statements that you can put into each column which 
is written at the bottom of the column (if you try to put too many statements into 
a column the system will tell you). 
 
 
 
6. Please start with the statements that you considered to be ‘Important in 
Defining what a Conspiracy Theory is’. Out of those, please choose the 2 
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statements that you felt were most important and using your mouse, drag them 
to the furthest right column. You will then need to select the 3 statements that 
you considered to be the next most important and drag them to the second 
furthest right column.  
 
Following this, select the next 5 statements that you consider to be important 
and so on until you have sorted all of the statements that you considered to be 
important. 
 
If you look at the image below, at the bottom of the furthest column it says ‘OK’ 
to indicate that there are the right number of statements in it. The column to the 
left of it says ‘too many items’ at the bottom to indicate you need to remove 
some statements from it.  
 
 
7. Please next consider the statements that you considered to be Not 
Important in Defining what a Conspiracy Theory is. Repeat the same 
process, starting with the 2 that you felt were the least important but place them 
in the furthest left column. 
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8. You will finally be asked to sort the remaining statements (statements that 
you neither agree nor disagree with, or any ambiguous or confusing statements) 
into the remaining columns. 
 
9. After you have sorted all statements, look over them again to see if there are 
any statements you would like to rearrange. 
 
10. You will then be asked to repeat this process for the ‘Q-sort Number Two’ 
but with a new set of statements. 
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Appendix I – Ethics  
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology  
 
 
FOR BSc RESEARCH 
 
FOR MSc/MA RESEARCH 
 
FOR PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE RESEARCH IN CLINICAL, 
COUNSELLING & EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
If you need to apply for ethical clearance from HRA (through IRIS) for research involving 
the NHS you DO NOT need to apply to the School of Psychology for ethical clearance 
also. Please see details on 
https://uelac.sharepoint.com/ResearchInnovationandEnterprise/Pages/NHS-Research-
Ethics-Committees.aspx 
 
Among other things this site will tell you about UEL sponsorship 
 
PLEASE NOTE that HRA approval for research involving NHS employees is not 
required when data collection will take place off NHS premises and when NHS 
employees are not recruited directly through NHS lines of communication. This means 
that NHS staff can participate in research without HRA approval when a student recruits 
via their own social or professional networks or through a professional body like the 
BPS, for example. 
 
If you are employed by the NHS and plan to recruit participants from the NHS 
Trust you work for, it please seek permission from an appropriate person at 
your place of work (and better to collect data off NHS premises). 
APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH ETHICS APPROVAL 
 
FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
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PLEASE NOTE that the School Research Ethics Committee does not 
recommend BSc and MSc/MA students designing research that requires HRA 
approval for research involving the NHS as this can be a demanding and 
lengthy process. 
 
Before completing this application please familiarise yourself with: 
 
The Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009) published by the British Psychological 
Society (BPS). This can be found in the Ethics folder in the Psychology 
Noticeboard (Moodle) and also on the BPS website  
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/aa%20Standard%20Docs/inf
94_code_web_ethics_conduct.pdf 
 
 
And please also see the UEL Code of Practice for Research Ethics (2015-16) 
https://uelac.sharepoint.com/ResearchInnovationandEnterprise/Documents/Ethi
cs%20forms/UEL-Code-of-Practice-for-Research-Ethics-2015-16.pdf 
 
  
HOW TO COMPLETE & SUBMIT THIS APPLICATION  
 
Complete this application form electronically, fully and accurately. 
 
Type your name in the ‘student’s signature’ section (5.1). 
 
Include copies of all necessary attachments in the ONE DOCUMENT SAVED AS .doc 
 
Email your supervisor the completed application and all attachments as ONE 
DOCUMENT. Your supervisor will then look over your application. 
 
When your application demonstrates sound ethical protocol your supervisor will type in 
his/her name in the ‘supervisor’s signature’ (section 5) and submit your application for 
review (psychology.ethics@uel.ac.uk). You should be copied into this email so that you 
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know your application has been submitted. It is the responsibility of students to check 
this.  
 
Your supervisor should let you know the outcome of your application. Recruitment and 
data collection are NOT to commence until your ethics application has been approved, 
along with other research ethics approvals that may be necessary (See section 4) 
 
 
ATTACHMENTS YOU MUST ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION 
 
A copy of the participant invitation letter that you intend giving to potential participants. 
A copy of the consent form that you intend giving to participants.  
A copy of the debrief letter you intend to give participants.  
 
OTHER ATTACHMENTS (AS APPROPRIATE) 
 
A copy of original and/or pre-existing questionnaire(s) and test(s) you intend to use.   
 
Example of the kinds of interview questions you intend to ask participants. 
 
Copies of the visual material(s) you intend showing participants. 
 
A copy of ethical clearance or permission from an external institution or organisation if 
you need it (e.g. a charity, school, local authority, workplace etc.). Permissions must be 
attached to this application. If you require ethical clearance from an external organisation 
your ethics application can be submitted to the School of Psychology before ethical 
approval is obtained from another organisation (see Section 5). 
 
 
Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) certificates: 
 
FOR BSc/MSc/MA STUDENTS WHOSE RESEARCH INVOLVES VULNERABLE 
PARTICIPANTS: A scanned copy of a current Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 
certificate. A current certificate is one that is not older than six months. If you have an 
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Enhanced DBS clearance (one you pay a monthly fee to maintain) then the number of 
your Enhanced DBS clearance will suffice.  
 
DBS clearance is necessary if your research involves young people (anyone 16 years of 
age or under) or vulnerable adults (see Section 4 for a broad definition of this). A DBS 
certificate that you have obtained through an organisation you work for is acceptable as 
long as it is current. If you do not have a current DBS certificate, but need one for your 
research, you can apply for one through the HUB and the School will pay the cost. 
 
If you need to attach a copy of a DBS certificate to your ethics application but would like 
to keep it confidential please email a scanned copy of the certificate directly to Dr Tim 
Lomas (Chair of the School Research Ethics Committee) at t.lomas@uel.ac.uk 
 
FOR PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE STUDENTS WHOSE RESEARCH INVOLVES 
VULNERABLE PARTICIPANTS: DBS clearance is necessary if your research 
involves young people (anyone under 16 years of age) or vulnerable adults (see Section 
4 for a broad definition of this). The DBS check that was done, or verified, when you 
registered for your programme is sufficient and you will not have to apply for another for 
the duration of your studies in order to conduct research with vulnerable populations. 
 
Please read all guidance notes in blue carefully to avoid incorrect or insufficient 
applications 
 
If yours is an online study using Qualtrics please see the example ethics 
application in the Ethics folder in the Psychology Noticeboard 
 
 
SECTION 1. Your details 
 
Your name: xxxx 
 
 
Your supervisor’s name: Dr xxxx  
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Title of your programme: (e.g. BSc Psychology) Professional Clinical Psychology 
Doctorate  
 
 
Submission date for your BSc/MSc/MA research: May 2020 
 
Please tick if your application includes a copy of a DBS certificate  (see 
page 3)  
 
 
 
Please tick if your research requires DBS clearance but you are a Prof Doc 
student and have applied for DBS clearance – or had existing clearance verified – 
when you registered on your programme (see page 3) 
 
 
 
 
Please tick if you need to submit a DBS certificate with this 
application but have emailed a copy to Dr Tim Lomas for 
confidentiality reasons (Chair of the School Research Ethics Committee) 
t.lomas@uel.ac.uk 
  
 
 
Please tick to confirm that you have read and understood the British 
Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009) and the UEL Code of 
Practice for Research Ethics (See links on page 1)       
 
 
 
SECTION 2. About your research 
 
What your proposed research is about:   
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Please be clear and detailed in outlining what your proposed research is about. Include 
the research question (i.e. what will your proposed investigate?) 
Title: What makes a belief seem implausible to others?  A Q methodology study of 
conspiracy beliefs 
The current study will explore how members of the general public determine the 
plausibility of conspiratorial beliefs. This will be investigated using the Q-sort 
methodology due to its emphasis on not pursing one absolute ‘truth’, but its ability to 
gain multiple different perspectives on this issue.  
There will be two Q-sets, with the first focussing on the question: “What are the different 
ways in which conspiracy theories can be defined?”  
The second Q-set will ask the question: “What kinds of features make a belief seem 
more implausible?” 
 
Design of the research: 
Type of experimental design, variables, questionnaire, survey etc., as relevant to your 
research. If the research is qualitative what approach will be used and what will the data 
be? 
This study will be a Q-sort methodology, mixed-methods design. This will involve two Q-
sets.  
A Q-set is developed from the concourse, which consists of the ‘full range’ of everyday 
discourse surrounding a particular topic. This will be accessed through a plethora of 
sources, including newspapers, films and academic literature. 
Once the concourse is adequately sampled a condensed but representative sample of 
statements will be narrowed down to form each Q-set.  
The study will be conducted online using a Q-sort programme. The programme will 
initially present participants with the first Q-set, comprised of various statements relating 
to different understandings of conspiracy theories. They will be asked to sort each 
statement according to importance (important, unimportant, and neutral) in relation to 
the first question: “What do you understand by the term ‘conspiracy theory’?” 
Following this, they will be presented with a forced-choice Q-sort distribution grid and 
asked to select the three statements that they consider to be most important from those 
they ranked ‘important’. These will be placed on the farthest column of the distribution 
grid. They will then be instructed to take the next four ‘important’ statements and work 
inwards until they have sorted all ‘important’ statements. Participants will then be given 
the same instructions for the ‘not important’ statements but placing these on the other 
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side of the grid. Participants will finally be asked to sort the remaining neutral statements 
by placing the ones that they did not feel strongly about in the central column and 
working either outwards or inwards.  
Following this, participants will be asked to go through the same procedure again, but 
this time with the second Q-set. The question addressed through the second Q-set will 
be “What kinds of features make a belief seem more implausible?” 
Once both Q-sets have been completed, each participant will be asked their reasons for 
sorting the statements in the way that they did. The following question will be asked in 
the debrief: 
‘I would like to understand how people made choices about the statements and so I 
would be grateful if you could email me about this.  Focussing on the second Q-sort, 
think of the three items you agreed with or disagreed with most strongly, please briefly 
explain why you rated them in that way’. 
 
Recruitment and participants (Your sample):  
Proposed number of participants, method/s of recruitment, specific characteristics of the 
sample such as age range, gender and ethnicity - whatever is relevant to your research. 
Opportunity sampling via social media will be used to recruit participants from the 
general population. Participants will need to be over 18-years old and fluent in English.   
 
Measures, materials or equipment: 
Give details about what will be used during the course of the research. For example: 
equipment, a questionnaire, a particular psychological test or tests, an interview 
schedule or other stimuli such as visual material. See note on page 2 about attaching 
copies of questionnaires and tests to this application. If you are using an interview 
schedule for qualitative research attach example questions that you plan to ask your 
participants to this application. 
The study will be online using a Q-sort programme (“Q-assessor”).  
Examples of statements used in the first Q-sort are as follows: 
Conspiracy theories tend to involve suspicion about the government and the official 
explanations of events  
Conspiracy theories can involve linking a whole series of world events together as 
something planned 
Conspiracy theories tend to assume that secret groups of people have more power to 
affect unfortunate events than happens in the real world  
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Conspiracy theories are hard to prove or disprove  
 
Examples of statements used in the first Q-sort are as follows: 
Conspiracy beliefs are not believable due to a lack of evidence 
Conspiracy beliefs are more credible when a lot of people believe them 
Conspiracy theories are more likely to be plausible when famous people believe them 
 
12. If you are using copyrighted/pre-validated questionnaires, tests or other 
stimuli that you have not written or made yourself, are these questionnaires and 
tests suitable for the age group of your participants?     
 N/A 
 
Outline the data collection procedure involved in your research: 
Describe in detail what will be involved in data collection. For example, what will 
participants be asked to do, where, and for how long? If using online surveys will you be 
using Qualtrics? Detail what you will include in the Qualtrics page that you intend to 
make available to potential participants (see the example ethics application for a student 
study using Qualtrics in the Ethics folder of the Psychology Noticeboard). 
 
Participants will be recruited via social media (i.e. Twitter, Facebook), where they will be 
given a brief summary about what is expected of them. If they express interest in 
participating, the participants will be asked to e-mail me. I will then e-mail them the 
information sheet (See Appendix A) and consent form (See Appendix B). This will be 
followed by a brief telephone call to ensure that they fully understand what is expected 
of them, and to address any queries that they may have. 
If an individual full consents to participate, I will then email them a more detailed 
information sheet about what the study involves (See Appendix C), a demographic 
questionnaire (See Appendix E) and the link to the “Q-assessor” programme. This 
programme will involve presenting participants with two separate Q-sorts. Q-sort 1 will 
always be presented first, and participants will be asked initially to read through each of 
the items in the Q-set before sorting and arranging the items onto a Q-sort grid. They will 
be asked to follow the same procedure for the second Q-sort.  The study will take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
The data will be stored on the “Q-assessor” programme, which will only be accessed by 
the researcher. To store this data, I will create three excel spreadsheets: one with 
156 
 
demographic data and participant ID numbers; another with the Q factor results which 
only has Participant ID numbers; and one with participant ID codes as well as 
names/contact details.   
A Q-methodology statistical programme (PQMethod; Schmolck, 2002) will be used to 
analyse the data.  The demographic data will be used in group terms to describe the 
sample and to help interpret Q-factors (as Q-factors are composed of individuals who 
have sorted the Q-item statements similarly).   
   
SECTION 3. Ethical considerations                                                                                     
 
Fully informing participants about the research (and parents/guardians if 
necessary):  
How will you fully inform your participants when inviting them to participate? Will the 
participant invitation letter be written in a style appropriate for children and young people, 
if necessary? 
I will be sending individuals who have volunteered to participate the information sheet 
(See Appendix A) and consent form (See Appendix B), and will then be communicating 
with them by phone/email to ensure that they fully understand the nature of the study, 
and informed consent.  
 
Obtaining fully informed consent from participants (and from parents/guardians 
if necessary):  
Is the consent form written in a style appropriate for children and young people, if 
necessary? Do you need a consent form for both young people and their 
parents/guardians? How will you gain consent if your research is collecting data online 
(e.g. using Qualtrics)? 
If participants agree to participate, they will be emailed a copy of the consent form, which 
they will be required to complete, sign and return. Verbal consent will also be obtained 
during the telephone call.  
 
16. Engaging in deception, if relevant: 
What will participants be told about the nature of the research? The amount of any 
information withheld and the delay in disclosing the withheld information should be kept 
to an absolute minimum. 
Participants will not be deceived in this study.  
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17. Right of withdrawal: 
In this section, and in your participant invitation letter, make it clear to participants that 
‘withdrawal’ will involve (1) participants being able to decide to not continue with 
participation in your research, and (2) the right to have the data they have supplied 
destroyed on request. You are asked to give participants a three-week window from the 
time they participate in your study to when they can withdraw their data. Make this clear 
in your participant invitation letter.  
 
Note: If your study involves data collection through Qualtrics, it is essential that 
you ask participants to provide their own participant code on Qualtrics (e.g. two 
letters and two numbers) so that you will be able to identify them if they later 
want to withdraw their data.  
 
To store the data, I will have three excel spreadsheets: one with demographic data and 
participant ID numbers; another with the Q factor results which only has Participant ID 
numbers; and one with participant ID codes as well as names/contact details. These 
spreadsheets will be stored by the researcher as a password protected file on a 
password protected computer, which only the researcher can access.  
The latter excel spreadsheet, which links participants ID codes with names/ contact 
details is required to enable me to email participants the debrief sheet in case of any 
queries from them, to ask them how they sorted the items, and to ensure that I can 
remove their data if they request that I do so. This will be deleted at the end of the study. 
Besides this, I will be using ID codes throughout the entirety of the study.  
In the letter e-mailed to each participant, they will be informed of their right to withdraw 
from the study. Participants will be able to decide to not continue with participation in the 
research, and will be informed of their right to have the data that they have supplied 
destroyed on request. Participants will be given a three-week window from the time they 
participated in the study to when they can withdraw their data (they will be provided with 
the exact date that they can withdraw by). After this point, the excel spreadsheet which 
connects them to their data will have been destroyed and so their data will no longer be 
identifiable and thus no longer possible to extract/ remove.  
 
18. Will the data be gathered anonymously?  
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This is where you will not know the names and contact details of your participants? In 
qualitative research that involves interviews, data is not collected anonymously because 
you will know the names and contact details of your participants.     
No 
  
19. If NO what steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality and protect the identity 
of participants?  
How will the names and contact details of participants be stored and who will have 
access? Will real names and identifying references be omitted from the reporting of data 
and transcripts etc? What will happen to the data after the study is over? Usually data 
will be destroyed after a study is over but if there is a possibility of you developing your 
research (for publication, for example) you may not want to destroy all data at the end of 
the study. If not destroying your data at the end of the study, what will be kept, how, and 
for how long? (suggested time is two years). It is advised that you destroy all names and 
contact details of participants at the end of your study regardless of how long will keep 
your data for. Make this clear in your participant invitation letter. 
The online programme will require participant codes only to ensure that the data 
remains anonymous. However, I will be personally following each participant up with a 
debrief letter and asking participants to explain their ratings (as the online programme 
doesn’t enable this).  
Data will be anonymised to analyse, but an excel spreadsheet with their identifiable 
information will be stored by the researcher as a password protected file on a password 
protected computer, which only the researcher can access. All names and contact 
details of participants will be destroyed at the end of study. Other data will be retained for 
five years before being destroyed.  
 
20. Will participants be paid or reimbursed? 
This is not necessary but payment/reimbursement must be in the form of redeemable 
vouchers and not cash. Please note that the School cannot fund participant payment.                              
  
NO 
 
SECTION 4. Other permissions and ethical clearances 
 
21. Research involving the NHS in England 
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Is HRA approval for research involving the NHS required?   NO 
Please see Page 1 of this application for important information and link 
 
Will the research involve NHS employees who will not be directly recruited 
through the NHS and where data from NHS employees will not be collected on 
NHS premises?           
   NO 
 
If you work for an NHS Trust and plan to recruit colleagues from the Trust will 
permission from an appropriate member of staff at the Trust be sought and is a 
copy of this permission (can be an email from the Trust) attached to this 
application? 
           NO 
 
22. Permission(s) from an external institution/organisation (e.g. a school, charity, 
workplace, local authority, care home etc.)?  
You need to attach written permission from external 
institutions/organisations/workplaces if they are helping you with recruitment and/or data 
collection, if you are collecting data on their premises, or if you are using any material 
owned by the institution/organisation. 
 
Is permission from an external institution/organisation/workplace required?  NO 
 
If YES please give the name and address of the 
institution/organisation/workplace: 
 
COPIES OF PERMISSIONS (LETTER OR EMAIL) MUST BE ATTACHED TO THIS 
APPLICATION 
 
In some cases you may be required to have formal ethical clearance from the external 
institution or organisation or workplace too. 
 
23. Is ethical clearance required from any other ethics committee?        
      NO 
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If YES please give the name and address of the organisation: 
        
 
 
       Has such ethical clearance been obtained yet?              N/A 
 
       If NO why not? 
 
 
If YES, please attach a scanned copy of the ethical approval letter. A copy of an 
email from the organisation confirming its ethical clearance is acceptable. 
 
Ethical approval from the School of Psychology can be gained before approval from 
another research ethics committee is obtained. However, recruitment and data 
collection are NOT to commence until your research has been approved by the School 
and other ethics committee/s as may be necessary 
  
SECTION 5. Risk Assessment 
 
If you have serious concerns about the safety of a participant, or others, during the 
course of your research please see your supervisor as soon as possible. 
 
If there is any unexpected occurrence while you are collecting your data (e.g. a 
participant or the researcher injures themselves), please report this to your supervisor as 
soon as possible. 
 
24. Protection of participants:  
Are there any potential hazards to participants or any risk of accident or injury to them? 
What is the nature of these hazards or risks (can be physical, emotional or 
psychological)? How will the safety and well-being of participants be ensured? Will 
contact details of an appropriate support organisation or agency will be made available 
to participants in your debrief sheet, particularly if the research is of a sensitive nature or 
potentially distressing? 
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The support organisation or agency that you refer participants to in your debrief letter 
should be appropriate. That is, is there a more appropriate support organisation than the 
Samaritans, for example (i.e. anxiety, mental health, young people telephone support 
help-lines? 
 
There are no foreseen potential hazards to participants or any risk of accident or injury to 
them. The safety and well-being of participants will be ensured by offering them with the 
contact details for further psychological support, should they find the nature or content of 
the research study distressing.  
Participants will be provided with the contact details for the Samaritans, advised to 
discuss any concerns with their GP, and also given information about IAPT services.  
 
25. Protection of the researcher: 
Will you be knowingly exposed to any health and safety risks? If equipment is being 
used is there any risk of accident or injury to you and how will you mitigate this? If 
interviewing participants in their homes will a third party be told of place and time and 
when you have left a participant’s house? 
 
No health risks are foreseen as the study will be conducted online.  
 
26. Debriefing participants: 
How will participants be de-briefed? Will participants be informed about the true nature 
of the research if they are not told beforehand? Will contact details of a support 
organisation be made available to participants via the debrief letter? All student research 
must involve a debrief letter for participants (unless the research involves anonymous 
surveys) so please attach a copy of your debrief letter to this application (see page 12). 
Participants will be e-mailed information about the nature of the research prior to 
participation. Participants will be debriefed via telephone. They will also be sent a debrief 
letter (See Appendix D), which will contain the details of support organisations if they feel 
that they need them.  
 
27. Other: Is there anything else the reviewer of this application needs to know to make 
a properly informed assessment? 
No 
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28. Will your research involve working with children or vulnerable adults?*   
                   NO 
           
   
If YES have you obtained and attached a DBS certificate?          N/A  
                     
 
If your research involves young people under 16 years of age and young people 
of limited competence will parental/guardian consent be obtained.   
                  N/A 
 
If NO please give reasons. (Note that parental consent is always required for 
participants who are 16 years of age and younger) 
 
 
 
* You are required to have DBS clearance if your participant group involves (1) children 
and young people who are 16 years of age or under, and (2) ‘vulnerable’ people aged 
16 and over with psychiatric illnesses, people who receive domestic care, elderly people 
(particularly those in nursing homes), people in palliative care, and people living in 
institutions and sheltered accommodation, and people who have been involved in the 
criminal justice system, for example. Vulnerable people are understood to be persons 
who are not necessarily able to freely consent to participating in your research, or who 
may find it difficult to withhold consent. If in doubt about the extent of the vulnerability of 
your intended participant group, speak to your supervisor. Methods that maximise the 
understanding and ability of vulnerable people to give consent should be used 
whenever possible. For more information about ethical research involving children see:  
 
https://uelac.sharepoint.com/ResearchInnovationandEnterprise/Pages/Research-
involving-children.aspx 
 
 
29 Will you be collecting data overseas?              NO 
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This includes collecting data while you are away from the UK on holiday or visiting your 
country of origin, and distance learning students who will be collecting data in their 
overseas country of residence. 
 
If YES in what country or countries will you be collecting data? 
Please click on this link https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice and note in the 
space below what the UK Government is recommending about travel to that 
country/province (Please note that you MUST NOT travel to a country/province/area 
that is deemed to be high risk or where essential travel only is recommended by the UK 
Government. If you are unsure it is essential that you speak to your supervisor or the 
UEL Travel Office – travelúel.ac.uk / (0)20 8223 6801). 
 
 
SECTION 6. Declarations 
 
Declaration by student:  
 
I confirm that I have discussed the ethics and feasibility of this research proposal with 
my supervisor. 
                                                                                            
Student's name: xxxx  
                                                      
                                         
Student's number:   U1725752                                     Date: 13/03/2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Supervisor’s declaration of support is given upon their electronic submission of 
the application 
 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION  
 
For research involving human participants 
BSc/MSc/MA/Professional Doctorates in Clinical, Counselling and Educational 
Psychology 
 
 
REVIEWER: Rona Hart 
 
SUPERVISOR: xxxx     
 
STUDENT: xxxx      
 
Course: Professional Clinical Psychology Doctorate  
 
Title of proposed study: TBC  
 
 
DECISION OPTIONS:  
 
APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been granted 
from the date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is submitted for 
assessment/examination. 
 
APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE 
RESEARCH COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In this circumstance, 
re-submission of an ethics application is not required but the student must confirm with 
their supervisor that all minor amendments have been made before the research 
commences. Students are to do this by filling in the confirmation box below when all 
amendments have been attended to and emailing a copy of this decision notice to 
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her/his supervisor for their records. The supervisor will then forward the student’s 
confirmation to the School for its records.  
 
NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION REQUIRED (see 
Major Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a revised ethics application must 
be submitted and approved before any research takes place. The revised application 
will be reviewed by the same reviewer. If in doubt, students should ask their supervisor 
for support in revising their ethics application.  
 
DECISION ON THE ABOVE-NAMED PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY 
(Please indicate the decision according to one of the 3 options above) 
 
APPROVED 
 
 
Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
Major amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before 
starting my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature):  
Student number:    
 
Date:  
 
(Please submit a copy of this decision letter to your supervisor with this box completed, if 
minor amendments to your ethics application are required) 
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ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 
Has an adequate risk assessment been offered in the application form? 
 
YES / NO  
 
Please request resubmission with an adequate risk assessment 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, 
physical or health and safety hazard? Please rate the degree of risk: 
 
 
HIGH 
 
Please do not approve a high risk application and refer to the Chair of Ethics. Travel to 
countries/provinces/areas deemed to be high risk should not be permitted and an 
application not approved on this basis. If unsure please refer to the Chair of Ethics. 
 
 
MEDIUM (Please approve but with appropriate recommendations) 
 
LOW 
 
 
Reviewer comments in relation to researcher risk (if any).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
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Reviewer (Typed name to act as signature):   Dr Rona Hart  
 
Date:  12th Apr 2019 
 
This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study on 
behalf of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PLEASE NOTE: 
 
For the researcher and participants involved in the above named study to be covered by 
UEL’s Insurance, prior ethics approval from the School of Psychology (acting on behalf 
of the UEL Research Ethics Committee), and confirmation from students where minor 
amendments were required, must be obtained before any research takes place.  
 
 
For a copy of UELs Personal Accident & Travel Insurance Policy, please see the Ethics 
Folder in the Psychology Noticeboard 
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UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology 
 
 
REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT TO AN ETHICS APPLICATION 
 
 
 FOR BSc, MSc/MA & TAUGHT PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE STUDENTS  
 
 
 
Please complete this form if you are requesting approval for proposed amendment(s) to 
an ethics application that has been approved by the School of Psychology. 
 
Note that approval must be given for significant change to research procedure that 
impacts on ethical protocol. If you are not sure about whether your proposed 
amendment warrants approval consult your supervisor or contact Dr Tim Lomas (Chair 
of the School Research Ethics Committee. t.lomas@uel.ac.uk). 
 
 
HOW TO COMPLETE & SUBMIT THE REQUEST  
 
Complete the request form electronically and accurately. 
Type your name in the ‘student’s signature’ section (page 2). 
When submitting this request form, ensure that all necessary documents are attached 
(see below).  
Using your UEL email address, email the completed request form along with associated 
documents to: Dr Tim Lomas at t.lomas@uel.ac.uk 
Your request form will be returned to you via your UEL email address with reviewer’s 
response box completed. This will normally be within five days. Keep a copy of the 
approval to submit with your project/dissertation/thesis. 
Recruitment and data collection are not to commence until your proposed amendment 
has been approved. 
 
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS 
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A copy of your previously approved ethics application with proposed amendments(s) 
added as tracked changes.  
Copies of updated documents that may relate to your proposed amendment(s). For 
example an updated recruitment notice, updated participant information letter, updated 
consent form etc.  
A copy of the approval of your initial ethics application. 
Name of applicant:  xxx     
Programme of study:  Doctorate of Clinical Psychology   
Title of research: What makes a belief seem implausible to others? A Q 
methodology study of conspiracy beliefs 
Name of supervisor: Dr xxxx    
 
 
Briefly outline the nature of your proposed amendment(s) and associated rationale(s) in 
the boxes below 
 
Proposed amendment Rationale 
The title of my research project 
 
 
 
 
To ensure that the title of the project has 
the same title on the ethical approval 
letter, and the application for examination 
arrangements 
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Please tick YES NO 
Is your supervisor aware of your proposed amendment(s) and 
agree to them? 
X  
 
 
Student’s signature (please type your name): xxxxx  
 
Date:  17.03.2020   
 
 
 
 
 
TO BE COMPLETED BY REVIEWER 
 
 
Amendment(s) approved 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer: Tim Lomas 
 
Date:  17.3.20 
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Appendix J – Debrief Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Debrief Sheet Following Participation in this Research 
Study 
 
 
What makes a belief seem implausible to others?  A Q methodology study of 
conspiracy beliefs 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this research study.  
 
The aim of this study was to explore how members of the general public 
understand conspiracy theories and how they determine their plausibility. This 
will provide insight into how people make judgements about the plausibility of a 
range of beliefs and will help us to gain a better understanding of what factors 
may cause people to question the plausibility of a speaker’s beliefs. This will 
potentially have numerous ethical, clinical and practical implications. 
 
As a final part of this study, I would also like to understand how people made 
choices about the statements and so I would be grateful if you could email me 
about this.  Focussing on the second Q-sort, think of the three items that you 
agreed with or disagreed with most strongly, and please briefly respond to this 
email, explaining why you rated them in that way. 
 
I would like to reiterate at this point that your data will be stored confidentially. If 
you choose to withdraw your data from the study, please let me know within 
three weeks. If you withdraw after this cut-off date, the researcher reserves the 
right to use your anonymised data as the analysis will have begun.   
 
If you have any further questions about the study, or require any further support, 
please do contact me. Alternatively, if taking part in this study has caused you 
to experience any discomfort or distress, and you feel that you would like to talk 
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to someone further about this, there are a number of organisations that you can 
contact. As a first point of call, your GP will be able to inform you of specific 
local organisations that would be able to access. However, there are also 
national organisations that you can contact, such as the Samaritans. They can 
be contacted via their free number which is 116 123.  
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Appendix K - PQMethod ‘Unrotated factor matrix’ output 
  
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Factor 
6 
Factor 
7 
Factor 
8 
1 0.8537 
-
0.2759 
-
0.1859 
-
0.0552 0.1077 
-
0.0746 0.0421 0.133 
p2 0.793 0.0242 0.1193 
-
0.0355 0.2717 0.1126 
-
0.1195 
-
0.1136 
p3 
-
0.0058 0.2636 0.155 
-
0.0668 0.4224 0.3547 0.1701 
-
0.3689 
p4 0.4852 
-
0.3374 0.4408 0.3361 -0.181 0.1067 0.2336 0.1182 
p5 0.4116 0.4013 0.1194 
-
0.2466 
-
0.0009 0.4679 0.2555 0.0855 
p6 0.2669 0.2013 0.6824 0.028 
-
0.0919 
-
0.1165 
-
0.0693 -0.026 
p7 0.3599 0.1775 0.0316 
-
0.5121 
-
0.1146 
-
0.1462 
-
0.0313 -0.186 
p8 0.7533 0.1269 
-
0.1128 0.0807 0.0315 
-
0.1613 -0.381 0.0361 
p9 0.7151 
-
0.2558 
-
0.1322 0.0537 
-
0.4207 
-
0.1231 0.0942 
-
0.1593 
p10 0.5938 
-
0.2377 
-
0.1119 
-
0.1785 0.4105 0.3075 0.0368 
-
0.0053 
p11 0.6476 0.466 
-
0.0985 0.2689 0.2799 
-
0.0933 
-
0.1771 0.0842 
p12 0.4791 0.4832 0.071 -0.06 
-
0.2122 
-
0.1158 0.3392 
-
0.0789 
p13 0.597 0.4502 0.0853 -0.045 -0.086 0.1351 0.0591 0.1916 
p14 0.7059 
-
0.2034 
-
0.4114 0.0257 
-
0.2862 0.0823 
-
0.1027 
-
0.0211 
p15 0.7014 
-
0.1165 0.1665 0.117 0.2552 
-
0.3263 -0.164 
-
0.1058 
p16 0.3578 0.2635 0.2023 0.6451 0.0411 0.1266 
-
0.2833 0.1331 
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p17 0.2394 0.4394 
-
0.1409 
-
0.3086 
-
0.0856 
-
0.0608 
-
0.1278 0.5854 
p18 0.252 0.6866 0.022 
-
0.3512 
-
0.1136 0.1154 0.2173 0.0504 
p19 0.7903 
-
0.0135 
-
0.2511 0.0503 
-
0.0368 0.2066 
-
0.1746 
-
0.2137 
p20 0.3598 0.4476 
-
0.5011 
-
0.1176 
-
0.1541 0.0941 0.1631 
-
0.1757 
p21 0.6487 
-
0.1838 
-
0.2396 0.2981 -0.343 
-
0.0061 0.0202 
-
0.0439 
p22 0.6705 0.2105 -0.301 0.4743 0.0435 -0.177 
-
0.0456 
-
0.0209 
p23 0.6321 0.5703 0.1967 
-
0.0586 
-
0.0264 
-
0.1642 0.1482 
-
0.1503 
p24 0.672 
-
0.3488 0.1268 0.028 0.2245 0.0888 
-
0.3148 0.2368 
p25 0.739 
-
0.3227 0.0355 
-
0.0061 0.0744 
-
0.0553 
-
0.1655 
-
0.2742 
p26 
-
0.2763 0.0189 0.0005 
-
0.3006 
-
0.1452 0.2623 
-
0.4344 
-
0.2147 
p27 0.5391 
-
0.0456 
-
0.0256 
-
0.3275 0.0695 
-
0.1832 
-
0.2638 0.2873 
p28 0.4834 
-
0.2021 0.1129 0.3857 0.1335 
-
0.2734 0.3849 0.1401 
p29 0.2314 
-
0.2189 0.4695 
-
0.3199 0.3278 
-
0.3335 0.0723 
-
0.2629 
p30 0.7629 -0.184 
-
0.0857 
-
0.2023 
-
0.1976 0.0484 
-
0.0082 
-
0.2132 
p31 0.3367 0.0815 
-
0.3319 
-
0.2252 0.3696 
-
0.0727 
-
0.0092 0.1355 
p32 0.7361 
-
0.2319 0.2931 
-
0.1432 0.2923 
-
0.1666 0.1562 0.0829 
p33 0.72 0.1822 0.1959 
-
0.0152 0.0146 0.0788 
-
0.1244 
-
0.1917 
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p34 0.7457 -0.092 
-
0.0032 
-
0.1613 0.0641 0.3663 
-
0.0734 
-
0.2389 
p35 0.7639 0.0351 0.0949 0.0383 -0.165 0.2246 
-
0.0013 0.2278 
p36 0.3001 
-
0.4668 0.3695 
-
0.2571 
-
0.0001 0.3359 0.0269 0.1484 
p37 0.7683 
-
0.3783 0.2134 
-
0.0346 
-
0.1338 -0.146 0.1983 0.0547 
p38 0.8536 
-
0.2334 
-
0.2882 -0.115 -0.019 
-
0.0361 0.0189 
-
0.0144 
p39 0.8372 0.0926 
-
0.1054 0.0478 
-
0.1597 
-
0.0615 -0.153 0.0901 
p40 0.1294 0.7343 0.0029 
-
0.0863 0.0368 0.2013 0.0745 0.1065 
p41 0.8754 0.0054 
-
0.0369 -0.055 
-
0.2939 0.0604 
-
0.1646 
-
0.0839 
p42 0.3408 0.3244 
-
0.1721 0.4989 0.3668 0.0074 0.1934 
-
0.1892 
p43 0.6796 0.2108 
-
0.2674 0.0758 
-
0.0273 
-
0.1181 0.3657 
-
0.2221 
p44 0.3774 0.1173 0.6875 
-
0.2273 
-
0.1045 
-
0.0824 0.0844 0.0356 
p45 0.6677 0.3915 0.2098 
-
0.0769 0.1431 
-
0.0631 
-
0.1352 0.1242 
p46 0.6834 0.142 0.0284 
-
0.3038 
-
0.1489 
-
0.1833 
-
0.1937 
-
0.1442 
p47 0.6918 0.3275 0.1048 0.0314 
-
0.2758 -0.462 0.0038 0.0422 
p48 0.6909 
-
0.1556 
-
0.2101 
-
0.2713 0.0521 0.0472 0.0384 0.0278 
p49 0.6367 -0.464 
-
0.0799 
-
0.1893 0.0864 -0.102 0.0873 0.0038 
p50 0.6011 
-
0.3685 
-
0.2235 
-
0.1328 0.2819 
-
0.0693 0.3096 0.1857 
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p51 0.652 0.1762 0.0369 0.2161 0.5293 0.2222 
-
0.1063 0.0083 
p52 0.8273 0.2349 0.0509 0.1751 0.037 
-
0.0007 
-
0.0084 
-
0.1925 
p53 0.6188 -0.493 0.1356 0.0986 
-
0.2414 0.1141 0.0743 
-
0.0234 
p54 0.6815 0.1501 0.0788 0.1164 
-
0.0977 0.1639 0.0637 0.3686 
p55 0.305 
-
0.0401 0.4687 0.3841 
-
0.3455 0.416 
-
0.0878 -0.113 
p56 0.5591 
-
0.3746 
-
0.2011 0.017 
-
0.0328 0.3932 0.2711 0.1969 
p57 0.6367 -0.464 
-
0.1798 
-
0.2894 0.0864 -0.002 0.1873 0.0039 
                  
Eigenvalues 20.822 5.4076 3.3701 3.0111 2.5654 2.2567 1.8598 1.7776 
% expl.Var. 37 10 6 5 5 4 3 3 
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Appendix L – Alternative Factor Solutions for Q-Sort One  
 
Stage One: Exploratory. Include all of the factors. A principal component factor 
analysis revealed 14 factors with eigenvalues over 1. The Kaiser–
Guttman criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 1960, 1970) criterion states that all 
eigenvalues below 1 should be discarded. In PQMethod, a varimax rotation will 
only rotate a maximum of 8 factors, so 8 factors were included in the analysis.   
** Correlations were high between some factors, suggestive of a strong degree 
of overlap between factors. If two factor arrays are significantly correlated this 
may mean they are too alike to interpret as separate factors and that they could 
be alternative manifestations of a single viewpoint. 
 
Factor Eigenvalu
e 
% Variance 
before 
Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sort Loadings (Ps) 
1 20.82 37.18 23 1, 9, 14, 19, 21, 25, 30, 38, 39, 
41, 46, 48, 49, 53 
2 5.41 9.66 11 5, 12, 13, 18, 23, 40 
3 3.37 6.01 7  6, 29, 44 
4 3.01 5.38 10 11, 16, 42, 51 
5 2.57 4.58 4 3, 17 
6 2.26 4.03 5 4, 31, 55 
7 1.86 3.32 6 26, 28 
8 1.78 3.17 8 10, 36 
 
Stage Two: different criteria for selecting factors. 
Criteria One: Brown (1980) suggests that factors that have two or more 
significant factor loadings following extraction should be accepted. A significant 
factor loading at the 0.01 level can be calculated using the following equation 
(Brown, 1980: 222–3): 
Significant factor loading = 2.58 x (1/√no.items in q-sort) = 0.44 
A check of the factor loadings listed in the PQMethod ‘Unrotated factor 
matrix’ suggests that factors one (40), two (10), three (6), four (4) and six (2) all 
satisfy this criterion and could legitimately be extracted and rotated. Factors 5 
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and 8 only had 1 and 7 had none. I have therefore only rotated 5 factors to 
explore the outcome.  
Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts 
Loading (Ps) 
1 20.82 37.18 25 1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 19, 
24, 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 
37, 38, 48, 49, 50, 53, 
56 
2 5.41 9.66 15 5, 7, 12, 13, 17, 18, 
23, 40, 45, 46, 47 
3 3.37 6.01 7  4, 6, 44, 55 
4 3.01 5.38 10 11, 16, 22, 26, 42, 51 
5 2.57 4.58 6 3, 21,  
 
Criteria Two:  
The second method is Humphrey's rule, which ‘states that a factor is significant 
if the cross-product of its two highest loadings (ignoring the sign) exceeds twice 
the standard error’ (Brown, 1980: 223). The standard error is calculated as 
follows: 
Standard error = 1 / (√no. of items in qset) = 0.17. Twice the standard error is 
0.34. 
Looking at the ‘Unrotated factor matrix’, the two highest loadings on Factor 1 
are 0.85 and 0.86, which means that a cross-product for this factor of 0.73 (0.85 
× 0.86) and so this factor should be extracted.  
Factor 2 – 0.69 x 0.73 = 0.50 
Factor 3 – 0.69x0.68 = 0.47 
Factor 4 – 0.65 x 0.54 = 0.34 
Factor 5 – 0.53 x 0.42 = 0.22 
Factor 6 – 0.46 x 0.47 = 0.22 
Factor 7 – 0.43 x 0.38 = 0.16 
Factor 8 – 0.59 x 0.37 = 0.22 
 
Applying Humphrey's rule in this strict fashion suggests that only four factors 
should be extracted from the data set.  
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Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before 
Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts Loading (Ps) 
1 20.82 37.18 26 1, 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 19, 21, 24, 25, 
27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 
48, 49, 50, 53, 56 
2 5.41 9.66 14 5, 7, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23, 40, 45, 
47 
3 3.37 6.01 7  6, 29, 36, 44, 55 
4 3.01 5.38   58.23 11    16, 22, 26, 28, 42    44 
 
Criteria Three: Humphrey’s rule can, however, be applied less strictly by 
insisting that the cross-products simply exceed the standard error. In these 
circumstances, the extraction of seven factors would clearly be acceptable as 
seven factors are above 0.17. 
 
Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts 
Loading (Ps) 
1 20.82 37.18 26 1, 9, 10, 14, 19, 21, 
24, 25, 30, 34, 35, 37, 
38, 39, 41, 48, 49, 50, 
53, 56 
2 5.41 9.66 12 5, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 
23, 40 
3 3.37 6.01 7  6, 29, 44 
4 3.01 5.38 10 11, 16, 22, 51 
5 2.57 4.58 4 3 
6 2.26 4.03 6 4, 31, 55 
7 1.86 3.32 5 26, 28 
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Appendix M - Alterative Factor Solutions for Q-Sort Two 
Stage One: Exploratory. Include all of the factors. A principal component factor 
analysis revealed 17 factors with eigenvalues over 1. The Kaiser–
Guttman criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 1960, 1970) criterion states that all 
eigenvalues below 1 should be discarded. In PQMethod, a varimax rotation will 
only rotate a maximum of 8 factors, so 8 factors were included in the analysis.   
 
Factor Eigenvalu
e 
% Variance 
before 
Rotation 
% 
Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sort Loadings 
(Ps) 
1 33.1943 58.24 18 9, 38, 39, 41, 48, 50 
2 2.5487 4.47 3 26 
3 2.1273 3.73 7 31, 56 
4 1.9077 3.35 12 20, 27 
5 1.6500 2.89 17 1, 30 
6 1.5991 2.81 11 12, 44 
7 1.3267 2.33 7 5, 13, 29 
8 1.2260 2.15 4 17 
 
Stage Two: different criteria for selecting factors. 
Criteria One: Brown (1980) suggests that factors that have two or more 
significant factor loadings following extraction should be accepted. A significant 
factor loading at the 0.01 level can be calculated using the following equation 
(Brown, 1980: 222–3): 
Significant factor loading = 2.58 x (1/√no.items in q-sort) = 0.42 
A check of the factor loadings listed in the PQMethod ‘Unrotated factor 
matrix’ suggests that factors one (56), two (3) and four (2) satisfy this criterion 
and could legitimately be extracted and rotated. I have therefore only rotated 3 
factors to explore the outcome.  
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Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts 
Loading (Ps) 
1 33.1943 58.24 29 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 
17, 22, 23, 31, 34, 36, 
38, 39, 41, 43, 47, 48, 
50, 52, 54, 55, 57 
2 2.5487 4.47 13 5, 15, 26, 29, 37, 51 
3 2.1273 3.73 24 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 20, 
24, 27, 28, 33, 35, 40, 
42, 44, 46, 49, 53, 56 
 
Criteria Two:  
The second method is Humphrey's rule, which ‘states that a factor is significant 
if the cross-product of its two highest loadings (ignoring the sign) exceeds twice 
the standard error’ (Brown, 1980: 223). The standard error is calculated as 
follows: 
Standard error = 1 / (√no. of items in qset) = 0.164. Twice the standard error is 
0.329. 
Looking at the ‘Unrotated factor matrix’, the two highest loadings on Factor 1 
are 0.922 and 0.923, which means that a cross-product for this factor of 0.864 
(0.922 × 0.923) and so this factor should be extracted.  
Factor 2 – 0.565 x 0.641 = 0.362 
Factor 3 – 0.411x0.380 = 0.156 
Factor 4 – 0.479 x 0.431 = 0.206 
Factor 5 – 0.474 x 0.330 = 0.156 
Factor 6 – 0.395 x 0.457 = 0.180 
Factor 7 – 0.376 x 0.370 = 0.139 
Factor 8 – 0.407 x 0.378 = 0.153 
 
Applying Humphrey's rule in this strict fashion suggests that only two factors 
should be extracted from the data set.  
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Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before 
Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts Loading 
(Ps) 
1 33.1943 58.24 41 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 
17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 
35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 
43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 
52, 53, 54, 55, 57 
2 2.5487 4.47   62.71 22   63 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 
26, 29, 32, 37, 44, 51, 56 
 
Criteria Three: Humphrey’s rule can, however, be applied less strictly by 
insisting that the cross-products simply exceed the standard error. In these 
circumstances, the extraction of four factors would clearly be acceptable as 
seven factors are above 0.164. 
 
Factor Eigenvalue % Variance 
before Rotation 
% Variance 
after 
Rotation 
Number of Sorts 
Loading (Ps) 
1 33.1943 58.24 26 1, 8, 9, 11, 17, 22, 23, 
31, 36, 38, 39, 41, 47, 
48, 50, 54, 55  
2 2.5487 4.47 14 5, 13, 15, 29, 37 
3 2.1273 3.73 20 20: 7, 10, 12, 16, 18, 
20, 24, 40, 44, 46, 53, 
56 
4 1.9077 3.35   69.79 10   70 10: 3, 26, 27 
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Appendix N – Factor Loadings for Q-Sort One  
Statements Factors 
 One  Two Three Four Five 
Conspiracy believers spend a lot of time 
reading about conspiracies on the internet     
1 3 3 3 1 
Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators 
act in secret              
1 2 4 4 0 
Conspiracy beliefs can be fun and 
entertaining  
 -2       0 4 4 2 
People enjoy talking to conspiracy believers -1 -1 3 3 -2 
 
Conspiracy beliefs assume that events are 
caused by large groups of conspirators acting 
independently 
-1 -2 -2 0 -1 
Conspiracy beliefs are logical and rational -4       
 
0 -2 1 -2 
Conspiracy believers are crucial in exposing 
real-life conspiracies (e.g. Watergate)  
0       4 -1 -1 -3 
Conspiracy believers think that the media 
routinely expose conspiracy theories 
-1      
 
-3 0 0 -1 
Conspiracy believers distrust academic 
researchers and scientists 
2       0 0 0 2 
Conspiracy believers think that all important 
information is being shared with the public 
-3      -4 -3 -4 -2 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are 
often powerful elites 
0       4 0 3 0 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs are 
often governments or officials  
0       3 1 2 1 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs rarely 
involve people from religious groups (e.g. 
Jews, Muslims etc.)  
-2 -2 -3 -2 -4 
Conspiracy beliefs take accepted facts but 
then make a big leap of faith to reach 
3      -2 -4 1 0 
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conclusions that aren’t supported by the 
facts. 
Conspiracy believers think events happen 
because of the planned actions of small 
groups, rather than broader forces like 
economic or political systems 
1       1 -2 -1 3 
Conspiracy beliefs assume that conspirators 
manipulate events to serve their own interests 
2       2 -1 2 -2 
Conspiracy believers do not believe that there 
is an intentional plan behind world events  
-2      -3 -1 -4 -2 
Conspiracy believers believe that they are the 
only ones who understand ‘what is really 
going on’  
3      1 1 1 2 
Conspiracy beliefs are so complex that it can 
be hard to definitively disprove them 
1       0 0 -1 -4 
Conspiracy believers think that all politicians 
and officials are corrupt 
-1       0 -2 -1 3 
The conspirators in conspiracy beliefs do not 
typically involve intelligence agencies 
-1      -3 -1 -2 2 
Conspiracy beliefs can have serious negative 
consequences, such as parents not 
vaccinating their children 
 
4       1 4 0 1 
A lot of people believe in conspiracies 0      -1 3 3 -3 
Conspiracy beliefs lead to some groups of 
society being treated badly  
0       1 2 0 0 
Conspiracy believers see those who disagree 
with them as hoodwinked or deluded 
2       2 1 1 4 
People use the term ‘conspiracy theorist’ as a 
way of undermining a view they disagree with 
0       3 2 -3 -1 
Conspiracy believers assume that there is 
only one explanation for an event when, in 
fact, there are a number of equally plausible 
explanations 
3      -1 1 0 1 
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Conspiracy believers think that there are no 
hidden connections or patterns behind world 
events 
-3      -4 0 -3 -1 
Conspiracy beliefs have caused a destructive 
level of mistrust in society 
1       0 1 -2 1 
Conspiracy believers interpret facts to fit their 
predetermined theory 
4      -1 2 2 3 
Conspiracy beliefs are based on evidence, 
rather than innuendo and suspicion  
-4       1 -3 -1 -1 
Conspiracy believers reinforce each other's 
ideas  
2       2 2 1 3 
Conspiracy beliefs prevent elites from gaining 
too much power 
-2      -2 -1 -3 0 
Conspiracy believers are happy to change 
their belief when they are presented with 
evidence which challenges it 
-3 -1 0 -2 -3 
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Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
Factor 
6 
Factor 
7 
Factor 
8 
p1 0.861 0.049 
-
0.3333 
-
0.0171 
-
0.2204 
-
0.0538 0.0613 0.0269 
p2 0.7812 0.1167 0.0144 
-
0.1862 
-
0.3304 0.0128 0.0636 
-
0.0504 
p3 0.622 
-
0.0523 0.0658 0.4792 
-
0.2352 
-
0.0703 
-
0.0883 
-
0.0043 
p4 0.6373 
-
0.2529 
-
0.1285 0.1783 0.2621 
-
0.1115 
-
0.2097 0.4078 
p5 0.5472 0.3263 
-
0.1871 0.3676 0.1651 0.3958 0.1182 0.045 
p6 0.8623 
-
0.0249 
-
0.0827 0.1453 
-
0.1296 
-
0.1461 -0.091 0.1679 
p7 0.8601 0.247 0.1477 0.0141 
-
0.0039 0.1998 -0.098 
-
0.0683 
p8 0.9109 
-
0.0476 
-
0.1789 
-
0.0254 
-
0.2244 
-
0.0597 0.0523 
-
0.0201 
p9 0.7837 
-
0.3227 0.045 
-
0.0204 0.0837 0.1244 
-
0.0222 
-
0.2461 
p10 0.6614 0.2719 0.2227 0.0144 
-
0.2754 0.1183 -0.138 0.3785 
p11 0.8733 
-
0.0293 
-
0.0826 
-
0.1476 0.0136 0.1163 
-
0.0189 
-
0.0077 
p12 0.4604 0.5653 0.3805 0.057 0.0899 0.0998 -0.001 
-
0.0584 
p13 0.6945 0.1236 
-
0.2043 0.4316 0.0869 
-
0.0527 0.2788 0.2264 
p14 0.747 
-
0.3968 
-
0.0479 0.0976 0.2085 
-
0.1737 0.0397 
-
0.1457 
p15 0.7209 0.2726 
-
0.3448 0.0623 
-
0.1062 0.0809 0.0279 
-
0.2531 
p16 0.7813 0.2674 0.1568 
-
0.1328 0.1096 0.0203 
-
0.0028 0.0213 
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p17 0.5407 
-
0.0822 -0.295 
-
0.1861 0.1891 0.2641 
-
0.2584 0.3531 
p18 0.6176 
-
0.0238 0.2902 
-
0.3053 0.0868 
-
0.0552 0.0694 
-
0.2254 
p19 0.8281 0.155 
-
0.1717 0.0149 0.1386 -0.025 
-
0.1446 
-
0.1536 
p20 0.6594 
-
0.0394 0.3609 0.1339 
-
0.0085 
-
0.0613 
-
0.2253 
-
0.0384 
p21 0.9024 0.1296 
-
0.1071 
-
0.0811 0.0131 
-
0.1669 
-
0.0788 0.0344 
p22 0.9218 
-
0.0048 
-
0.1618 
-
0.0748 0.1145 
-
0.1162 
-
0.0411 0.0408 
p23 0.9233 
-
0.1462 
-
0.0078 
-
0.0888 0.1222 
-
0.1611 
-
0.0506 
-
0.0483 
p24 0.7547 -0.021 0.277 
-
0.0606 
-
0.1352 
-
0.3554 
-
0.0216 0.064 
p25 0.8614 0.0371 0.1028 0.0539 -0.03 
-
0.0423 
-
0.1681 
-
0.1474 
p26 0.0032 0.6411 
-
0.1022 
-
0.3065 0.4744 
-
0.3509 
-
0.0655 
-
0.0489 
p27 0.6182 
-
0.2648 0.249 0.3537 0.235 
-
0.2445 
-
0.0666 0.0726 
p28 0.6726 0.115 0.1364 0.11 0.2122 
-
0.2025 
-
0.0454 
-
0.1616 
p29 0.4387 0.4264 
-
0.3217 0.2341 
-
0.1411 
-
0.2767 0.3769 -0.142 
p30 0.8236 0.0514 0.052 
-
0.1436 
-
0.3099 
-
0.1952 
-
0.0519 
-
0.0652 
p31 0.5037 
-
0.0685 0.0005 -0.38 
-
0.2803 -0.1 0.2674 0.2493 
p32 0.7946 0.2443 
-
0.0426 0.1367 0.12 0.2752 
-
0.0584 0.0781 
p33 0.8265 0.1017 0.1114 0.0915 0.077 0.0645 0.0887 0.108 
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p34 0.9181 
-
0.0029 
-
0.0737 
-
0.0492 0.0184 
-
0.1593 
-
0.1323 
-
0.0516 
p35 0.9022 0.0354 0.1169 
-
0.1035 
-
0.1808 
-
0.1326 
-
0.1324 0.071 
p36 0.8234 -0.143 0.0351 
-
0.1057 0.2552 0.1481 
-
0.0997 0.0551 
p37 0.7849 0.2787 
-
0.1341 0.1414 -0.18 
-
0.0397 
-
0.1372 0.1213 
p38 0.8626 -0.121 
-
0.1165 
-
0.0979 0.1475 0.0277 0.2042 
-
0.0964 
p39 0.7946 
-
0.2558 
-
0.0764 
-
0.1544 0.1681 0.2569 0.1062 
-
0.0392 
40 0.7396 
-
0.0303 0.411 
-
0.1668 
-
0.1021 0.223 0.3084 
-
0.0337 
p41 0.7465 
-
0.1931 
-
0.1235 -0.068 0.1513 0.0141 0.3709 0.004 
p42 0.7754 
-
0.0112 0.2281 0.2278 0.0697 0.1436 
-
0.1832 
-
0.1164 
p43 0.8595 
-
0.1947 -0.044 0.0368 
-
0.1802 
-
0.1007 
-
0.1123 
-
0.1035 
p44 0.7323 0.1576 0.1585 
-
0.1815 
-
0.1826 0.4574 
-
0.1076 
-
0.0234 
p45 0.8716 
-
0.0786 0.1117 -0.063 0.1361 
-
0.0423 
-
0.0277 0.0264 
p46 0.8792 
-
0.0311 0.2594 0.0088 0.0941 0.0819 0.0159 
-
0.0782 
p47 0.8733 
-
0.0599 
-
0.0794 
-
0.1929 0.0046 0.0199 0.1267 0.1581 
p48 0.8166 
-
0.0952 
-
0.0298 
-
0.1942 0.1358 0.0618 0.0846 0.038 
p49 0.7308 
-
0.1007 0.172 0.3178 
-
0.1032 0.0385 0.1059 -0.214 
p50 0.8154 
-
0.0926 
-
0.3291 
-
0.2458 0.1112 0.0252 -0.04 -0.108 
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p51 0.7594 0.3613 
-
0.2326 
-
0.1173 0.0111 
-
0.0829 
-
0.1577 
-
0.0538 
p52 0.8604 
-
0.0282 
-
0.1044 0.14 0.0186 0.1226 0.0806 
-
0.1627 
p53 0.7282 -0.076 0.2613 0.0012 0.0444 
-
0.2786 0.1538 0.1386 
p54 0.8557 
-
0.2815 
-
0.1027 
-
0.0531 
-
0.1939 0.0988 
-
0.0257 
-
0.0548 
p55 0.7331 
-
0.2981 
-
0.2562 0.043 
-
0.2289 0.0316 
-
0.1956 0.0042 
p56 0.5802 0.1216 0.2934 
-
0.1061 0.0854 
-
0.0569 0.2879 0.3062 
p57 0.6503 
-
0.1144 0.0065 0.273 0.0712 0.1082 0.3012 0.0941 
                  
Eigenvalues 33.1943 2.5487 2.1273 1.9077 1.65 1.5991 1.3267 1.226 
% expl.Var. 58 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 
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 Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
When a majority of academic researchers and 
scientists endorse the belief 
4 3 3 4 
When the believer is very sociable and has lots 
of friends 
0 0 -1 -1 
When the belief appears to be hypothetically 
possible  
2       4 1 1 
When the believer is highly educated  2 2 0 0 
When the evidence for and against the belief is 
confusing 
-1      -3 -1 1 
When the believer seems indiscriminately 
suspicious 
-2      -4 -2 -1 
When the believer is from a different social 
group (cultural, ethnic, religious, political etc.) 
to you 
0 0 -1 -1 
When the belief seems to involve jumping to a 
particular conclusion not supported by the 
evidence 
-3 -4 -4 0 
When most people you know don’t believe it 0      -2 0 1 
When the belief pins the blame for something 
on an identifiable group of people rather than 
something more abstract 
0       0 -1 -2 
When the conspiracy would have required lots 
of different people to co-operate  
-2       1 1 3 
When someone you think is credible believes it  3       2 1 0 
When the belief is based on several different 
independent sources of evidence 
4 0 4 2 
When the believer will change their mind in 
light of evidence which contradicts the belief 
1      -1 -1 1 
When the believer seems to spend a lot of time 
on conspiracy websites  
-1      -1 0 1 
When official sources (e.g. government 
reports) do not support it  
0      -1 1 0 
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When the believer does not seem gullible or 
naïve 
1       1 1 3 
When the belief is presented in an incoherent 
and hard to follow manner 
-3 1 0 -3 
When the belief is supported by a 
whistleblower who has had access to secret 
information 
3 1 4 -2 
When the believer only seems to talk to people 
who agree with them 
-1 -1 -3 -2 
When experts seem to disagree about the 
belief 
-1 -3 -1 -3 
When the believer is not obsessed by the belief 1 0 0 0 
When the belief seems to be the simplest 
explanation of the evidence 
1 1 2 1 
When the believer can provide persuasive 
evidence for it 
3 2 3 2 
When the believer seems eccentric or odd  -1 -2 -1 0 
When the believer seems to be open-minded 
about alternative explanations when they 
weigh up the evidence  
2 3 3 4 
When the conclusions reached seem to go 
beyond the evidence 
-3 -1 2 -1 
When you are aware of strong evidence which 
contradicts the belief 
-4 -3 -4 2 
When the belief fits with my own political views 1 0 0 -1 
When the believer appears to have mental 
health difficulties  
-1 -2 -2 -1 
When the belief seems to be based on opinion 
rather than fact 
-4 -2 -3 -3 
When the argument for a belief seems circular -2 1 -2 -4 
When the belief doesn’t involve making too 
many assumptions 
2 2 2 3 
When the belief just seems intuitively right 1 4 2 2 
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When the believer does not get overly 
emotional about the belief 
0 3 0 0 
When the believer only cites evidence which 
supports their belief and does not mention 
anything which might contradict it 
-2 -1 -3 -2 
When the belief seems to be unquestioned 
within the believer’s social group 
0 0 -2 -4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
